2015: Is Nigeria Going The Way Of Yugoslavia? By Itotenaan Henry Ogiri, PhD, FCA Executive Director (Finance and Administration) Niger-Delta Development Commission (NDDC) I am constrained to embark on this intellectual exercise to draw some salience to Nigerians on the need to thread with caution as we approach the all-important 2015 general elections. Although this might inadvertently provoke a national debate of sort, it has become pertinent for one reason. This attempt would have achieved an objective even if it is seen from the post-positivist philosophical perspective, employing interpretivist paradigm of social reality. The ontology and axiology of human interpretations makes it more potent, in my view. Like it is in the Bible; ‘Heaven and earth shall pass away, but the word of God changeth not’, elections will come and go but the geographical entity called Nigeria will remain thereafter irrespective of how many people are killed in the course of elections. The question therefore is: why should we kill or get killed in the name of elections? The unity and peaceful co-existence of Nigeria ordinarily ought to be the hallmark of a ‘true’ politician who desires to serve and lead at every level. Inciting statements can only increase tension and needless apprehension within the populace. This becomes more worrisome in the face of growing tension and fear over the likely outcome of the 2015 election, especially the presidential poll. Clearly, the ground is being made fertile by this despicable scenario for various interest groups to consider exploring alternative plans in case of ‘any eventuality’. The prediction by some experts within the United States National Intelligence Council in a document entitled Map-ping Sub-Saharan Africas Future predicting outright collapse of Nigeria as a nation-state’ in 2015 cannot be wished away. Although former President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo had described the prediction as glib(ly) talk arising from dubious or diabolical benchmarks, page 17 of the report under the heading, Downside Risks, the US Intelligence claimed that while currently Nigerias leaders are locked in a bad marriage that all dislike but dare not leave, there are possibilities that could disrupt the precarious equilibrium in Abuja. Ambassador John Campbell, a senior member of the NIC, whose personal conceptualization of the body’s prediction drew the ire of the nation, appears to be resolute, saying he stood by his views. “My view has not changed about the serious challenges Nigeria faces. I think the challenges are more pronounced than they were before the Boko Haram insurrection began in the North. Political life is also unsettled by the approach of the 2015 elections.” Campbell was quoted to have stated this in an interview last August. Even if the United States Government said that there are no signs that Nigeria will disintegrate before, during or after the February general elections, only Nigerians, particularly Nigerian political leaders can save Nigeria from the theoretical precepts set by the predictions of Campbell’s NIC. This becomes very imperative against the background of similar predictions the United States had reeled out that came to pass. After all, the same America predicted in 1989 that in one year, the then boisterous Yugoslavia would be history and it came to pass. Like it was in the pre-break-up era of Yugoslavia, most political actors are exhibiting extreme desperation just as others threaten break-up should the outcome of the presidential election appear unfavourable to them. In all these, one fact is unambiguous-it takes a few persons to mute, germinate and nurture an idea to fruition. For instance, results from recent studies by Klanjsek and Fleve (2011) in their work, ‘An Exit Of Yugoslavia’, published in the Journal Of Nationalism and Ethnicity painted a pathetic, yet irreversible picture that the Yugoslavia’s extermination was instigated by a small group of political entrepreneurs. The above assertion is strengthened by Bojana Blagojevic’s position as if he had Nigeria in mind-“Ethnically diverse societies carry various degrees of conflict potential. Ethnic emotions, rooted in historical memories of grievances are at the core of conflict potential….. Under the stress of a major structural change that brings a sense of chaos and uncertainty, the consciousness of historically rooted ethnic identities and emotions are employed as vehicles to ethnic violence for political purposes”. In essence, the above paints a vivid picture that political entrepreneurs can manipulate ethnic emotions in order to mobilize groups for their own selfish aims and objectives, which are nothing but political. This concurs to a large extent, with Stuart Kaufaman’s position that belligerent leaders stoke mass hostility, hostile masses support belligerent leaders and both threaten other groups, creating a security dilemma which in turn encourages even more mass hostility and leadership belligerence. The corollary of the above however remains, perhaps, the unintended show of strength as a counter to the immediacy of the threat. As V.P. Gagnon, Jnr puts it- “If the challenger elites are successfully mobilizing the majority of the politically relevant population against the status quo, ruling elites will feel quite threatened and will be willing to incur high costs to preserve their position. Threatened elites will also attempt to recruit other elites, at the local and regional as well as national levels to prevent such a mobilization.” Clearly, the Nigerian situation appears to be gravitating towards either of the above or both positions. We therefore must guide against the activities of those whose interests are unpretentiously not identifiable with that of our collective destiny as a nation. As much as possible, political campaigns should be issue-based with an uncompromising distance from inflammatory statements as the hallmark. Truly, as a nation of many parts, we are in a state of fragile cohesion and unity with feelings of unfair treatment from across various ethnic nationalities that comprise Nigeria. This is regardless of the promises by politicians who have hipped on the people, most often, ‘ I will build world class hospitals, I will construct 1000 kilometers of road in your state, I will provide free education at all levels, I will put food on your table, free this, free that. But Nigerians know and understand that what the politicians meet on ground is in most cases not what they had expected. Would it therefore, not be better if aspiring politicians outline their campaign issues without unnecessarily heightening the expectations of the electorates to the extent of thoughts of hopelessness and wishing for the worst case scenario? Yugoslavia In Historical Perspective Yugoslavia came into existence as a result of World War I. In 1914 only Serbia which included the present Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro were independent states; Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Known as the land of South (i.e. Yugo) Slavs—was created at a time Croat, Slovenian, and Bosnian territories that had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire united with the Serbian Kingdom. The country broke up under Nazi occupation during World War II with the creation of a Nazi-allied independent Croat state, but was reunified at the end of the war when the communist-dominated partisan force of Josip Broz Tito liberated the country. Following the end of World War II, Yugoslavian unity was a top priority for the U.S. Government. While ostensibly a communist state, Yugoslavia broke away from the Soviet sphere of influence in 1948, became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, and adopted a more de-centralized and less repressive form of government as compared with other East European communist states during the Cold War. At various times during the past millennium, the country known as Yugoslavia, and its surrounding countries, straddled the borders of three faith groups: Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Roman Catholicism. Various sources give conflicting stories of the areas past. Prior to 6th century : Kosovo and the surrounding area were occupied by the Illyrian people, who became present-day Albanians. 6th & 7th centuries : The Serbs arrived in Kosovo and the surrounding area. 12 & 13th century: Rastko (1174-1236 CE) created the first Serbian national church. After a brief alliance with Rome, the church became part of Orthodox Christianity. 14th century: The Ottoman Turks conquered what is now Yugoslavia at the Battle of Kosovo in the Field of Blackbirds in 1389 CE. Serbian Prince Lazar could have avoided the conflict by agreeing to pay tribute to Murad I, the Turkish Sultan. However, Lazar and his army rejected this option. They swore the Kosovo Covenant. This committed them to fight to the death of the last man rather than submit to control from a foreign power. Islam was introduced by the Turks during their occupation. 15th century: Muslim influence was extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina. 16th century: Slovenia and Croatia came under the influence of Austria. Roman Catholicism was introduced. Thousands of Serbs were forcibly relocated to the Croatian border with Bosnia. 19th century: After Russia defeated the Turks, Serbia was granted independence. But Kosovo and Macedonia remained under the control of the Turks. The Austro-Hungarians got control of Bosnia-Herzegovina and retained Croatia and Slovenia. Pre-World War II: With the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the collapse of the Ottoman empire, and the conclusion of World War I, Yugoslavia became a kingdom under King Alexander. His dictatorship included Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. A fascist separatist movement, the Ustase, was established by the Croats to promote their independence. 1945 to 1980: Joseph Tito unified the 6 republics into a communist dictatorship, independent of Russia. He was able to suppress religious and cultural rivalries among the Roman Catholics, Serbian Orthodox and Muslims during his lifetime. But, as noted in the quotation at the start of this essay, no concerted attempt was made by the political or religious leaders to settle centuries-old religious hatreds. An opportunity was missed that might have avoided (or reduced) ethnic cleansing and genocide during the 1990s. Tito angered the Serbs by granting autonomy to the north-eastern province of Vojvodina and the southern province of Kosovo in 1974. 1980s: Tito died in 1980. In 1987, while investigating allegations that the minority Serbs in Kosovo were being attacked by the ethnic Albanian majority, Slobodan Milosevic had promised his fellow Serbs that No one will ever beat you again. Milosevic quickly became a Serbian hero, and was able to force changes to the Yugoslav constitution through its Parliament in 1989. This terminated the autonomous status of the provinces of Vojvodina (in the north) and Kosovo (in the south). Milosevic removed Kosovos autonomy, established direct Serbian rule over the province, expelled the Albanians from the Kosovo parliament, the state bureaucracy, and state owned industries, and closed the state-run school system and most of the medical system to them. The Albanians in Kosovo became a majority with few rights in their own country. Leading Kosovo intellectual, Ibrahim Rogova, promoted a nonviolent approach to resolve the system of Apartheid under which they were persecuted. 1990s: The unravelling of Yugoslavia accelerated. 1990: The north-west province of Slovenia voted the Communist party out of office. Slovenia won its independence from the rest of Yugoslavia in 1991. 1991: Croatia made a bid for independence. Croats and Serbs started a civil war. The U.N. assisted in establishing a cease-fire, starting in 1992. 1991: Macedonia declared independence. It was admitted to the UN under a provisional name in 1993, and was recognized by the U.S. and Russia in 1994. 1992: Bosnia declared independence. A civil war among the Croats, Serbs and Muslims erupted. The world was horrified by new images of starving prisoners in concentration camps. The civilian population was heavily targeted by armies on all sides. Hans Küng and Karl-Josef Kuschel commented: Similarly, there is no doubt that the Catholic and Orthodox churches in particular have identified themselves all too much with their own political leadership in the most recent controversies and not made a commitment for peace openly, opportunely and energetically. 1 1995: The Dayton Accord, brokered by the U.S., established a fragile peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Representatives from Kosovo were excluded from the talks. It probably would not have been possible to get the principal parties in the Bosnian conflict to the Dayton bargaining table if Kosovo was on the agenda. The conflicts in Kosovo was not discussed; Rugovas nonviolent strategy lost its credibility. 2 1996-7: Following the Dayton Accord, many ethnic Albanians in Kosovo decided that their nonviolent approach was getting nowhere. The Kosovo Liberation Army began a guerrilla campaign. 1998: The situation had become critical. The Serb army destroyed several villages in Kosovo in order to evaluate Western reaction. The West responded with rhetoric and...meetings, but no credible threats. The Yugoslavian government then escalated the conflict. Yugoslavia had been gradually disintegrating since the death of Tito. The country lost much of its territory and population during the 1990s as Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina achieved independence. By 1999, Yugoslavia consists of only four provinces: Vojvodina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. Montenegro had a large degree of local autonomy. The government and Serbian people of Yugoslavia are totally opposed to losing any more territory to independence or autonomy movements. This led to a massive civil war in Kosovo, and a lower-scale program of ethnic cleansing in Vojvadina. NATO became involved in 1999 in an extensive bombing campaign summed up as: Serbs out, peace keepers in, refugees back. On June 12,1999, a ceasefire was arranged and KFOR peacekeepers entered Kosovo. Subsequently,The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia charged Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević with crimes against humanity, violating the laws or customs of war, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and genocide for his role during the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Before the end of the bombing, Milošević, along with Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić and Vlajko Stojiljković were charged by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with crimes against humanity including murder, forcible transfer, deportation, and persecution on political, racial or religious grounds. Further indictments were levelled in October 2003 against former armed forces chief of staff Nebojša Pavković, former army corps commander Vladimir Lazarević, former police official Vlastimir Đorđević, and a one time head of Serbias public security, Sreten Lukić. All were indicted for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. Why Did Yugoslavia Break Up? In October 1990, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) presented a dire warning to the U.S. policy community on Yugoslavia: ‘Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within a year, and will probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will not stave off the breakup. [...] A full-scale inter-republic war is unlikely, but serious inter-communal conflict will accompany the breakup and will continue afterward. The violence will be intractable and bitter. There is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity. The varied reasons for the country’s breakup ranged from the cultural and religious divisions among the ethnic groups making up the nation, to the memories of WWII atrocities committed by all sides, to centrifugal nationalist forces. However, a series of major political events served as the catalyst for exacerbating inherent tensions in the Yugoslav republic. Following the death of Tito in 1980, provisions of the 1974 constitution provided for the effective devolution of all real power away from the federal government to the republics and autonomous provinces in Serbia by establishing a collective presidency of the eight provincial representatives and a federal government with little control over economic, cultural, and political policy. Another potent factor was the issue of ethnic hatred. According to James Graham in his book; ‘The Violent Break Up Of Yugoslavia’, ‘the numerous ethnic groups that comprised Yugoslavia held historical animosities towards each other stretching back in some cases hundreds of years. Yet these animosities were put aside after World War Two and under Titos grip the nation achieved internal peace. They were not however forgotten and when nationalist politicians needed to create a power base, they merely had to promote nationalist symbols and myths, and encourage the discussion and exaggeration of past atrocities. This created a deadly snowball effect that proved unstoppable’ The issue of forged unity also laid a path in this process. Yugoslavia has long been an ethnic melting point where great civilisations and religions have met. The Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War One created the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes out of territory from the Austrian and Turkish empires. The allies hoped the Kingdoms people would forge a new common identity based on their shared status as Southern Slavs. They were however divided in various other ways. Croats and Slovenes were Roman Catholic, used the Latin alphabet and orientated towards western and central Europe. In contrast Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins were under the repressive autocratic control of the Ottoman Turks, Eastern Orthodox in religion, used the Cyrillic alphabet and were less economically developed. Bosnians, though much like the Serbs had practiced Bogomilism and converted to Islam only in exchange for autonomy and protection by the Turks. The Serbs regularly rose against the Turks and were subsequently heavily repressed, thus considered the Bosnian Muslims Slavs that had sold out. During World War Two these antagonisms flared into outright slaughter as the Nazi controlled ethnically Croat Ustashe puppet regime murdered innocent Serbs, Jews and others. The regime never had majority Croatian support but this was irrelevant to Serbs in the conflicts of the 1990s even though they themselves did not have clean hands. Josip Tito and his communists suppressed discussion on the wartime genocide and earlier nationalist outrages in the process creating a powerful reservoir of suppressed memories and hatred. Tito re-established Yugoslavia through the skilful use of fear and the credibility of communist ideology. Yugoslavs feared many things including a return to the carnage of wartime massacres, the power of the Soviet Union and some a great Serbian restoration. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) as the only substantial pan-Yugoslavian institution was thus the only force capable of allaying these fears. Fear and force did in time give way to compromise that was eventually enshrined in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. This constitution established a collective presidency, rotating chair and dissolved a great deal of power to the republics thus weakening federal institutions. Tito himself often kept this system going by ordering republics to follow federal laws. Titos death in 1980 combined with the end of Cold War rivalry and the decline of communist ideology in the rest of Europe in the 1980s lead to the severe weakening of Yugoslavias crucial unifying factors. The multi-party political system that resulted from the 1990 elections was seriously flawed. Political parties of which there were a large number lacked time and resources to develop a wide range of policies. Voters were thus denied the information they needed to make informed decisions. Additionally there was no chance to vote to maintain Yugoslavia even though 62 percent of Yugoslavs claimed Yugoslavian affiliation was very, or quite, important to them in a 1990 survey of 4,232 people. Nationalists’ claims that other groups would block vote successfully turned it into a self-fulfilling prophecy. External factors also had a significant impact. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, the unification of Germany one year later, and the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union all served to erode Yugoslavia’s political stability. As Eastern European states moved away from communist government and toward free elections and market economies, the West’s attention focused away from Yugoslavia and undermined the extensive economic and financial support necessary to preserve a Yugoslav economy already close to collapse. The absence of a Soviet threat to the integrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its constituent parts meant that a powerful incentive for unity and cooperation was removed. Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia’s president from 1989, took advantage of the vacuum created by a progressively weakening central state and brutally deployed the use of Serbian ultra-nationalism to fan the flames of conflict in the other republics and gain legitimacy at home. Milosevic started as a banker in Belgrade and became involved in politics in the mid-1980s. He rose quickly through the ranks to become head of the Serbian Communist Party in 1986. While attending a party meeting in the Albanian-dominated province of Kosovo in May 1987, Serbians in the province rioted outside the meeting hall. Milosevic spoke with the rioters and listened to their complaints of mistreatment by the Albanian majority. His actions were extensively reported by Serbian-controlled Yugoslav mass media, beginning the process of transforming the former banker into the stalwart symbol of Serbian nationalism. Milošević was elected president of Serbia in 1989. Having found a new source of legitimacy, Milosevic quickly shored up his power in Serbia through control of the party apparatus and the press. He moved to strip the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina of their constitutionally-guaranteed autonomy within Serbia by using mass rallies to force the local leaderships to resign in favor of his own preferred candidates. By mid-1989 Kosovo and Vojvodina had been reintegrated into Serbia, and the Montenegro leadership was replaced by Milosevic allies. After attempts by Serbia to impose its authority on the rest of the country, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on June 25, 1991. Fighting immediately broke out as the federal army (controlled largely by Serbs) moved into Slovenia. A fragile peace was negotiated by a European Community (EC) delegation, but fighting soon resumed. By the end of July, 1991, however, all federal forces had left Slovenia, although fighting continued throughout the summer between Croatian forces and the federally backed Serbs from Serb areas of Croatia. In September 1991, Macedonia declared its independence, and the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina voted for independence that October. In January 1992, with Serbs holding 30% of Croatia, a cease-fire was negotiated in that republic, and the United Nations sent in a peacekeeping force. In that same month the EC recognized Croatia and Slovenia as independent states, and in April the EC and the United States recognized Bosnia and Herzegovinas sovereignty. The Serbs, with about 30% of the population, seized 65% of the latter republics territory and proclaimed the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croats, with about 20% of the population, seized about half the remainder of the land and proclaimed the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. The poorly armed Muslims, who comprised more than 40% of the population, held the rest of the republics territory, including the capital. In a campaign of ethnic cleansing carried out mostly by the Serbs, thousands of Muslims were killed, and many more fled Bosnia or were placed in Serb detention camps. In May, 1992, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro and called for an immediate cease-fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Macedonia was widely recognized the following year (though Greece withheld recognition and imposed an embargo until after an agreement was reached with Macedonia in 1995). Although Serbia and Montenegro declared a new Yugoslavian federation, the EC announced in June, 1992, that the new government could not claim the international rights and duties of the former Yugoslavia, because those rights and obligations had devolved onto the different republics. This opinion was affirmed by the United Nations in Sept., 1992. The United Nations also imposed a naval blockade on Yugoslavia, which along with the sanctions resulted in severe economic hardship, including hyperinflation for a time. After Serbia reduced its support for the Bosnian Serbs, the United Nations eased sanctions against Yugoslavia. In late 1995 Yugoslavia (in the person of President Milošević of Serbia) participated in the talks in Dayton, Ohio, that led to a peace accord among Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia (Yugoslavia). Milošević became president of all Yugoslavia in 1997. Tensions increased in Kosovo in 1997 and 1998, as a period of nonviolent civil disobedience against Serbian rule gave way to the rise of a guerrilla army. In Mar., 1999, following mounting repression of ethnic Albanians and the breakdown of negotiations between separatists and the Serbs, NATO began bombing military targets throughout Yugoslavia, and thousands of ethnic Albanians were forcibly deported from Kosovo by Yugoslav troops. In June, Milošević agreed to withdraw from Kosovo, and NATO peacekeepers entered the region. Demonstrations in the latter half of 1999 against Milošević failed to force his resignation. Meanwhile, Montenegro sought increased autonomy within the federation and began making moves toward that goal. Regardless of Milosevics personal sacrifice to abdicate political power as a result of the growing tension, his ouster neither reversed the disintegration of the once nebulous Yugoslav Federation or mitigated the consequences that followed thereafter. After all, the seeds of discord and primordial disharmony planted long before him merely germinated at his time. It then means that Milosevic was not Yugoslavias ISSUE; he was just a passing item in the YUGOSLAVIAN QUESTION of forced contraption that pre-dated him in decades. Perhaps, someone else may have done worse than Milosevic. Yugoslavia: What Lessons For Nigeria? Various historical traditions have characterized modern society. Today, it is almost impossible to see any nation-state without socio-cultural/political diversities. In Europe for instance, the creation of modern nation-states has generally been assumed to be intrinsic to modernization. To most of such nation-states, such is irreversible. So, what lessons are there for Nigeria with these empirical findings? My view is that politicians of various persuasions should place national unity, peace and stability of Nigeria uppermost in their minds as we enter the last lap of the 2015 electioneering year. Instructively, utterances, actions, inactions as well as reactions as we approach the elections are to the effect that it is either that a particular region is reminded of a forgotten loss or/and re-awakened from the slumber or refreshed of old memories. Or else, what more could fit as a rehearsal than the recent ‘burial of Biafra war heroes in Anambra state, South East Nigeria? Sensibilities are raised in this regard, no doubt. While not insinuating the possibility of the revival of the old Biafra, I am yet to see any leader of the nation’s most commercially industrious ethnic nationality, the Igbo speak against Biafra whether dead, contemplated or alive.. Understandably therefore, one is close to concluding that the Biafran dream was merely an arrested process. What about the average Niger-Deltan? In the light of the tension generated by the build-up to the elections under their son, President Goodluck Jonathan, does the mind set of an average Niger-Deltan who witnessed the unfortunate civil war not beat regrets that Biafra did not happen? What about the growing feelings that the region must only generate resources and not to manage its resources? Also, can a ‘take your power, leave our oil alone’ scenario come without any resistance? Assuming but not praying for this to happen, only God knows the possible balkanization that will strive even within a successful ‘proclamation of freedom’ by the Niger-Delta. Obviously, the North cannot be insulated from this. Is it a possibility that the now vociferous ‘power must return to the North’ slogan is as a result of self-re-examination on the part of promoters of such ideas that they have failed to follow strictly, the admonition handed down by the most revered late Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello just a few days after Nigeria’s independence that under no circumstance should the North compromise political power in a post-independence Nigeria? In my view, it is the same way Leonard Karshima Shilgba, an Associate Professor of Mathematics with the American University of Nigeria and President of the Nigeria Rally Movement as well as Coordinator of the Middle Belt Federation under the Middle Belt Coalition Agenda dissects the above statement that other Nigerian ethnic nationalities sandwiched between major ethnic blocs in their mega regions will perceive a break-up (God forbid) scenario for Nigeria. Conclusion The fact is that, what the nation called Nigeria faces today is the case of being between the devil and the deep blue sea. Thus, great care and caution must be deployed to use in our thoughts, actions and decisions. Not strangely too, there are two possible alternatives- staying with the president and consolidating on his achievements to further move the country forward or effect a change to try an alternative governance model. In all these, the voice of the people matters most just as the decision of Nigerians is the cornerstone. Truly, Nigerians have a collective task ahead if the nation must circumvent the security cum intelligence predictions of the world’s most powerful nation, the United States. This is a national call and admonition that must be taken with all the seriousness it deserves if the ‘external factors in the Yugoslava experience have to be contained. In this regard, political actors, possibly, political entrepreneurs who have laid land mines along the nation’s route to another democratic path have a duty to unmine the lands for Nigeria to move forward as one united indivisible entity.
Posted on: Sun, 25 Jan 2015 05:46:57 +0000
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