«Caruana miscarried the clear choice agreed on Gibraltar» At - TopicsExpress



          

«Caruana miscarried the clear choice agreed on Gibraltar» At some point in his term, all-or almost all Spanish governments have faced the Gibraltar dispute with the United Kingdom to enforce the Spanish claim of sovereignty over the territory and manage diverse and disturbing consequences involved the persistence of the last colonial situation in Europe. We did so with the intention of giving a decisive impulse to the solution of the dispute, opening according to a formula as realistic as possible but all that was necessary unequivocal as to the claim of sovereignty by Spain. The July 12, 2002, the British foreign minister, Jack Straw, formally announced to the House of Commons that the two countries had reached an agreement in principle about the joint sovereignty over Gibraltar, and confirmed that the talks would continue after the summer with the goal of reaching a global agreement. Had advanced to the point that he had never reached to an agreement that the dispute with encarrilara real change, balanced with future travel for the full reintegration of the territory sovereignty over Gibraltar. Shortly after we arrived the Government, the Minister Abel Matutes and cosovereignty discussed as a way that we had to explore. The message was on the table to pick up where it had conditions. A conservative government in decline, with a future electoral defeat and close as the presiding John Major in a match that lived in nationalist exacerbation full account of its traditional divisions over the European Union was not the best partner to open this pathway. Abel Matutes was a pioneer in this way and a reliable and experienced minister who raised a great respect and was well aware of the European Union, from which he had conducted a very active policy of cooperation with Latin America. It was a great asset in that first government, which had just foreign policy very demanding [...]. We had reached a degree of trust and dialogue that allowed us to talk about this serious difference in our relationships without the restrictions that were common in story line and very established. We were aware that Spanish-British relations could have a future projection should not be hampered by the persistence of this litigation [...]. Prime Minister Tony Blair and myself talked in depth about this opportunity. Blair told in his memoirs how, as he finished off the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, took the family stay in Doñana, where we went to spend Easter with marriage Blair, to talk with your mother and explain our position on Gibraltar [...]. Blair and I were engaged in a negotiation process we wanted that had deadlines and that concluded with an overall agreement that everyone could submit to their respective Parliaments not only acceptable but as a compromise possible and desirable for bilateral relations and welfare of the citizens of Gibraltar and the surrounding region. In July 2001, the ministers Josep Pique and Jack Straw agreed to revive the so-called Brussels Process, the compromise reached in 1984 to undertake bilateral negotiations in which the UK agreed to address issues of sovereignty. That same year, in November, I met with Tony Blair at the country residence of the Prime Minister at Chequers. We treat in detail and in the best possible environment the finer points posed by negotiating positions closer and got enough to start conversations. After that you start a serious diplomatic work and consistently led by Josep Pique and conducted by a team of very solvent in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who faced the task of finding formulas according to a problem that seemed insoluble . They did a great job. Blair remained committed to advancing the negotiations and in May 2002 we achieved agreement on a draft joint Spanish-British statement that collect the final agreement. In the text of the statement said that the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom share the following objective: to resolve their differences over Gibraltar and, thus, provide modern Gibraltar sustainable status, including their effective participation in the European Union policies. is provided for the conclusion of a bilateral treaty by which both states should share sovereignty over Gibraltar, including the isthmus. Gibraltar is claimed that could preserve their traditions, customs and way of life while Spain and the United Kingdom, as cosoberanos ostentarían appropriate skills together, particularly on defense, foreign affairs, control maritime and air space and borders, immigration and asylum and for those measures that might be necessary to ensure economic and financial stability. Both governments would share the obligation to protect and promote the interests of Gibraltar in the EU and internationally. We committed ourselves to work to get the maximum EU funding for Gibraltar and the region, to eliminate restrictions on the airport and begin talks with the local government for the inclusion of Gibraltar in the Customs Union, the Schengen Agreement and other policies of European Union. Gibraltarians could keep the British and Spanish access under the provisions of the future treaty. When Straw announced the agreement in principle, progress was being made in the three points for negotiating effort. It was, first, of the temporality of the agreement. That is, the future treaty should not be understood as that which supplied the Spanish claim, still pointing to the full reintegration of sovereignty over the colony [...]. The second point concerned the scope of the referendum to be held in Gibraltar. We could not accept a referendum to decide on the bilateral treaty foresaw conclude that both states. That would be a referendum on self-determination that would give Gibraltar ability to override the sovereign decisions of two states. We accepted a referendum on the status of self-government would keep Gibraltar, but not joint sovereignty agreement itself. This was where the legal and political acquired all his sensitivity. The third issue to be resolved was the Spanish presence on military installations. We put on the table the joint command of such facilities, while the UK spoke of joint use, which for us was insufficient [...]. Despite the difficulties, it was working well and we kept finding acceptable formulas will continue to drive the negotiation process. It is true that some symptoms began to appear worrisome, especially increasing hardening of positions defending diplomats from the Foreign Office (the known power of top British bureaucracy), differences that were beginning to appear in the British government and an agenda would complicate policy for Tony Blair. Straws announcement in the House of Commons intended to mark the beginning of the final phase of negotiations and formalize the British Governments commitment to a global agreement. However, an aggressive reaction led to the Gibraltar authorities and activation of the lobby of the colony in London. The chief minister, Peter Caruana, took his challenge and announced a plebiscite in the colony wanted delegitimize the negotiation and leave the Government no leeway Blair. The strategy found sufficient support to inhibit the response would have been required by the British Government to keep negotiating. The November 7 announced the plebiscite occurred, with the result expected. Just over seventeen thousand people, whose rights and interests are scrupulously respected the agreement were designing, and they were going to benefit from economic liberalization and expansion of trade, put a decisive obstacle to malograba the clearest opportunity and developed an agreement that would favor all [...]. Again, it is incomprehensible that, instead of continuing to explore the possibilities open to substantial progress in the way of co-sovereignty, our successors in the government retreated to a point unusual and seriously prejudicial to the Spanish claim to accept incorporating a trilateral forum Gibraltar as a more recognized by Spain. A serious error that could have only one interpretation: the weakness and neglect of our key foreign policy for too long. larazon.es/detalle_normal/noticias/4208591/espana/caruana-malogro-la-opcion-mas-clara-de-acuerdo-sobre-gibraltar#.UnagQKJBmi3
Posted on: Sun, 03 Nov 2013 19:14:15 +0000

Trending Topics



Recently Viewed Topics




© 2015