Au venit chinezii Acum cateva zile, premierul Chinei, Li Keqiang, a vizitat Romania, tinand, cu aceasta ocazie, un frumos discurs in Parlament cu referiri la Milescu Spataru, echipamente industriale romanesti importate de China in anii ’50 ori filmul “Valurile Dunarii”. Vizita sa a prilejuit guvernului nostru mari motive de satisfactie, investitiile promise fiind vazute deja ca principala realizare a actualei puteri. Presa prietenoasa guvernului s-a entuziasmat, publicul a trait inaltatoare momente. Unii, mai realisti, ne-au explicat ca, de fapt, nu suntem asa importanti pentru chinezi, acestia dorindu-si numai un “cap de pod” in Uniunea Europeana. In contextul entuziasmului general, am recitit capitolul “China 2020” din lucrarea “The next 100 years” a lui George Friedman. Geopoliticianul american a venit si el in Romania mai pe la inceputul anului, parca, dar a uitat sa ne lase cateva pasaje din prognoza lui sumbra cu privire la China. Spicuind din lucrarea lui G.F. vedem ca noul nostru “cel mai bun vechi preten” are niste probleme, investitiile in tara noastra fiind ultima dintre acestea. Its a tricky business. A geopoli-tricky business, that is: 1. Nu se mai poate extinde, fiind izolata: First, China is an island. It is obviously not surrounded by water, but it is surrounded by impassable terrain and wastelands that effectively isolate it from the rest of the world [pg. 89]. Geografia determina strategia, aceasta da forma istoriei si creaza mentalitati. Optiunile Chinei sunt, din acest punct de vedere, limitate. Ori izolationism ca’n vremea lui Mao, ori deschidere catre comert ca’n secolul al XIX ori acum. De regula, deschiderea catre comert a dus la imbogatirea regiunilor de coasta si dezechilibru fata de interiorul sarac. Discrepanta a dus la scaderea puterii guvernului central si ruperea statului de-a lungul granitelor sale regionale. The Europeans encountered a China in the mid- nineteenth century that was going through one of its isolationist periods. It was united but relatively poor. The Europeans forced their way in, engaging coastal China in intense trade. This had two effects. The first was the dramatic increase in wealth in the coastal areas that were engaged in trade. The second was the massive increase in inequality between China’s coast and the poor interior regions. This disparity also led to the weakening of the central government’s control over the coastal regions, and to increased instability and chaos. The coastal regions preferred close ties to (and even domination by) the Europeans. [90] 2. Cresterea economica nu’i sustenabila: China’s economy is not nearly as robust as it might seem, and its political stability, which depends heavily on continuing rapid growth, is even more precarious. [88] „Visul chinezesc” a fost dintotdeauna o China unita si deschisa. China unita inseamna un guvern central puternic, capabil sa tina regiunea de coasta sub control si interiorul multumit. Pare sa’l fi realizat Deng Xiaoping (succesorul lui Mao), dar pariul sau se bazeaza pe sustinerea ritmului de crestere economica. Iar el nu se poate sustine. In primul rand, pentru ca se bazeaza pe imprumuturi sub rata de dobanda internationala. In al doilea rand, pentru ca nu tine cont de realitatile structurale ale economiei de piata (un stat, totusi, comunist), multe dintre imprumuturi fiind neperformante. In al treilea rand, pentru ca este finantat din export ieftin. Mai devreme sau mai tarziu (dar nu prea tarziu) realitatile economice nu vor mai putea fi ignorate, iar orice scadere a ritmului economic chinez are doua efecte devastatoare: a) regiunile de coasta bogate vor cauta „exitul” de sub controlul Beijing-ului; ‘un businessman din Shanghai are mai multe in comun cu un businessman din Los Angeles’ decat cu un taran din Houpei. b) presiunea interiorul sarac asupra guvernului central pentru suprataxarea oraselor de coasta. Primii vor tinde spre sciziune, ceilalti spre revolta - e istoria Chinei! China is gambling at the beginning of the twenty- first century that it can carry out an indefinite balancing act. The assumption is that it will be able to gradually shift resources away from the wealthier coastal regions toward the interior without meeting resistance from the coast and without encountering restlessness in the interior. Beijing wants to keep the various parts of China happy and is doing everything in its power to achieve that end. Underlying this is another serious, and more threatening, problem. China appears to be a capitalist country with private property, banks, and all the other accoutrements of capitalism. But it is not truly capitalist in the sense that the markets do not determine capital allocation. Who you know counts for much more than whether you have a good business plan. Between Asian systems of family and social ties and the communist systems of political relationships, loans have been given out for a host of reasons, none of them having much to do with the merits of the business. As a result, not surprisingly, a remarkably large number of these loans have gone bad—“nonperforming,” in the jargon of banking. The amount is estimated at somewhere between $600 billion and $900 billion, or between a quarter and a third of China’sGDP, a staggering amount. These bad debts are being managed through very high growth rates driven by low- cost exports. [92] 3. Criza politica. Retinem sciziunea Chinei din perioada de dupa intruziunea britanica si triunful lui Mao. Atunci afacerile de pe coasta chineza gravitau in jurul comertului, investitiilor si intereselor straine, incercand sa iasa de sub controlul guvernului central. Criza politica a Chinei e cauzata de acest dezechilibru de teluri. Interiorul doreste suprataxarea regiunilor de coasta si redistribuirea bogatiei, coasta doreste ruperea de interiorul sarac. Cand banii nu vor mai „curge” in China, guvernul de la Beijing va trebui sa apeleze la coercitie. Pentru a preveni revolte in interior si a’si mentine controlul va fi nevoit sa se indrepte catre coasta. Pentru a mentine China unita va fi musai sa o re-inchida, iar pentru asta vor apela la nationalism. Strainii vor fi facuti vinovati pentru situatia economica a tarii. E un scenariu probabil. Dar cum bunastarea birocratiei si aparatului repesiv depind de bogatia regiunilor de coasta, controlul centrului va scadea si China se va scinda din nou. E un scenariu si mai probabil. The problem for China is political. China is held together by money, not ideology. When there is an economic downturn and the money stops rolling in, not only will the banking system spasm, but the entire fabric of Chinese society will shudder. Loyalty in China is either bought or coerced. Without available money, only coercion remains. Business slowdowns can generally lead to instability because they lead to business failure and unemployment. Ina country where poverty is endemic and unemployment widespread, the added pressure of an economic downturn will result in political instability. [...]A businessman in Shanghai has interests in common with Los Angeles, New York, and London. Infact, he makes far more money from these relationships than he does from Beijing. As Beijing tries to clamp down on him, not only will he want to break free of its control, but he will try to draw in foreign powers to protect his and their interests. Inthe meantime, the much poorer people in the interior of the country will be either trying to move to the coastal cities or pressuring Beijing to tax the coast and give them money. Beijing, caught in the middle, either weakens and loses control or clamps down so hard that it moves back to a Maoist enclosure of the country. [...] The critical question is which outcome is more likely. Ifthere is indeed a serious economic crisis, the central government will have to find a substitute ideology for communism. Ifpeople are to sacrifice, it must be for something they believe in—and if the Chinese cannot believe in communism, they can still believe in China. The Chinese government will atempt to limit disintegration byincreasing nationalism and the natural companion of nationalism, xenophobia. Historically, China has a deep distrust of foreigners and the party will need to blame someone for economic devastation. As Mao blamed foreigners for China’sweakness and poverty, the party will again blame foreigners for China’seconomic problems. [96/97] Ebosa acestui text este urmatoarea: nu numai ca economia Chinei nu o va aduce pe aceasta in postura de lider mondial, dar nici macar superputere economica nu va fi pentru multa vreme. Uitati investitiile in strainatate (deci in Romania), China se va intoarce impotriva ei insei, intrand in „stare de criza pe care o traverseaza periodic”. Concluzia e ca s’ar putea sa ne entuziasmam prea devreme. Sau sa ne fi trezit prea tarziu. Previziunile lui Friedman sunt pentru 2020, dar e clar ca ele sunt devansate. Putem sa le avansam pentru 2030, argumentele stau in picioare. Sau, macar, daca scenariile geopolitice nu sunt plauzibile, analiza ramane una interesanta.
Posted on: Tue, 03 Dec 2013 18:57:51 +0000
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