Based on the idea that the adaptive function of conscious perception may have been to influence others to ascribe certain perceptual states to oneself, it is possible that the likelihood of conscious perception of certain cues may be based upon whether the other individual is a friend or a rival (one might be more likely to consciously perceive something that could provide benefits if the other individual was someone with whom one has a cooperative relationship). This evolutionary approach to consciousness would predict that explicit memory (which is also considered ‘conscious’ memory) would play a larger role in influencing others, than would implicit memory (or ‘unconscious’ memory)12 , priming and the recognition of relations in a visual set (Eichenbaum, 1999). Being able to (selectively and sometimes self-deceptively) share information about facts and events could have had a significant effect on reproductive success, especially considering the importance of social relations in determining status and resource distribution in the Pleistocene13 . The functional role of explicit memory (and selective explicit memory) might be to allow for the communication of information that can most effectively manipulate others in the social environment into forming a favorable representation of ones own mental state. This framework might also have interesting applications for the study of memory in other animals. If ToM ability is, indeed, a prerequisite for the evolution of explicit memory, this means that any species without a ToM capacity could not have explicit memory. Another area of research that might benefit from this evolutionary perspective on consciousness is the study of social manipulation and self-deception. The individual variations in self-deceptive behavior suggest that there might also be individual variations in discrepancy between one’s ultimate intentions and the experience of proximate intentions through consciousness. Individuals who are high in self-deception may have self-reflective ToMs that represent more proximate goals and individuals low in self-deception may have representations of more ultimate intentions. Also, if the evolutionary function of indecision is to evaluate the externalities associated with potential actions and, in some cases, to aid in social exploitation, this suggests that one might be able to experimentally manipulate the degree of indecision that subjects experience. This model for indecision predicts subjects will report greater indecisiveness about performing an action that might impose costs on another individual when in the presence that individual, than when that individual is absent. Conclusion This paper presents a functional explanation for phenomenological experience based upon an evolutionary framework which neither ‘reduces’ consciousness to the physical processes (perhaps simply because we don’t have the tools to fully understand them) nor does it invoke any dualistic notions of a separation between body and mind, and it generates a variety of predictions that can be empirically tested. But does it answer the perennial question that should be asked of any theory of consciousness "Couldn’t all of this be true, and yet it still wouldn’t ‘be like anything’ to have all these properties that you ascribe to people?" That is a matter for the reader to determine. I do, however, suggest that certain evolutionary pressures may have led to the emergence of a sort of ‘social interface’ that has within it representations of the motives of oneself and others, access to certain memories 14 , perceptual information about the physical world, emotional experience, and the feeling that one is making decisions about one’s actions. The notion that consciousness evolved as a representation of the mental states that others would ascribe to oneself can be nothing more than speculative at this point, but it is intriguing that those perceptual and emotional elements that can be processed by the ToMs of others are the same elements that make up a large part of our phenomenological experience. Endnotes 1 Physical emotion such as desire, fear, pain and pleasure are those which involve interaction with physical resources (Nesse, 1998). They do not necessarily involve interaction with or an understanding of the social world. 2 In the Pleistocene, the ability to interact with others and form relationships was critical to reproductive success. The importance of the social emotions in this ability is well illustrated by the case of Phineas Gage, probably the most famous individual with damage to prefrontal areas of the brain,. He had been very social and well liked, but after damage to the frontal lobes, he behaved unethically, exhibited no observance of social conventions, demonstrated an inability to plan within a com plicated social environment and had no sense of responsibility towards himself and others (Damasio, 1994). 3 This self-referential theory of mind would be a representation of the information that other’s have about one’s own intentions. It might be more appropriate to call it a theory of another’s theory of one’s own mind. 4 Damasio (1994) refers to the ‘experience’ of emotion as feeling, something distinct from the emotion itself. And there is evidence (Lane, 1998) that emotional perception can occur outside of conscious awareness. 5 This is known as the ‘facial feedback hypothesis’ (Izard, 1971, Tomkins, 1980). 6 Schacter’s (1964)two-factor theory of emotion is not very different from this notion. This theory states that the conscious experience of emotion depends on physiological arousal and the cognitive interpretation of that arousal. 7 The phenomenon of blindsight provides an example of a situation in which the brain collects sensory information without conscious awareness. Individuals afflicted with blindsight lack any perceptual visual experience, but they can still make re markably accurate guesses about the occurrence of a variety of visual phenomena, (Dennet, 1991). In a sense, blindsighted individuals have ‘beliefs’ about the state of the world, but they are not aware of their own beliefs. (A belief being a particular st ate of mind in which a certain notion about the state of the world is represented, and can presumably be acted upon.) 8 By ultimate intentions I mean the ‘purpose’ towards which one’s behaviors, feelings and beliefs are ultimately directed. Self-deception is having a belief about one’s intentions that is not accurately representative of one ultimate intentions.< /P> 9 This could be either direct (being ‘honest with yourself’), as in a feeling of hunger when the ultimate intention is the consumption of food, or indirect (engaging in self-deception) as in a feeling that one wants to be with one’s mate for one’ s entire life, when one’s ultimate (‘subconscious’) intention may be to have several offspring and then abandon that mate and the offspring to seek out a new mate. 10 By indecision I mean something qualitatively different from uncertainty. Uncertainty presumably existed before indecision, as a byproduct of the fact that it is not always possible to determine all the physical effects of a potential ac tion. I am not suggesting that uncertainty was an adaptation, however I think it is likely that indecision emerged as a tool designed to evaluate the social effects of a potential action. 11 There are probably many circumstances in which the experience of indecision has a negative, as opposed to a positive, effect on one’s social environment, but this does not suffice as an argument against the evolvability of such a mechanism. Al l that would be necessary for the evolution of mechanisms underlying indecision is an average net benefit from keeping one’s options open, or convincing others that you are averse to imposing costs on them. 12 Schacter (1987) was one of the first to make this distinction between explicit and implicit memory. 13 It is interesting to note that explicit memory retrieval (but not implicit memory retrieval) has been found to activate prefrontal regions of the brain (Schacter, 1998). Some of the same prefrontal areas have been found to be active during The ory of Mind tasks (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Fletcher, et. al. 1995; Frith, working paper; Stone, 1998), which suggests that there may be interdependence of the two processes and that it might be useful to examine the relationship between ToM and explicit memory . 14 Selective memory and ‘flase’ memories would be included in the explicit memories to which the ‘social interface’ would have access.
Posted on: Thu, 19 Sep 2013 17:01:35 +0000
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