A strange but common OPCA concept is that an individual can somehow exist in two separate but related states. This confusing concept is expressed in many different ways. The ‘physical person’ is one aspect of the duality, the other is a non-corporeal aspect that has many names, such as a “strawman”, a “corporation”, a “corporate entity”, a “corporate fiction”, a “dead corporation”, a “dead person”, an “estate”, a “legal person”, a “legal fiction”, an “artificial entity”, a “procedural phantom”, “abandoned paper work”, a “slave name” or “slave person”, or a “juristic person”. [418] Many OPCA nomenclature schemes relate to this duality. For example, the ‘lower case’ vs. ‘upper case’ name pairs indicates the ‘physical person’ and ‘non-corporeal aspect’, respectively. When “::Dennis-Larry: Meads::” says he acts “on behalf of DENNIS LARRY MEADS (juristic person)”, he appears to indicate he believes he has two separate aspects, and that the man in the courtroom (“::Dennis-Larry: Meads::”) is representing his other half (“DENNIS LARRY MEADS (juristic person)”). Other times OPCA litigants say they are “agents”, “trustees”, “owners”, “representatives” or “secured party” for their other aspect: Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 (CanLII), 2012 ONSC 1835; Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675 (CanLII), 2001 BCSC 675 at paras. 26-28, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 (CanLII), 2011 TCC 495 at paras. 5-6; Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 (CanLII), 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309; Canada (Minister of National Revenue ‑ M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 (CanLII), 2009 FC 99 at para. 27, 340 F.T.R. 150; Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 (CanLII), 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 9; Services de financement TD inc. c. Michaud, 2011 QCCQ 14868 (CanLII), 2011 QCCQ 14868 at para. 6; this proceeding. [419] A particularly surreal variation on this theme is reported in Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 750 (CanLII), 2006 BCSC 750 at para. 92, 151 A.C.W.S. (3d) 204, where the ‘physical litigants’ purported to intervene in the action against their ‘non-corporeal aspects’. Justice Garson classified that attempt as “unintelligible” and struck the associated counterclaim: para. 93. [420] The ‘dash colon’ and ‘family/clan/house of’ motifs uniformly indicate the ‘physical person’ half of these double/split individuals. Other times the ‘physical person’ is called a “natural person” or is described as being “flesh and blood”: Porisky Trial Decision; R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 (CanLII), 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, 2009 CanLII 9368 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, 2009 CanLII 9368 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 783 at para. 24, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)). Mr. Meads adopts the latter kind of language, he (the physical litigant) is “the living flesh and blood sentient-man”. [421] There are different explanations for the non-corporeal similarity. Some OPCA gurus promote the idea that this aspect is created by the state, burdened with legal obligations, then ‘shackled’ to the physical person. Other OPCA gurus present the non-corporeal aspect as a part of a person that can be split away, and then burdened with obligations and debts. [422] Of course, either approach is legally ineffectual. Canadian law does not provide for a person to have two aspects - this entire concept is yet another ‘magic hat’. This fundamental misapprehension was eloquently explained by Justice Gauthier in Canada (Minister of National Revenue ‑ M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 (CanLII), 2009 FC 99 at paras. 17, 27, 340 F.T.R. 150: ... Mr. Camplin in the above‑mentioned case seems to have argued, in the same fashion as the respondent, that he had two capacities, one which he characterised as being his private capacity as a natural person for my own benefit and the other as his capacity as legal representative of the taxpayer. Here, the respondent characterises his purported capacities as being (1) as a natural person, and (2) as a taxpayer. The deletion of the words legal representative from the latter purported capacity does not render this case distinguishable from the one at bar. The whole notion of their being a second capacity distinct from the one of a natural person or human being is a pure fiction, one which is not sanctioned by law. One can describe nothing in any terms one wishes; it still remains nothing. ... Cory Stanchfield’s attempt to argue before this Court that his body comprises two persons which act in different capacities is of one of two things: (1) an inadmissible division of his indivisible entity, or (2) an attempted creation of a second entity in a fashion which is not recognized by law, the result of which amounts to nothing in the eyes of the law. It is an attempt at the impossible and the respondent cannot do the impossible. Therefore, “Cory Stanchfield (the Respondent)” and “Cory Stanchfield, in his capacity as a natural person (the Witness)” is but one person, with one single capacity ... [Emphasis added.] See also Canada (Minister of National Revenue ‑ M.N.R.) v. Camplin; M.N.R. v. Camplin, 2007 FC 183 (CanLII), 2007 FC 183 at paras. 8-9, 2007 FC 183 (CanLII), [2007] 2 C.T.C. 205; R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCCA 150 (CanLII), 2006 BCCA 150 at para. 3, 265 D.L.R. (4th) 193; Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at paras. 40, 44-45, 2009 CanLII 9368 (ON SC), 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 (CanLII), 2011 TCC 495 at paras. 6, 8; Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 (CanLII), 2012 ONSC 1835 at paras. 24-29; Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Boyle, [2006] O.J. No. 2181 (QL) at paras. 3-5, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 127 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). [423] The answer is that, as Justice Gauthier observed, no matter whatever nomenclature the OPCA litigant wants to adopt to describe his ‘other self’, it is the person before the Court who is subject to its order. 1. Unshackling the Strawman [424] Certain gurus see the non-corporeal half of a person as detrimental, a kind of parasitic conjoined legal twin, and believe the state and court can only affect that aspect of a person. Lindsay is a major proponent of this theory; he invites his followers to ‘kill their strawman’ and thereafter be free of any income tax obligation. These OPCA litigants will therefore refuse to acknowledge their non-corporeal aspect and its obligations: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 (CanLII), 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 27, 302 B.C.A.C. 76; Canada (Minister of National Revenue ‑ M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 (CanLII), 2009 FC 99, 340 F.T.R. 150; Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 (CanLII), 2011 TCC 495 at paras. 6, 8; Porisky Trial Decision. [425] This objective can lead to very unusual OPCA litigant responses. For example, in reply to an action against “FRED L. JAJCZAY”, the defendant responded: It is agreed by you in your private capacity with no dispute coming from you that my name, Fred L. Jajczay, is my private property; that I have never given permission or authority to any person, men or women to associate my name with a dead corporate entity; that the alteration of my name in any manner is fraud. [Emphasis in original.] The intended effect is that Jajczay is trying to deny affiliation with his all capital letters ‘strawman’. [426] OPCA gurus often seem drawn to the sea, so it is perhaps unsurprising that one variant on this theme is that a newborn is issued a “Berth Certificate” that makes a person a “passenger” on the “ship of state”. Instead of killing their ‘strawman’, these litigants emphasize they are “on dry land”, and not subject to Admiralty law. They may ceremonially destroy or denounce their “berth certificate”. [427] Mr. Meads appears to subscribe to an aspect of this theory. In court he explained how he was two persons, a “corporate identity” that was created by the state (or alternatively, me), and was subject to legislation and this court. That “person” had been involuntarily attached to his other aspect, his “living flesh and blood sentient-man” or “soul”. He now rejects that association and the obligations that follow. 2. Dividing Oneself [428] Mr. Meads also applied the other form of the OPCA ‘divided/split person’ concept, that these two linked imaginary personalities can interact with one another, and thereby structure a kind of inter-relationship. In Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, 2009 CanLII 9368 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 783 at para. 14, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), Justice Brown reproduces a “most unusual” contract: ... signed twice by Mr. Kovacevic: once in his capacity as “secured‑party, first‑party”, and then again as “debtor, second‑party”. [429] Brown J. then at para. 15 summarizes the document’s intended effect: It appears that by this document Mr. Kovacevic has attempted to split himself into two separate persons – a “flesh and blood living man”, and a “juristic person\strawman\legal entity” created by the Province of Ontario. If one takes the document at face value, then Mr. Kovacevic impliedly acknowledges that up until December 11, 2007 – i.e. three months after he had purchased the Mercedes‑Benz ‑ he was a “juristic person”. He then attempts to transfer to his newly created “flesh and blood living man” all his property then owned. The document notably is silent as to what happened to the debt held at that time by the “juristic person”. [430] He then concludes at para. 45: Of course this document has no legal effect. In the eyes of the law it is rubbish. However, when read together with the other documents created by Mr. Kovacevic it forms part of what I conclude to be a deliberate effort on his part to avoid payment of his debt obligations. [431] A similar strategy is reported in R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 (CanLII), 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 41-45, affirmed 2010 BCCA 391 (CanLII), 2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C. 5141, where the litigant attempted to create a lien between two aspects of himself; see also Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 (CanLII), 2011 TCC 495 at para. 6. [432] With that, I turn to the documents delivered by Mr. Meads on June 19 and 21. These are, I believe, the most complex set of ‘intra-personal’ contractual and trust relationships reported in a Canadian court. These are carefully formatted, impressive looking documents, and are obviously by the same author who composed the ‘fee schedule’ attached as Appendix “A” to these Reasons. These documents share much parallel, if not identical, language and format. For example, the “Property List” in the ‘fee schedule’ is also an element of other items. [433] I will briefly explain my interpretation of the intended operation of these documents. [434] As previously explained, Mr. Meads subscribes to the idea that the non-corporeal aspect of himself was created by the state (or alternatively by me, on June 8, 2012). He must believe he nevertheless has ‘signing authority’ over that other personality because in his “power of attorney” he, as “DENNIS LARRY MEADS, Debtor and Grantor”, authorizes his “attorney-in-fact”, “Dennis-Larry: Meads, Secured Party Creditor” total control over his affairs. Presumably, the ‘corporate entity’ is now a puppet for the physical person. [435] The UCC Financing Statement registered in Ohio for a Certificate of Birth purports to create or reflect a trust of “DENNIS LARRY MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust” in favour of “Dennis-Larry:Meads, as Beneficiary of the Revested Trust”. The document continues: This is actual and constructive notice that all of Debtors interests now owned or hereafter acquired is hereby accepted as collateral for securing contractual obligations in favour of the Secured party as detailed in a true, complete notarized security agreement in the possession of the Secured party. Notice in accordance with UCC-Property- this is the entry of the debtor in the Commercial Registry as a transmitting utility and the following property is hereby registered in the same as public notice of a commercial transaction: Certificate of Birth Document #[...] [sic.] Translated out of ‘gibberese’, Mr. Meads is purportedly assigning the value of his birth certificate, a “commercial transaction” presumably with Canada, to his “flesh and blood” self. [436] The Alberta Personal Property Registry Verification Statement for “DENNIS LARRY MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust” presumably does the same for his a birth certificate, social insurance number, UCC1 financing statement, a certificate of marriage, a motor vehicle operator’s license, Canadian passport, and several court orders. [437] The “Commercial Security Agreement”, which is identified by the cryptic notation “DLM042011960 SA 01 Registration # 11120912227” purportedly promises that “DENNIS LARRY MEADS, A LEGAL ENTITY” assumes all debts and obligations of “Dennis-Larry:Meads, a Personam Sojourn and People of Posterity”, while granting Dennis-Larry:Meads all his property. Similarly, the “Hold Harmless and Indemnity Agreement Non Negotiable Between the Parties” causes “DEBTOR: DENNIS LARRY MEADS” to generally indemnify “CREDITOR: Care of Dennis-Larry Meads”. [438] This duplicates in general effect the analogous material advanced in Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic: everything good and of value attaches to the physical person of Mr. Meads, while all obligation and debt is allocated to the unfortunate DENNIS LARRY MEADS, corporate entity. [439] Of course, that does not work. Mr. Meads is Mr. Meads in all his physical or imaginary aspects. He would experience and obtain the same effect and success if he appeared in court and selectively donned and removed a rubber Halloween mask which portrays the appearance of another person, asserting at this or that point that the mask’s person is the one liable to Ms. Meads. Not that I am encouraging, or indeed would countenance, the wearing of a mask in my courtroom. canlii.org/en/ab/abqb/doc/2012/2012abqb571/2012abqb571.html
Posted on: Mon, 25 Aug 2014 13:38:37 +0000
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