As will be shown, atheism frequently arises out of definitional - TopicsExpress



          

As will be shown, atheism frequently arises out of definitional problems. The most prominent ones throughout history are restricted and inadequate definitions of “God,” “love,” and “evil.” We will consider each in turn. (1) Restricted Definition of God. At this juncture, the reader might ask, “If the existence of God cannot be disproved, what is the foundation of atheism?” The brief answer is that it cannot be grounded in a formal argument based upon the definition of “God” given above (“absolutely simple” or “unrestricted,” or “infinite” – in the sense of an A-infinity). If a proof against the existence of God is to be formulated, it would have to have an alternative definition of God which introduces exclusionary properties, restrictions, or finitude into the definition. For example, if one defines “God” as a being which would necessarily interfere with human freedom (which would be contrary to the purely inclusive properties of perfect love and perfect goodness/justice, etc.), then one might be able to formulate an argument which says, “If human beings are absolutely free, then ‘god’ (defined as necessarily interfering with freedom) cannot exist.” But the definition of God in this argument is arbitrarily restricted (and contradicts the absolute simplicity and unrestrictedness of the unconditioned Reality -- see Encyclopedia Units E-F). Furthermore, if one understands a purely inclusive God to be perfectly loving and good, one would have to say that God helps human freedom in every way possible to be complete and perfect, and therefore, would not undermine human freedom. (2) Suffering and “Love.” One might have had a terrible experience of suffering or grief, and think to oneself, “How could God allow this to happen? My grief is incompatible with a perfectly loving God!” One might go on to think that this is a disproof of the perfect love of God which might suggest that God is not purely inclusive or that pure inclusivity does not include love; and if pure inclusivity does not include love, and God is not perfectly loving, then there is no point in affirming His existence. There can be little doubt that the primary reason for atheism is the inability to answer the question of human suffering. The importance of this question has led me to write yet another volume entitled Suffering and the God of Love. For the moment, I will endeavor a brief answer, though this is quite dangerous because the superficiality intrinsic to brevity may cause resentment on the part of readers who have suffered greatly. Nevertheless, I will proceed in the hopes that the reader will forgive this unavoidable flaw, and direct attention to my other volume on suffering for a lengthier treatment. Once again, atheism arises out of an assumed definition – but this time it does not arise out of a definition of “God;” it arises out of a definition of “love” which is attributed to God. The effect is essentially the same because when the inadequate definition of love is attributed to God, it seems to mitigate the perfect inclusivity of God. So, what is this so-called inadequate definition of “love”? It is one that holds that love is incompatible with suffering. In my view, this definition is overly simplistic for several reasons. I will mention only two of them here. First, the above definition does not consider the interrelationship between freedom and love. If our love is to be our own, then we must be free to do acts of unlove (which could cause great harm, suffering, or evil). Stated conversely, if we are not free to do anything but love, then our love is not our own. It is merely a program of behavior that has nothing to do with our choice. Our love would not be self-initiated. Thus, if God wants to create loving creatures (in imitation of His perfect love), God has to create free beings who can cause suffering and evil in the world by their choices. The dynamics of love and freedom require that God allow us the latitude to grow in love through our human freedom. God’s only alternative to allowing free beings to choose unloving acts is to completely refrain from creating loving creatures. Is that something that perfect Love would do? The second problem with defining love as incompatible with suffering is that it does not allow for suffering to purify freedom toward love. I will speak solely for myself, here; but often I have contented myself with an incredibly superficial view of life’s meaning (e.g., material well-being, ego-satisfactions, status, etc.) and incredibly superficial views of human beings (as material beings instead of transcendental beings; as problems instead of mysteries) during the “good” times. It was only when I was challenged by real suffering that I began to ask more probative questions, to search for deeper purpose in life, and to let go of what was then manifestly superficial (underliving my life). These moments of suffering led me to the discovery of love as the purpose of life – to the enjoyment of others’ companionship and friendship, to the recognition of the goodness and lovability of others, to the depth of empathy and compassion; indeed, to the discovery of my heart. I do not think I could have let go of my more superficial, materialistic, egocentric views of happiness and meaning without having experienced suffering, deprivation, and need for others. Furthermore, I do not believe that I would have discovered my own transcendental identity without this same deprivation and need. Much like Saint Augustine, my contentment with material and ego-satisfactions distracted me from noticing that I had desires for perfect and unconditional Truth, Love, Goodness/Justice, Beauty, and Home Though I went to church and had some religious sensibility, I tended to live life on a material-ego level. Suffering not only led to a discovery of my heart, but also of my transcendental desires; and this discovery, in turn, led not only to a discovery of my transmaterial being (what might be termed my “soul”), but also of my yearning for unconditional Love – my yearning for God. In retrospect, I am grateful for the suffering that led me to the discovery of love, my heart, my soul, and the loving God. I did not like my suffering while I was experiencing it, but the journey – the journey in freedom – that led to the discovery of what is truly pervasive, enduring, and deep, made the suffering worthwhile; for it led to an eternity’s worth of purpose, a true respect for the transcendent other, and the discovery not merely of my heart, but of my transcendent heart and my call to unconditional Love. No, for me, suffering was not incompatible with love. Suffering was the instrument of Love. (3) Inadequate Definitions of Evil Another issue has recurrently emerged throughout the history of philosophy, namely, the problem of evil. It would seem that if God is perfect Goodness and Love, He would not permit evil in the world; and furthermore, it would seem that anything evil should be excluded by God (who was defined above to be a perfectly inclusive Reality). Again, the seeming incompatibility between a perfectly good God (a perfectly inclusive God) and evil arises out of an assumed definition. This time, the definition of “evil” seems incompatible with perfect Goodness and inclusivity. Since evil seems to be evident, it seems to mean either that God is not perfectly good or that a perfectly good (perfectly inclusive) God does not exist. Let us consider the first point, namely, that if God is perfectly good, He would not allow evil in the world. This contention has already been addressed above with respect to the definition of “love,” so I will only briefly repeat the germane point: if God were to disallow all human evil, then God would have to disallow the free choice to act in an evil way; and if God disallowed the free choice to act in an evil way, He would not allow our good actions to be self-initiated. He would essentially have programmed us for good behaviors, but not allowed us to choose good behaviors over against the option of choosing evil ones; therefore, He would have foreclosed the possibility of our good actions truly being self-initiated, and therefore truly being our own. Furthermore, acts of human evil can purify our freedom toward perfect Love, for when evil actions are perpetrated against us, we are challenged to respond with a gift of self (love) in forgiveness, mercy, and compassion. These selfless actions (which are frequently undeserved by the perpetrators) are the highest manifestations of human generosity and love. Ironically, they are elicited by evil. The story of my life, as well as world history and literature, are replete with examples of how forgiveness of evil has led to the intensification of goodness and love. Would Europe be the same without the Marshall Plan in which America forgave the debt (and built up the economies) of the nations with whom it had been at war?[4] Would Viktor Hugo’s hero, Jean Valjean, have existed without the forgiveness of the priest from whom he had stolen the candles?[5] Would the great ideas of human rights and economic rights have occurred without the forgiveness of centuries of oppression? The list goes on and on. Evil elicits vengeance, and vengeance begets vengeance, unless a free agent intervenes and lets go of the just offense in a recognizable act of compassion. This act not only stops the cycle of vengeance begetting vengeance, but also calls collective human consciousness to a higher ideal, a higher sense of collective self, which is at once intrinsically beautiful, while allowing the real possibility of peace. Ironically, this greatest of human choices can be induced by evil. We may now proceed to the second point of tension between God and evil, namely, that if God is perfectly good, He must exclude evil (which seems to contradict His pure inclusivity). Again, the problem is definitional, for the definition of “evil” seems to get in the way of God being both perfect goodness and perfect inclusivity. However, the definition of “evil” which does this views “evil” as something positive – as something existing in itself. A brief summary of the volumes which have been written on this since the time of Plato shows a more comprehensive view of “evil” which does not view it as something positive or existing in itself. In this view, evil is seen to be a negation of a free being’s power to love. Obviously, the free being exists, and his power to love exists (and is positive). But evil does not exist apart from this free being and his positive capacity to love. Evil occurs when the existing free agent negates (ignores or undermines) his positive power to love. Now, these evil actions could have, say, angry feelings embedded in them. But these feelings are not identifiable with evil itself; they are the result of evil (that is, a free agent’s choice to ignore or undermine his capacity for love). Furthermore, destructive (evil) behaviors may come from this free agent, but these behaviors are also not identifiable with evil itself; they are the result of evil (i.e., a free agent’s choice to ignore or undermine his capacity for love). Thus, the occurrence of evil is not something which exists in itself; rather, it is the result of a free agent’s choice to ignore or undermine the capacity for affection, empathy, compassion – love. In sum, evil can occur through an existing free agent, and it arises out of the ignoring or undermining of an existing capacity for love. It can give rise to feelings and destructive behaviors which have ontological status. However, the evil of the free agent, of the feelings, and of the destructive behaviors does not exist of itself. It occurs through the negating of the positive power to love in the free agent. If this definition of evil is correct, then it is not excluded by God; for it has no existence which can be excluded. God’s perfect goodness and perfect inclusivity remain completely compatible. There are other kinds of atheism not connected to the notion of “God,” and therefore not concerned with incompatibility between God and a particular phenomenon (say suffering or evil). For example, socio-political atheism generally tends to be more irreligious than atheistic. It objects to religion because it is, say, an “opium of the people” (a distraction from needed socio-political change). Philosophers who proffer these claims frequently do not offer any argument against the existence of God, but rest their case on their sense of religion as antithetical to human progress. Many such philosophers frequently ignore the fact that religion is responsible for social progress in many arenas, such as the initiation and advancement of laws, legal systems, social welfare systems (through, say, prophets who exhorted the populace to care for widows and orphans), schools and educational systems, hospitals and health care systems, etc. This makes those philosophers’ selective view of history quite suspect. I would like to conclude this section by returning to an important point made earlier – namely, that I do not want my brief treatment of suffering and evil to convey in any way a disregard for the true suffering that so many have endured in their lives. Grief at the loss of a loved one, debilitation at the loss of one’s faculties, indignity at the hands of callous individuals, should never be underestimated. My sole purpose in treating the above topics was to show how careful we must be in our definitions of “love,” “evil,” and “God.” As we attempt to translate our deepest emotions and experiences into concepts, we will want to remember that the more nuanced and complete the definitions, the more they will correspond to the truth; and the more they correspond to the truth, the more they will present the path to healing and deliverance within the horizon of unrestricted Love, Goodness, Justice, Beauty, and Home. We are now in a position to objectively and comprehensibly consider the age old objection to theism that belief in God is near wishful thinking.
Posted on: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 07:38:46 +0000

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