Administrative Error It is judicially acknowledged that failure to sign an official document could be due to an administrative error. In Practice Note (Guardianship: Justices’ Signatures) In re N(A Minor) (1972) I WLR 596 at 597 Sir, George Baker P said: “in the present case the justices’ reasons are signed by two justices . We have been told by Mr. Eady, who was present before the justices, that in fact three justices sat and that it appears from a letter from the justices’ clerk that the justice who has not signed was the chairman of the justices . The inference which I would draw from that is that the chairman dissented from the view of the other two justices. It is not satisfactory that this court should be left to draw that inference, which may be wrong. It may be that the failure to sign is simply an administrative error, or because the chairman has been ill or abroad, or something of that kind. Further, practice varies: some justices’ clerks put on the documents the names of the justices who were sitting, others do not. I would direct, first, that the names of the justices should always appear either, and preferably, at the top of the reasons or at the top of the notes. It is very important in many cases, and particularly in cases concerning children, for this court to know the composition of the bench and whether a lady or indeed ladies sat. Secondly, if a justice does not sign the reasons it should be stated either that the cause of not signing is that that justice did not concur in the decision or reasons, alternatively that there is some other reason, which need not necessarily be specified, for the absence of his or her signature.” The Court however did not base its judgment on the absence of the presiding judge’s signature but on the merits of the case. It however issued this Practice Direction for future guidance. In Plymouth Corporation v. Hurrel (1968)1 QB 455 CA. at 465-466 Salmon L. J commenting on the signature of a town clerk on a notice to a person in control of a house under the authority of the local council said “ Clearly the only purpose of having the town clerk’s signature upon the notice is to provide some evidence that it has been duly authorised by the local authority. The signature in itself has no .magic about it...” This being the clear purpose of a signature, in dealing with the problem of absence of signature of the presiding officers in this case, as sir Donald Nicholls V-C said in Deposit Protection Board v Dalia (1993)1 All ER 599 at 605- 606, “the court treading circumspectively, must look at the underlying purpose of the legislation and construe the draftsman’s language with that purpose in mind” Clearly the underlying purpose of the signatures of the presiding officer and the polling agents on the pink sheets is to provide evidence that the results to which they relate were those generated at the relevant polling station in compliance with the constitutional and other statutory requirements, otherwise each “ signature in itself has no magic about it.” The evidence in this case clearly shows that absent the presiding officer’s signature, those of the polling agents are there. In those circumstances even if the failure by the presiding officer to sign the same is condemned as unconstitutional yet the polling agents’ signatures, the public glare of the count and declaration of the results in question, the provision of copies of the same to the polling agents and their sustenance at the constituency’s collation centre and all the way to the strong room of the 2 nd respondent (the Electoral Commission) and the cross checking of the same thereat by the parties; representatives should satisfy the policy objective of article 49(6) regarding signature. Indeed the petitioners have not on any ground approaching prejudice of any sort questioned the authenticity of the results which do not bear the presiding officer’s signature. Even though the constitution is undoubtedly the most sacred law of this country, despite the passion attached to the rebirth of constitutionalism in 1969 it was not pursued even in those early days to the point of crushing substantial justice. Thus in Okorie alias Ozuzu v The Reupublic (1974) 2 GLR 272 C.A in reacting to the
Posted on: Thu, 05 Sep 2013 09:48:49 +0000
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