1995:15).UnderthebannerofIslam,thenomadicgroupsof Somalia, much like the Arabs, became “organized and found leadership in the Prophet Muhammad and his succeeding Caliphs” (Mukhtar 1995:15). Awe and respect for Islam’s power to unite a previously divided nomadic cul- ture characterized Muslim psyche up until the fall of the Islamic Empire. The fall of the empire dealt a significant and devastating blow to Muslim regional identity and the subsequent transgenerational transmission process, not surprisingly, con- veyed a loss of pride and esteem and an implicit desire to restore Islam’s regional identity. The need for attachment (or perceived entitlement) to a regional Islamic identity was later exacerbated by European colonialism in Horn of Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries and enflamed by (1) US-backed forces in neighboring, rival Ethiopia during the Ethiopia–Somalia war in the latter half of the 20th century and by (2) US- backed warlords controlling Mogadishu in the early 21st century. Constant throughout these centuries of non-Islamic-imperialist rule was the legacy of an Islamic state that once distinguished the Horn and the adjacent Arab peninsula. A return to the “glorious days” only became viable or feasible after colonialist powers (European, then American) weakened their grip on the Horn. It is at this point that the transgenerationally transmitted ideology of an Islamic legacy began to manifest concretely in the form of the Union of Islamic Courts in 94 Cont Islam (2007) 1:89–103 modern day Somalia. Prior to this manifestation, the legacy of political Islam was kept alive via oral story and myth about a time when Somalias nomadic tribes “hitherto in harmony together lived” (Mansur 1995a:111).Thenin2006,withthe defeat of Mogadishu’s warlords and the persistent weakening of Baidoa’s Transitional Federal Government, the potential for political Islam, as envisioned by the UIC, reawakened the hope for a return of the once-wounded Islamic caliphate. The legacy of the Islamic empire, kept alive in Somali myth, finally found its voice in the UIC. The UIC, whose real or imagined ancestry “experienced a massive trauma and severe losses at the hands of the enemies” (Volkan 2006:154), was finally completing the tasks cited by Volkan by reversing “shame and humiliation” and turning “passivity into assertion” (Volkan 2006:154). Identity: political Islam as a defense mechanism for Somalia’s Muslim majority Replete with tribes, clans, and nomads, Somalia has always found it difficult to unite under one particular political umbrella. All attempts to institute a clan government have failed miserably, with devastating consequences for all who tried it (Ahmed 1995:151).Moreover,initiativesbytherulingcolonialeliteweretonoavail,as Somalis lack a concept of traditional state power and hierarchy. Ample speculation exists on why one political hierarchy or paradigm was insufficient in, or incapable of, rallying Somalis clans under the rubric of a political agenda. Despite the fact that Somalia has a common language, culture and religion, one salient obstacle continues to confuse ethnic and clan identity: the understanding of a Somalia “that is in Africa, but not of Africa,” and that is “not enough Arab and not enough African” (Ahmed 1995:141). Additionally, it is widely believed throughout Somalia that clan lineage descended from a common ancestor Samale and that the relationship between these clans is more or less egalitarian. Clans are neither in favor of nor in opposition to any particular clan, and bloodlines do not articulate any kind of clan hierarchy or preference. This egalitarianism prevented the emergence of a centralized government and Somalia remained for centuries a “state of chiefdom where central political authority meant nothing” (Hersi 1977:177),despitemorerecentattemptsbyruling dictators in the latter half of the twentieth century to control the populace. Inter-clan and intra-clan alignment did occur however. The Bedouin adage, “I against my brothers; my brothers and I against our cousins; brothers, cousins and I against the world” (Mukhtar 1995:14)wasnotlostonSomaliaandbecameapparent when threats arose. In an effort to protect one’s family or clan, Somalis would “form a wide network of supporters and dependents whose potential aid will serve as a hedge against a host of natural and sociological uncertainties” (Rosen 1984:135). It comes as little surprise then, since the historical precedent exists for this type of behavior, that Somalis formed a wide network of brothers and cousins to face external threats like neighboring Ethiopia and the omnipresent United States. Firstly, the Ethiopian-armed Transitional Federal Government in Baidoa, Ethiopian troops stationed within the borders of Somalia, US-assisted Ethiopian troops, and US- backed warlords, all contributed to a growing fear of a possible attack on the Somali people (which has now, sadly, come true). Secondly, the Christian orientation of Cont Islam (2007) 1:89–103 95 Ethiopia and the United States, external forces perceived by Somalis to be threats to Somali security and livelihood, exacerbated the fear that the attack was not only physical but ideological. Thus, the formation of the wide network of brothers and cousins gained momentum not because clans were being called upon to unite, a feat shown by history to be impossible, but rather because all Muslim brothers and cousins were being summoned, a feat more feasible given Somalia’s majority Muslim population. Islam, consequently, emerged as a politically expedient tool for defending Somalia because of its capacity to unite Somalis. The prevailing rubric, a religious not an ethnic one, was proving with marked success its capacity to organize Somalis. “Territorial encroachment” (Bandura 1973:19)wasperceivedbySomalistobe occurring on two different levels: geographically and ideologically. Geographically speaking, although the aggressive behavior exhibited by Ethiopia and the United States had not ignited a violent reprisal by the Union of Islamic Courts in an effort to, in Albert Bandura’s words, “attack rivals who intrude on their domain” (Bandura 1973:19),theterritorialencroachmentbythe “west” (understood locally as Ethiopia and internationally as the United States) was a powerful catalyst in unifying formerly disparate and sovereign clans. While geographical encroachment may be the catalyst, it was the ideological territorial encroachment that was the sinewy glue holding the clans together under a paradigm of protection: political Islam. As long as Ethiopia and the United States continued to exhibit aggressive behavior at the doorsteps of Somalias borders, political Islam would remain impenetrable because, in many respects, it was entirely dependent on the real or perceived threat to the Somali people. Political Islam was the shield behind which disparate clans found refuge; it was a manifestation of the culture of “brothers, cousins and I” who form a wide network to “hedge against a host of natural and sociological uncertainties.” According to Bandura, “Aggression is typically provoked by threats intruders pose to food supplies, to nesting sites, to offspring, to mates, and to dominance status…In these instances, events that forebode painful consequences provoke combat” (Bandura 1973:161).ConsideringwhatSomaliswitnessedonalocal, regional and international level, the defensive positioning was logical from a Bandurian perspective. Confronting Somalis, historically and more recently in 2006, were the following: (1) corrupt warlords, supported by the CIA, who controlled local communities mainly through munitions and violence; (2) heavily armed Ethiopian troops, equipped by the US, stationed within Somali borders; and (3) threatened, planned or actual invasions into neighboring countries by heavily armed US forces. Prior to the warlords in Mogadishu, prior to the recent arming of Ethiopian troops, prior to the invasion of Iraq and the potential invasion of Iran or Syria by US forces, political Islam in Somalia had neither momentum nor munitions. In 2006 it acquired both; furthermore, it was galvanized by the anti-Islamic rhetoric emanating from the US and the UK. Why? Two reasons are plausible: (1) Somalia’s version of political Islam had learned, through observation of the violence exerted by the warlords, Ethiopia and the United States, that violence is effective in getting results and achieving a stated goal; and (2) the violence by the warlords, Ethiopia and the United States was understood by Somalis within the Quranic framework of Asghar jihad (Fuller 2003:150)orthelesserjihad,anexternally- 96 Cont Islam (2007) 1:89–103 oriented jihad that legitimates the defense of the Muslim community against the non- Muslim community. In the case of the former point, research shows that if “aggression, however learned, is positively reinforced, it will become a preferred mode of response” (Bandura 1973:92).InSomalia,theUnionofIslamicCourtshave,forthepast decade, watched warlords positively reinforced by the US (in terms of financial, logistical and tactical support) for their aggressive behavior, witnessed Ethiopia positively reinforced by the US (money, munitions) for their aggressive aspirations in the Horn, and observed the US positively reinforced (increased access to oil, wealth) by its aggressive actions in neighboring countries (Nigeria, Iraq). Extrapolating from this theory of positive reinforcement, it is not surprising then that political Islam would exhibit similar aggressive behavior – though the UIC’s aggressive behavior paled in comparison to the behavior exhibited by warlords, Ethiopia and the US – in an attempt to reap assumed rewards. In the case of the latter point, Asghar jihad allowed Muslims to protect themselves from external threats, “to fight [the enemy] until there is no persecution” (Quran 2: 193), and to “protect Islam and Muslims from harm” (Peters 1996: 103–148). Not surprisingly, Somalis perceived Ethiopian and US aggressiveness, due to the explicit Christian orientation of both nations, as a threat to Somalia’s Muslim population specifically. Increased aggressiveness by Christian countries – as had been the case in 2006 with Ethiopian troops maneuvering within Somali borders and US State officials publicizing plans for a military intervention – resulted in reciprocated defensive posturing by the Union of Islamic Courts. And it was justified by Asghar jihad. Since the perceived threat failed to diminish, political Islam remained fueled by the aggressive jihadist desire to protect Somali’s Muslim majority. Moreover, as long as anti-Islamic sentiment was expressed and felt globally, political Islam (as an aggressive counter-reaction to real or perceived anti-Islamism) remained the unifying mechanism for previously disparate clans and sub-clans within Somalia. It is worth noting, finally, that the Somali Diaspora in the United States believed that without external threats, such as Ethiopia and the United States specifically, the Union of Islamic Courts would eventually crumble. This thinking spurred Somalia’s Diaspora to lobby the US State Department and US Congress to cease all talk of military intervention and to encourage Ethiopia’s immediate troop withdrawal. By removing the perceived threat, the Somali Diaspora believed that the UIC would be less inclined to engage in what Konrad Lorenz understood to be a natural and “essential part of the life-preserving organization of instincts” (Lorenz 1963:48), aggression. As long as the perceived threat was perpetuated and promulgated, however, Somalis would continue to engage in life-preserving, aggressive defensiveness. And for a majority of Somalis, political Islam was the most expedient mechanism for this defensive posturing. Morality: Islam and personal jihad, purging corruption Prior to the national amalgamation effort by the Union of Islamic Courts to consolidate power, neither the local warlords in Mogadishu nor the Transitional Cont Islam (2007) 1:89–103 97 Federal Government leadership in Baidoa was considered legitimate by Somali citizens. The local warlords, ruling quasi-officially, were considered by many if not most Somalis as unmistakably corrupt. It was widely known that the local warlords received monies from the United States – monies theoretically intended for community security and welfare – and that these funds consistently and solely remained in warlord coffers. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, erected in 2000 by the UN, following nearly a decade of warlord rule and civil war, was painfully inept, erringly corrupt (warlords held government seats) and situated inconveniently distant from Mogadishu, in the regional city of Baidoa, out of regional warlord reach and unable to bring order to the ensuing chaos in Mogadishu. In Somali citizens’ perspective, the government, much like the warlords, retained a track record of corrupt leadership, exemplified most acutely by General Mohamed Siad Barre’s brutal and corrupt dictatorship which lasted from 1969–1991, whom many Somalis accuse of war crimes (Lewis 2000). Consequently, and not surprisingly, political Islam, in the form of the Union of Islamic Courts, coalesced as an answer to corrupt local and inept federal governance and was able to deftly win “support from ordinary people weary of years of violence, corrupt warlords and the absence of a functioning government” (Landay 2006). The summoning by the Union of Islamic Courts for less corrupt local and federal leadership did not fall on deaf ears; there was already a religious framework among the majority Muslim population for understanding this summons. It was jihad, specifically the greater of the two forms of jihad, known as Akbar jihad. This greater internally-oriented jihad “is the constant struggle within the self against evil impulses that must be overcome to lead a pious life” (Fuller 2003:150).TheUnion of Islamic Courts seized upon the application and relevancy of this personal jihad and encouraged Somalis to be victorious, unlike the warlords or government leadership, in the “internal struggle within each individual against one’s own evil inclinations” (Johnston 2003:48).Itwaswellknownandpubliclyrecognizedthat previous Somali leaders had failed in waging the internal jihad, or war “against one’s own uncontrollable passions, lack of spiritual discipline, and tendencies toward illegitimate violence” (Appleby 2000:12)andthatnewleadershipwasnecessaryto ensure that the principles of Akbar jihad were maintained. The vacuum in moral governance and the absence of leaders who strove to be consistent with Akbar jihadist ideals opened the space for the UIC to seize control. After the UIC took control, in 2006, of Mogadishu and the southern and northern parts of Somalia, principles of Akbar jihad remained at the fore of their political messaging and maneuvering. Some examples included the banning of movie houses and televisions which were perceived as threats to the internal struggle for pious thoughts. Similarly, the UIC strove to maintain legitimacy (as non-corrupt leaders) by attending to citizens’ needs, something the warlords and the brutal dictators never managed. The airport opened after 11 years of closure, shipping ports and sea ports were secured to ensure safe transport of food and products, law and order returned to Mogadishu, education and healthcare remained a top priority, environmental regulations were instituted (e.g. ban on deforestation, charcoal burning, killing rare animals and plants, etc.) and crime reduced significantly. 98 Cont Islam (2007) 1:89–103 The UIC appeared to remain committed to successfully waging an internal jihad against their own evil inclinations but also “against the evils of one’s society” (Johnston 2003:48),(anotherIslamicinterpretationoftherequisitesofinternal jihad). The UIC’s endeavor to “create an ethical public order that embodied divine justice and mercy” (Cox 1994:274),inlinewiththeteachingsofIslamvis-à-visthe greater Akbar jihad, could hardly be debated as legitimate or real. UIC’s commitment was clear. In comparison to the corrupt and violent regimes represented by local warlords and federal systems of governance, the UIC made it apparent to the Somali people that it valued a “divinely approved blueprint for human conduct that was inherently and essentially religious” (Cox 1994:275)andunderstood,asShariahlawdictates, that “questions of ethical content [are] treated in every possibly sphere of human activity, including governance” (Cox 1994:275).Thisterminology(andthe accompanying ideology of a personal jihad in accord with Islamic principles) resonated with the Muslim majority and transcended clan identity and clan demarcations. In many Somalis view, the language of Islam and the UIC’s emphasis on pious leadership was a marked relief from the previous power-brokers’ irreligiousness. Somalia’s socio-political shift towards a more pious religious system of governance, one that mirrored the individual’s jihadist struggle against evils, is not unlike what is happening in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia. Co-religionists in these secular countries perceive the absence of state- provided services, like education, healthcare, environmental protection, transpor- tation, as a “key source of despair and popular anger against the regime” (Fuller 2003:28)andanindicationthatthesecularregime,byhoardingpublicfundsand failing to distribute them via public services, has failed to be victorious in their internal jihadist struggle against evils facing the self (in this case, greed). In each of these countries, Somalia included, political Islamic movements thus became known for the opposite, more pious behavior: “providing shelters, educational assistance, free or low-cost medical clinics, housing assistance to students from out of town, student advisory groups, facilitation of inexpensive mass marriage ceremonies to avoid prohibitively costly dowry demands, legal assistance...and women’s groups” (Fuller 2003:28).Throughtheprovisionofpublicservices,themessagethese Islamic movements are sending to their secular regimes is that they, unlike the secular leadership, are victorious in waging the internal jihad against evil and cor- ruption because they are not succumbing to greed by hoarding public funds in private coffers. In addition to broadcasting a highly moral message (by attending to public needs and starkly contrasting the secular regime’s immorality, corruption, violence or mere inability to provide for basic needs), political Islam’s efforts to ensure that basic human needs were sated elucidates what motivated the Somali citizen. By offering substantial public services to the community, political Islam was able to impress upon its followers that it remained victorious in the personal jihad against evils internally or externally. Simultaneously, through the provision of public services in an attempt to showcase aptitude in waging the internal jihad, the community found great favor in political Islamic movements because, on an individual level, their basic human needs like shelter, security, and sustenance were accounted for. Cont Islam (2007) 1:89–103 99 Basic human needs theory states that “individuals have inherent drives to fulfill a set of deep-seated, universal needs” (Jeong and Vayrynen 1999:61).Failureby “repressive political structures, exploitative economic systems, lack of autonomy and other factors” to fulfill these basic human needs will “inevitably generate conflict because human beings are inherently driven to gratify their needs regardless of the consequences for the self or the society” (Jeong and Vayrynen 1999:61).Therefore, as long as political Islam outshined or outranked the secular regimes’ capacity to meet the basic human needs of the ordinary individual, political Islam in Somalia would remain politically popular for individuals inherently driven to pursue the most expedient mechanism for needs-gratification. In sum, both the internal jihad and basic human needs theory offer some rationale and explanation for political Islam’s success in Somalia. The former resonated with the Muslim majority within Somalia and provided a sharp contrast to the previous (corrupt) leaders’ inability to be victorious in the internal jihadist struggle against evil. The latter resonated with the Somali public because political Islam attended to the basic human needs of individuals (in an effort to appear strong vis-à-vis the internal jihad), something the previous warlords and current federal administration has never accomplished. Conclusion Understanding Somalia’s surge towards political Islam undoubtedly goes beyond what this article could posit and encapsulate. Recognizing that the Quran, the Sunnah, the Hadith, and the attendant verses explicating Shariah law’s relevance to the nation-state lay a fertile foundation for political Islam to emerge, this article explored what additional factors may be at play in stimulating theocratic governance in Somalia. This article examined how transgenerational transmission, aggression and the internal jihad summoned the rise of political Islam and intended to give the reader a deeper understanding into the reasoning behind Islam’s popularity within a historically divided nation-state. Vamik Volkan’s theories on transgenerational transmission, ancestral depositing and entitlement ideology were particularly relevant in cataloguing the tragic losses accumulated (psychically) after the fall of the Islamic empire and the demise of the golden era of Islam and how these psychical wounds, and the concomitant wish for a return to the “glorious days,” were passed down through the generations via oral story and myth. Consequently, extrapolating from Volkan’s theories, political Islam in the 21st century reinvigorated the ancestrally deposited wish to reverse this historical shame and humiliation and return Islam to its previous glory. Albert Bandura’s theories on aggression were valuable in analyzing the defensive posturing of Somalia due to the perceived threats both geographically and ideologically. Geographically speaking, Ethiopia and the United States were considered real threats, due in part to the presence of Ethiopian troops within Somalia, the legacy of US-backed warlords, and US talk of military intervention within Somalia. Ideologically speaking, Somalia, a Muslim majority country, perceived the threat of Ethiopia and the United States, both Christian majority countries, as part of a larger Christian war against Islam. Both geographical and 100 Cont Islam (2007) 1:89–103 ideological threats, as a result, were translated within the Somali socio-political sphere as “territorial encroachment” and “intruder threats.” These external threats forced Somalia, a historically clan-based society, to do what it had never done before: unite. Since in both cases, geographically and ideologically, Somalis faced attack, political Islam provided a convenient and expedient umbrella under which all Somalis could come together. Internal jihad and basic human needs theory, lastly, give perspective into why political Islam followed so closely on the heels of Somalia’s inept, corrupt and brutal warlords and government ministers. Corrupt leadership in Mogadishu and Baidoa instigated the call among the Muslim majority in Somalia for increased fervor and rigor in the war against internal evils and desires. This resonated resolutely among the Muslim populace in light of their discontent with previous and/or existing leadership, and so began the campaign for moral, upright leadership and victory over ones own internal jihad. In this quest, the Union of Islamic Courts strove to exemplify their righteous and pious pursuit (and set themselves apart from the corrupt warlords and government ministers) by attending to the public’s basic human needs, something the corrupt warlords and government ministers rarely orchestrated. This campaign, of course, while religiously congruous with Muslim ideology, appealed concurrently to the individual drive to satisfy basic human needs, a fundamental force in all human beings. In satisfying Somalis basic human need for shelter, security, and sustenance, the Union of Islamic Courts found favor in two ways: as a provider in the pursuit of need-satisfaction and as a victor in the Islamic internal jihad. Assuredly, there are more theoretical frameworks that could be soundly applied to Somalia to assist understanding and articulate the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts, and more generally, the rise of political Islam. This article merely intends to provide officials working within Somalia or on behalf of Somalia an initial lens for analyzing and understanding recent Islamic trends. Despite recent Ethiopian and US military attacks on Somalia’s Islamic leadership, political Islam is not leaving the country anytime soon. Consequently, it would behoove foreign officials engaged in Somalia to better understand the origins and appeal of political Islam in Somalia. Most pointedly, this paper encourages government officials to closely examine the roots of political Islam and to understand not fear its re-emergence in Somalia. Far from a manifestation of the Taliban, political Islam was actually meeting the needs of Somalis, physically and psychically, and until external institutions and authorities recognize this, Somalia will remain guarded, isolating itself further from a society that fails to understand her. Postscript In closing, it is worth briefly mentioning how the Somali Diaspora within the United States has responded to recent Ethiopian and US military action. Undoubtedly, there are vastly varying opinions and perspectives. Somali Diaspora loosely or formally affiliated with the Transitional Federal Government are, not surprisingly, generally supportive of Ethiopian and US moves to reinstate the government within Mogadishu proper. This move will prove quite lucrative for the Transitional Federal Cont Islam (2007) 1:89–103 101 Government and those associated with it. As this article goes to print, US Senators Feingold and Coleman are proposing legislation in the Senate that will allocate substantial funding – in addition to the $40 million in stabilization funds provided by the US State Department – for Somalia’ transitional government, a leadership known for its financial malfeasance. Somali Diaspora more intimately connected to civil society and religious organizations within Mogadishu, however, appear more skeptical of the government’s ability to regain control of Mogadishu and win the hearts and minds of Somalis. One Somali columnist Khadija O. Ali, a former member of the Somali Transitional National Parliament and a Minister of State from 2000 to 2002, wrote “Despite the [Union of Islamic Court’s] military defeat, the war is far from over,” citing that a majority of Somalis view the Transitional Federal Government as a “puppet government” that has been “externally imposed with little popular support and legitimacy.” (Ali 2007)WhileAli’s analysis contradicts US Ambassador Frazer’s belief in the viability of the Transitional Federal Government, implied by her recent comment that “they offer a promising vehicle forward for Somalia” (Frazer 2007),Ali’s concerns appear common among Somali Diaspora. US eagerness to expeditiously instate some semblance of Somali leadership, consequently, must be tempered with extreme caution lest the US error once again. US-backed warlords failed miserably in attending to Somalis’ needs and so will the Transitional Federal Government so long as Ethiopia and the US continue to ignore political Islam and the role it played and will continue to play in Somali polity. As this article suggests, the governing forces operating within and on behalf of Somalia, must recognize and account for political Islam’s historical origins, importance of identity, theological implications, and overall popularity. By doing so, governing forces begin to build the foundation for a legitimate and representative leadership within Mogadishu. Such an overture also builds the necessary trust within a society deeply skeptical of external interventions. This is precisely what is needed at this critical juncture. Somalia cannot afford another bungled attempt by the US. 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