ANTI-TERRORISM ACT 1997 PLD 2006 FSC 26. Moulvi Iqbal Haider V/S Federation of Pakistan(FB) S.10(4). S.7 Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. Art.203-D & 227 of Constitution. Repugnancy to Injunction of Islam. Petitioner had challenged vires of S.10(4) of Zina Ord. as well as S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, on the ground that those were repugnant to Injunction of Quran and Sunnah, as those carried the sentence of death as Tazir without keeping in view prescribed standard of Tazkiya-Tush-Shahud. Petitioner had prayed that both S.10(4) of Zina Ord. and S.7 of the 1997 Act are repugnant to Injunction of Islam and prayed for suspension of sentence awarded under the said sections. Contentions raised by petitioner were devoid of force as Verses of Holy Quran quoted by him did not at all pertain to issue under consideration. Said Versus in no way dealt, by any stretch of imagination, with the question of compoundability of punishment awarded under Tazir by a court of law. Term Tazir was used for punishment which was not fixed by Holy Quran and Sunnah and was left to discretion of Head of State, Majlis-e-Shoora or Qazi and was based on principles laid down by Holy Quran and Sunnah. In fact it was a penal punishment which was actually a reformative, deterrent and punitive measure for those offences for which no Hadd punishment had been laid down in Shariat. Such punishments were considered by Muslim jurists throughout, to be in harmony with Hadd as they aimed at correction and eradication of various criminal/moral acts or social evils. Tazkiya-Tush-Shuhud, though desired, was not a mandatory requirement for cases wherein Tazir punishment was awarded. Courts were to determine credibility of witnesses and to properly appreciate evidence on record before awarding any punishment to accused. Petitioner could not make any specific reference to any Verse of Holy Quran nor could cite any judgment from Sunnah of Holy Prophet (p.b..u.h.) to support his contentions. PETITION DISMISSED. PLD 2007 Quetta (DB) 25. Agha Shahid Hassan Bugti V/S Federation of Pakistan S.11-B, E, H, O & Q. Freezing of Bank accounts. Allegations against petitioner was that he allegedly was member of a prescribed organization --- Validity--- Federal Government or competent Authority had been authorised under S.11-E of the ATC Act to freeze accounts of proscribed organizations and not of individuals who were suspected to be affiliated or associated with such proscribed organization. For individuals separate procedure had been laid down in S.11-O and 11-Q of the 1997 Act, wherein only Anti-Terrorism Court had been authorized to forfeit the money or other property of individuals upon their conviction U/S 11-H of Anti-Terrorism Act. Bank accounts of the petitioner, in the present case were not forfeited by Anti-Terrorism Court nor he was tried or convicted by the court, but under impugned notification issued by Ministry of Finance on the request of Interior Ministry of exercising the powers purportedly U/S 11-E of the 1997 Act, which did not confer powers on Federal Government or any other Authority to freeze account of an individual. Allowing petition, it was declared by the High Court that directions to freeze accounts of petitioner were without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Banks were directed to honour the cheques of petitioner and make payment. PLD 2006 Lahore 111. Abdul Rauf V/S Chief Commissioner Islamabad S.11-EEE. Art.199 of Constitution. Detention order. Validity. Chief Commissioner had passed the order of detention on the basis of the list notified in the Fourth Schedule, under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, vide office Notification that the accused was an activist of a banned party. Procedure as provided in S.11EEE of the said Act had not been adopted. Accused was not asked to execute bonds to the satisfaction of the District Police Officer for his good behaviour and not to involve himself in any act of terrorism. Even the grounds of his arrest and detention were not conveyed to the accused. Chief Commissioner had failed to justify as to how the accused was acting in the manner prejudicial to the activity or security of Pakistan or any part thereof or to extraordinary affairs of the Government or maintenance of supply of service. Liberty of a cigizen could not be curtailed merely on presumptions. Impugned order of detention passed by the Authorities was consequently declared to be without lawful authority and was set aside accordingly. (2) S.11-EEE. Detention order, passing of. Registration of a case alone is not sufficient to curtail the liberty of a citizen on spy information that he was a terrorist, as it amounts to punish him before proving the allegation against him. (3) S.3 West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1973. Constitutional jurisdiction. Scope – High Court can insist on discloure of the material on which the executive authority had acted, subject to the right of the State to claim privilege in respect of an appeal against decision of executive authority. Mere production of order of the detaining authority in proof of “satisfaction” is not sufficient. IMPURGNED ORDER SET-ASIDE. 2007 PCrLJ 956. Mst. Sakeena Mai V/S Government of Punjah (Lahore) S.11-EEE. Petitioner had impugned order passed by Secretary to Provincial Government whereby arrest and detention of accused/detenu in exercise of powers under S.11-EEE of Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 was directed. Law officer in his report had simply submitted a report to District Police Officer and appended a list of cases in which detenu/accused had been involved. Law officer had further stated that impugned order was passed on basis of secret reports of the Agencies which could not be produced in the court being privileged documents. Question as to whether certain documents was privileged one, could only be determined by the court and not by the Authority relying upon the documents while passing impugned order. No sufficient material was available before detaining Authority at the time of passing impugned order, except report of District Police Officer and the list of cases in which accused had been involved in past. Detenu had already furnished bond in terms of S.11-EEE of 1997 Act and no material was available on record that either the detenu committed violation of said bond or that any fresh case was registered against him after submission of said bond. No evidence was also on record to show that detenu was convicted even in any of alleged criminal cases. Report of DPO was based on mere apprehensions and did not disclose even a single event of physical involvement or participation of detenu in any anti-social activity in order to attract provisions of S.11-EEE of the Act of 1997. Impugned passed against accused/detenu was declared to be without lawful authority. DETENU RELEASED. 2009 PCrLJ 257. Atta Ullah @ Hasnain @ Hassan V/S The State (Lahore DB) S.426(2-B)CrPC. S.25(8) ATC Act 1997. High Court during the appeal of convict, could suspend the sentence U/S 426 CrPC but in cases tried by Anti-Terrorism Court, the said powers, were not available in view of bar contained in S.25(8) of the ATC Act. When a court could not exercise a power of releasing accused on bail during the pendency of appeal before it, said jurisdiction could not be exercised even after the decision of appeal by invoking provisions of S.426(2-B) CrPC. (2) S.426(2-B) CrPC. S.13(a)(c )) & 13(b) Arms Ord. S. 4 & 5 Explosive Substance Act 1884, S.7 Surrender of Illicit Arms Ord.1991. Discretion had been left with the court to suspend the sentence of a convict who had been granted leave to appeal by the Supremem Court “if it would think fit according to the facts and circumstances of the case”. Mere fact that petitioner had been granted leave to appeal, would not, ipso facto, give him right to seek the suspension of sentenceHuge quangtity of illicit arms in the shape of a Kalashinkov, 3 magazines, 56 bullets and 2 hand-grenades, were recovered from the petitioner; and two courts had concurrently found him guilty, of the said offence and at that stage, it could not be said that such huge quantity was planted by the police to implicate the petitioner falsely. No special circumstances had been urged for suspension of sentence. Since the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, any more comments could prejudice the case of the petitioner before the apex Court. PETITION DISMISSED.
Posted on: Fri, 02 Jan 2015 13:43:40 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015