Anyone willing to proof my Heidegger paper? Yeah, I know. You totally dont have anything better to do with your time. Ill leave it here just in case. Heidegger, Sociality, and Therapy The purpose of this paper is not to attempt to present the totality of Heideggerian philosophy. Rather, this paper will focus on a brief and specialized exploration of the social implications of Heideggerian philosophy. One of the ideas that will be explored is the notion of Dasein. That is, Dasein, which is mine, is also about my relation to and with the Other. This is a point often glossed over in popular Heideggerian interpretations, which seem to generally suggest Heideggerian philosophy promotes a radical individualism. But before this discussion of Dasein’s social element is conducted, this paper will begin by briefly covering Heidegger’s encounter with Nazism. Some may find it difficult to talk about Heidegger without first addressing this elephant in the room – especially when the discussion revolves around sociality. This exploration is important in understanding Heidegger’s thoughts on others given the extremely negative predisposition many of us hold in regards to Nazism and anyone associated with Nazism. Many who have reviewed Heidegger have obviously found these predispositions difficult to suspend. Indeed, if one claims that a relationship with others has value but then supports a system that involves the exploitation and even killing of others, might we be justified in altering our perception of one’s philosophies? In the foreword section of Victor Faris’ Heidegger and Nazism, Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis conclude that “Heidegger stands as before us a singular case, philosophically sui generis, the source of one of the most influential currents of philosophical thought in our century, the only major thinker to opt for Nazism, the main example of absolute evil in our time—possibly of any time. The combination is without any known historical precedent” (p. ix, 1989). After this discussion of Heidegger’s association with Nazism and an exploration of his social philosophies, this paper, in the interest of pragmatism, will touch on some of the potential therapeutic implications of Heidegger’s leaping-in and leaping-ahead. That is, what might leaping-in and leaping-ahead look like in a therapeutic setting and how might it be a method of assisting others? A hypothetical example will be offered to help illustrate the point. In the interest of objectivity, it should be noted that many of Heidegger’s Jewish critics may have had, and with good reason, a very difficult time maintaining objectivity when interpreting and analyzing his work after World War II for obvious reasons. For this reason David Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature seems appropriate in this situation: “Reason is a slave of the passions” (p. 415, T 2.3.3.4). This is not to take away from such criticisms of Heidegger, but to remind us of the profound power emotionality can have over our thinking processes. With this in mind, the findings of investigative Heideggerian scholars who have done a great deal of research on this matter will now be presented. In Eclipse of the Self, Zimmerman found that “Heidegger was not a supporter of the racist elements of National Socialism; in fact, he initially hoped to focus the movement on higher goals” (p. 191, 1981). Here, Zimmerman found that Heidegger was possibly duped by the promise of a socialized alternative to capitalism, not aware that racial hatred and elitism would take center stage within the movement. In Heidegger and Nazism, the foreword authors found that “Heidegger severed his links to the movement when he realized its true nature and criticized it in his later writings; he was never a racist and went out of his way to defend various Jews, including Husserl; he never abandoned the discipline of serious philosophical inquiry for any more immediately political goal” (p. x, Farias, 1989). This is in agreement with Zimmerman’s findings, that Heidegger was not a racist. This also provides insight into Heidegger’s “holding fast” to his philosophical principles, not purposefully compromising integrity for political favor. Zimmerman echoes these findings: “In his lectures on Nietzsche in 1936-1937, Heidegger sharply criticized the decadent conception of human ‘greatness’ propounded by the Wagnerians so popular with Hitler” (p. 192, 1981). This again confirms Heidegger’s disinterest in racial inferiority or elitism. Although it took him a while to do so, Heidegger eventually disconnected himself from Nazism, though this may not have been as “blatant” as some would have liked. Heidegger was known as a proud man, perhaps even arrogant. Maybe these personality characteristics shed some light on why Heidegger was slow to disassociate himself from Nazism. Heidegger is often viewed as someone who was obsessed with the self. Indeed, when Heidegger writes of Dasein in Being and Time, he claims, on page 223 of the Guignon & Pereboom translation, that “Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine” (Guignon & Pereboom, 1995). In The Fragile “we”, Vogel, at least initially, reaches a similar conclusion when he weighs Heidegger against Buber: “But in Buber’s philosophy responsibility for myself always occurs within the horizon of responsibility to the ‘Thou.’ In Heidegger’s account of existence, on the other hand, the self appears to take priority over others” (p. 2, Vogel, 1994). Since it cannot be denied that Dasein is about me, and that inauthentic living is a condition where my Dasein loses its identity to damning conformity, is this a “take away” that allows us to accurately conclude that others have no valuable place in the world? Feminist philosopher Tina Chanter doesn’t think so. On page 6 of Time, Death, and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger, Chanter has an admonition in regards to such a conclusion: “I cite these passages in which philosophers, not only those who have greatly influenced by Heidegger’s though, but also those less engaged with it, record their admiration for him as a thinker of the first rank, to mark the impossibility of circumventing, avoiding, or refuting Heidegger’s philosophical contribution by any simple route or in any definitive way” (p. 6, 2001). Put simply, it’s not just that Heidegger should be respected for his contributions to the field of philosophy; it’s that a hasty critique of Heidegger is extremely difficult due to the complex range and scope of his philosophies. Dasein is no exception. And while we may never fully understand Dasein, it is imperative to remain open to just how far the scope of Dasein extends. If Dasein is in all cases mine, doesn’t this suggest, at least in part, that even if a relationship with the other is established, that the relationship is essentially self-serving? Vogel, on page 82 of The Fragile “we”, writes “That care is inevitably self-related does not imply that it is selfish. That I can only be open to the other’s horizon from my own, that my understanding of others is necessarily colored by my own prejudices, does not mean that I cannot learn from another” (p. 82, 1994). That is, my perspective is the starting place, but that doesn’t necessarily mean I am unable to bettered by external forces, nor does it mean that my relationship with others is only necessary if it suits my betterment. Even if Dasein were only about the pursuit of one’s egoism, Zimmerman writes, in Eclipse of the Self, that “Although the egoist thinks that he is fully individuated, the fact is that his goals, opinions, and desires are largely determined by prevailing social customs and expectations” (p. xxiii, 1981). Indeed, just how much of us is actually ours – are we not part of a world that influences us in profound ways? Now that we have established what Dasein’s totality is not, or at least broadened the range of what Dasein may be, it is appropriate to ask: Just how did Heidegger think of others? And in answering this question, it is probably best to let Heidegger speak for himself. On page 225 of Being and Time, Heidegger writes that the “world is always the one that I share with Others” (Guignon & Pereboom, 1995). If we share the world with others, where does Dasein, which is mine, fit in? Heidegger thinks that while Dasein is mine, Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is about a relationship with others. In this way, one’s own Dasein is actually enriched through a relationship with others: “One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power.” (p. 226, Guignon & Pereboom, 1995). Not only are we benefited by the Other, but the Other is benefited by us! This equates to a mutually beneficial relationship that is necessary for both Dasein and the Other. In Eclipse of the Self, Zimmerman explores the progression of Heidegger’s thought chronologically. Heidegger’s thoughts on sociality aren’t limited to Being and Time: “In his later work, Heidegger continued to develop the idea that human existence is not merely for itself but has a cosmic function” (p. 232, Zimmerman, 1981). Zimmerman expands on this point about a cosmic human relation by offering a useful illustration: “The beings of the cosmos mutually appropriate each other because they ‘make way’ for each other. The dry earth lets the rain be moist, and the rain lets the earth be absorbent” (p. 240, Zimmerman, 1981). This demonstration of the essentiality of relation can also be applied to the relationship between the self and others. For instance, suppose John is a college professor and Paul is a college student. Because of John, Paul is able to obtain a certain form for beneficial formalized education. Because of Paul, John is able to have a beneficial vocation. This “making way” that Zimmerman writes about is expanded upon by Vogel in The Fragile “we”: “And just as ‘existential solipsism’ does not remove one from, but elicits a more intimate appreciation of the world to which one always belongs, so it does not detach one from, but places one in a new capacity for relation with others” (p. 73, Vogel, 1994). Sometimes it is necessary to take a step “away” from something in order to see it in more clearly. But this step away does not constitute an actual distance; rather, it results in a truer, more accurate relationship. Vogel expands on this point: “It is clear that Heidegger sees authenticity as involving not resignation or a renunciation of the world but rather a double movement of withdrawal and return, of disorientation and reorientation. In this return or reorientation the world and others alike are disclosed in a new way” (p. 74, Vogel, 1994). A phenomenological example of this can be found in Fadiman’s The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down: “Sometimes I felt that the Hmong of Merced were like one of those visual perception puzzles: If you looked at it one way you saw a vase, if you looked at it another way you saw two faces, and whichever pattern you saw, it was almost impossible, at least at first glance, to see the other” (p. 252, Fadiman, 1997). This profound view of human connectivity is not only apparent in Heidegger’s later work, but can also be found in his work prior even to Being and Time. Summarizing Heidegger’s thought in a passage from his 1925 History of the Concept of Time lectures, McMullin writes in Time and the Shared World that the “publicity, commonality, and social interdependence of the world in which I exist are themselves essential features of my existing” (p. 32, 2013). The conclusion that we are left to contemplate is that we need one another. In McMullin’s recent work, Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations, she discusses how prominent Heideggerian interpretations are unfair to Heidegger’s potential social implications: “Dominant interpretations tend to misunderstand Heidegger’s work in this regard by characterizing Heideggarian self—Dasein… In response I develop an account of Dasein’s social nature that is grounded in Heidegger’s notion that Dasein’s originary temporality expresses itself in a heedful accommodation of the temporalizing presence of the other Dasein. In doing so I am able to provide an account of Dasein-to-Dasein relationships as a type of mutual recognition of individuated personhood within everydayness” (p. 3, 2013). That is, one’s Dasein may respect the individual Dasein of someone else without diminishment. Rather, this “mutual recognition” actually allows the self to pragmatically exist among others. McMullin expands on this idea of respecting the individuality of others while still maintaining one’s own Dasein: “By demonstrating the manner in which Dasein’s fundamental being-with-others is first and foremost a responsive acknowledgement of the other’s particularity, I am able to provide a Heidegger-inspired account of respect and the intersubjective origins of normativity” (p. 3, 2013). Some may find McMullin’s approach as a bit of a stretch. McMullin humbly qualifies herself: “…this book is not so much an interpretation as a creative restructuring of his work aimed at building from it a coherent, unified position that explicitly addresses this issue” (p. 4, 2013). Indeed, many philosophers have concluded that Heidegger’s social ontology is severely underdeveloped, which could explain why McMullin is attempting a more “explicit” approach. And although McMullin’s work is admittedly a “creative restructuring” as opposed to a philosophical “interpretation,” it is not without Heideggerian insight or value: “I thereby show how Heidegger may serve as a valuable resource for developing an appropriately complex understanding of the relationship between persons—a novel contribution not only to contemporary Heidegger scholarship but also to the philosophical tradition as a whole” (p. 3, 2013). We are yet again reminded not only of the complexity of Dasein, but of the complexity of our relation to others. And in “restructuring” our view of Heideggarian sociality, provided McMullin does not do violence to Heidegger by misrepresenting him, we are able to, as discussed in the previous paragraph, step outside of predispositions and see the same puzzle from a new position or from a different perspective. Before this brief discussion of McMullin is concluded, it is relevant to note McMullin’s interpretation of Heideggerian empathy. McMullin thinks that Heideggerian empathy should “provide the first ontological bridge from one’s own subject, initially given by itself, to the other subject, which is initially quite inaccessible” (p. 5). This beautifully sums up how confounding communication can be between two individuals and how empathy can help open the door to this “inaccessible” realm – the realm of the reality of the other. In fact, according to McMullin’s interpretation, Heidegger concludes that “there is no human self in the absence of the other” (p. 5). We are yet again reminded of the profound importance of the other when we meditate on the notion that we would not exist without the other – both in terms of actually existing (I’m born and brought into this world because of the other) and sociality (my Dasein battery is only fully charged when I am in relation with others). It is now appropriate to discuss the balance that sociality must find. That is, we must not go “overboard.” It is possible to fall into inauthentic living by not paying enough honest attention to oneself. Heidegger discusses this scenario in Being and Time: “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself” (p. 227, Guignon & Pereboom, 1995). Thus we must seek the balance between self and the other – we must walk a tightrope between authentic and inauthentic living. Failure to find this balance results in inauthentic living, which is an inward death. Failure to find authentic relation to the other also results in inward death. We cannot find our authentic destiny outside of community with other people, but we can also forfeit our authentic self if we do not find this balance. Heideggerian philosophy can yield therapeutic benefits. For instance, in considering leaping-in and leaping-ahead, one may be reminded of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. In leaping-in, we address basic, primal, immediate needs. This is the base of Maslow’s pyramid. In leaping-ahead, we encourage long term goals, self-resiliency, and self-actualization. This is the top of Maslow’s pyramid. There is a strong relationship between the two ideas therapeutically. That is, until someone’s basic needs are met, they cannot achieve self-actualization. Similarly, if someone has met their basic needs but isn’t working toward the goal of self-actualization, they may be caught in a perpetual state of infantile helplessness. Sometimes, in leaping-in to help someone, we may be doing more harm than good. A famous Chinese proverb demonstrates this issue perfectly: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” Suppose Marcus is a homeless man and Maximilian is a wealthy philanthropist. Maximilian has an idea to end homelessness in his city. To test his idea, Maximilian finds Marcus on a street corner and explains that he would like to help him. Max tells Marcus that he is building a series of nice apartments, all fully furnished. The apartments will have a dedicated chef who will prepare healthy, nutritious meals each day for all tenants. Max tells Marcus that he would like him to come live in these apartments and take advantage of the high quality meals that would be prepared for him. Max tells Marcus that the whole thing is free. Marcus accepts, and lives in a quality apartment receiving free meals for a significant amount of time. He spends his days watching television, playing video games, and sleeping. In this scenario, has Maximilian’s leaping-in done more harm than good? Will Marcus ever progress beyond having his basic needs met? Now consider a revised version of this scenario. Suppose Maximilian offers Marcus the same deal, but under one condition: Marcus must agree to work with a life skills specialist and community college advisement/guidance counselor. Maximilian hires both the life skills specialist and the guidance counselor and makes them available to Marcus. Now, while Marcus is having his basic needs (food and shelter) met, he is also being encouraged to find and explore his inborn talents. Marcus eventually earns a degree in an area that is true to his interests and goes on obtain solid employment, purchase a home, and contribute to society in a much higher capacity than before. In this scenario, Maximilian’s leaping-ahead encouraged Marcus to better himself. But in order to reach a leaping-ahead level of relation with Marcus, Maximilian first had to leap-in and meet Marcus’ basic needs. In this scenario, both Maximilian and Marcus were nurtured. The relationship was mutually beneficial. Maximilian’s Dasein needed to help the other in order to reach a bettered version of itself. Marcus’ Dasein needed to be given help in order to progress to a stage where he became able to exist authentically instead of merely meeting the basic needs of survival. This is how Heideggerian social philosophies may look when practiced therapeutically.
Posted on: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 15:02:33 +0000
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