AS/Mon(2013)14rev 27 June 2013 amondoc14r_2013 or. Engl. Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) Consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia III. Access to the breakaway regions, including by international monitors 37. Access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia by civilians as well as by international organisations is of crucial importance from both the humanitarian and political perspectives. It has been the subject of PACE recommendations and the cease-fire of 12 August 2008 agreement. Regrettably, no progress has been achieved in this respect and the situation has even deteriorated recently. 38. In 2009, Russia vetoed continuation of the 100-strong UN presence operating mainly in Abkhazia, as well as the large OSCE mission that was active in Georgian controlled areas, as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia. UNDP and UNHCR presence in Abkhazia has been scaled back. 39. The EUMM does not have unrestricted access to the breakaway regions. EUMM experts have participated in the IPRM fact-finding visits that were authorised by the de facto authorities. The absence of impartial and independent monitors - and potential mediators in case of rising tensions - negatively affects the security climate in the region. 40. The de facto authorities of South Ossetia have, as a rule, refused access to international organisations, including for humanitarian reasons, via the south, except for the Geneva co-chairs and the ICRC. This attitude has contributed to the deep isolation of the region. 41. Initially, the de facto authorities of Abkhazia generally allowed access to international organisations via the south. However, this policy seems to have changed and most requests for visits are now refused. Today, Abkhazia is also to a large extent isolated, with international engagement limited to the work of a very few humanitarian and civil society organisations. Their activities are hampered by deliberate bureaucratic restrictions. 42. For Georgia, access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia is regulated by the law on the occupied territories. In principle there are no limitations for civilians to cross the ABL with these two regions. Foreign nationals are requested to inform the authorities that they will visit the two territories from within Georgia but do not need authorisation. However, the law specifically prohibits entering the occupied territories via the external borders of Georgia that are not under control of the authorities in Tbilisi, i.e. via Russia or via the sea in the case of Abkhazia. In order to enter the two territories via such borders explicit authorisation needs to be granted by the Georgian Cabinet of Ministers. Entering the two territories via the north without such authorisation, which is granted only in exceptional circumstances provided for in the law, is a crime according to Georgian law and punishable with hefty fines or prison sentences for repeat offenders. 43. The criminalisation of entry into the two occupied regions via its land borders with Russia (or sea in the case of Abkhazia) has contributed to the isolation of the two territories and has raised concerns among the international community, including neighbouring countries such as Turkey. The current authorities have proposed changing the law on the occupied territories on this issue. Illegal entry would not be decriminalised but punishment for first time transgression would be mostly symbolic. Although these proposals are fiercely criticised by the Georgian opposition, during our visit we were told that they will enter into force at the latest in July 2013. However, the Russian Foreign Ministry considers them insufficient to have any tangible impact. 44. The prohibition of crossing of the ABL in both directions by civilians imposed by the de facto authorities is of serious concern. The de facto authorities of South Ossetia do restrict civilian movement across the ABL with the exception of the Akhalgori region which is predominantly inhabited by ethnic Georgians. However, reportedly travel across the ABL with Akhalgori has recently also become increasingly more difficult. As a result, people who want to join their relatives living a few kilometres away behind the ABL, are obliged to travel via Vladikavkaz and cross the border between Georgia and North Ossetia, which amounts to a two- day journey. Holders of a Georgian passport still need a visa to enter Russia. Georgia has abolished visa requirements for Russian passport holders. 45. The de facto authorities in Abkhazia were more lenient with regard to ABL crossing. Ethnic Georgians residing in the breakaway region – predominantly in the Gali region - were relatively readily given permission to cross the ABL to obtain medical treatment or, for pupils, to attend Georgian schools. 46. However, the situation has become more difficult with the increased borderisation of the ABL, which has been practically finalised by now, and in particular after Russian border guards sealed off the ABL and, in September 2012, took full control over the only existing crossing point. Since then, crossing the ABL in any direction, even for humanitarian reasons, has become increasingly difficult, if not impossible. There have been reports of a number of fatalities on the ABL when the Russian border guards did not allow ambulances to cross from Abkhazia into Georgia proper, which is the nearest place for emergency medical services for residents of Abkhazia. 47. The sealing of the ABL has left many locals who do not possess so-called Abkhaz passports unable to cross to the Tbilisi-controlled part of the territory. According to the data released by the de facto Abkhazi authorities, about 13 000 passports, up from 3000 in 2010, have been issued to Gali Georgians. Most residents of Abkhazia, except ethnic Georgians from the Gali district, have Russian passports, but many more remain stateless under the laws imposed by the de facto authorities. 48. The current Georgian Government is considering softening its attitude towards Abkhazia residents travelling on Russian passports but not to those holding passports issued by Russian officials in Abkhazia itself, as this might give the impression of accepting Russian recognition of, or jurisdiction over, Abkhazia. It has also removed rules that complicated travel inside Georgia for those with Abkhazia and South Ossetia issued so-called “passports”, accepting them as valid ID documents within the Tbilisi-controlled territories. 49. Another concern is that many Gali residents must travel for hours to reach the only existing checkpoint. The intention of creating a second crossing point has been announced by the de facto authorities but so far it has not materialised. 50. Before the recent Georgian elections, almost all of Abkhazia “official” trade and border crossings went via the land border on the Psou River in Russia. The new Georgian Government has removed regulations that made it impossible to use Georgian roads to bring goods to Abkhazia through the ABL. 51. To further facilitate trade and increase freedom of movement, the new government says it is willing to consider restoring the railway over the ABL between the Tbilisi- and Sukhumi-controlled territories. assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2013/amondoc14rev_2013.pdf
Posted on: Fri, 28 Jun 2013 10:53:27 +0000