At the beginning of 1939 the bulk of the garrison defending the Canal was divided between two separate sectors that were about as far apart organizationally as they were geographically. The Pacific Sector had a slight preponderance of force. Assigned to it were the 4th Coast Artillery Regiment, the 33d Infantry, and a battalion of the 2d Field Artillery. At the opposite end of the Canal, in the Atlantic Sector, were the 1st Coast Artillery Regiment and the 14th Infantry. Antiaircraft units made up part of both coast artillery regiments. In addition to these troops assigned to the sectors, certain units were directly under the commanding general of the Panama Canal Department. These department troops included air units-the 19th Wing (composite), with about 28 medium bombers, 14 light bombers, 24 pursuit planes, and a few trainers and utility planes. Plus a regiment of combat engineers, together with Signal Corps, quartermaster, and ordnance units, and other service and administrative detachments. The total strength of the garrison-sector as well as department troops-came to approximately 13,500 men. To the Army garrison was given the mission of protecting the Canal against sabotage and of defending it from positions within the Canal Zone. Close-in defense was thus an Army responsibility except for two specific tasks: that of providing an armed guard on vessels passing through the Canal, and that of maintaining a harbor patrol at the entrances to the Canal. Both of these tasks were entrusted to the Navy and Coast Guard, along with its primary responsibility for offshore defense. Plans for protecting the Canal against sabotage during an international crisis of this sort had been drawn up in Panama and given constant study ever since the spring of 1936. Now, steps to put them into effect were quickly taken. Three basic measures had been provided for: first, the installation and operation of special equipment in the lock chambers, designed to detect underwater mines and bombs and to prevent damage from this cause; second, the restriction of commercial traffic to one side of the dual locks at a time; and third, the inspection of all ships before they entered the Canal and the placing of an armed guard on vessels while in transit through it. Reinforcements had been arriving in Panama in a steady stream. At the end of January 1940 the strength of the garrison stood not quite at 19,500 men; by the end of April it had risen to approximately 21,100. This build up continued so that when the Japanese attack on Hawaii came, there were nearly 58,000 troops on guard in -the Canal Zone, in the Republic of Panama. General Marshall and Secretary Stimson decided to restrict Canal traffic for an indefinite period; for the purpose of effecting repairs. in mid to late 1940, this was when the SIP7 system began being secretly implemented. What this amounted to was a complete exclusion of Japanese shipping through the canal; all other vessels even remotely connected with the European Axis were permitted to pass through after close inspection and the placing of American personal onboard. So, as early as July 1941 all ships, no matter their flag of origin were being boarded and inspected before they were escorted through the canal, and no Japanese ships were allowed to transit the canal. When they were re-routed away from the Canal, the Japanese Embassy protested. But they received a very noncommittal reply from Acting Secretary of State Welles, who had been informed by the War Department of its intentions and who was in complete accord with them. Then you have to factor in that the War Department, which had administered the Canal Zone and the Canal since 1904 when it was started and then completed by the Army Corps of Engineers in 1914. They had always thought of ways to protect it from sabotage by both air attack and enemy shipping. And they had been in complete control of the Zone. The crews of ships transiting the canal were removed all during The Great War, and the ship was manned by USN/USCG personnel, and guided by a USN pilot at the helm after complete inspections and before entering the canal proper. This policy was relaxed during the inter-war years, but re-instituted in 1939. It was during early 1940 that all European Axis friendly ships, or ships flying occupied nations flags were barred from using the canal, completely. Any suspect ship was de-crewed and held for 24 hours with armed guards on the ship. After 1940 few if any Polish, Belgian, Dutch, Norwegian, Vichy French, Austrian, or Danish flagged ships transited the canal without extensive inspection and crew removal, period. This also excluded the Indo-Chinese flags which had been occupied by Japan with the nod of the Vichy French. By an odd extension, this also excluded the flags of the Soviet Union merchant marine for a time, as they had that non aggression pact with Hitler, and later when the Japanese were fully barred, it was in July 1941 and the Soviet shipping was once again allowed!
Posted on: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 16:22:17 +0000