But by and large, the UPC was still organised and therefore to Obote it still enjoyed nationwide support. Therefore, the best way to oust Amin would be from Obotes view to launch a surprise military strike and following it the population would rise up and Amins government would fall. How do we explain as to why was Museveni so serious on a protracted struggle against Amin, unlike the UPC and Obote who preferred a direct military invasion of Uganda in the hope that Ugandans would rise against the Amin government? Once you know Musevenis obsession with power there is nothing surprising anymore. It was not like him to prefer to gradually build support in Uganda . There was another reason. Museveni who harboured political ambitions of his own recognised that he was an unknown factor in Ugandan politics. Nothing he could do at that stage could win him enough support across Uganda to make him president.This bitter truth disturbed him right up to the end of the 1970s. As we said earlier, he had expressed ambitions to one day be president of Uganda since his high school days. He never hid that ambition and in Tanzania it was burning as hot as ever. It was impossible that such an ambitious person could prefer a gradual process to oust Amin if an immediate and daring raid on Uganda could achieve that goal within a few days or weeks. Explain how come he advocated the gradual approach? Museveni was realistic enough about his chances to know that a strike at Amins regime followed by the downfall of the military government could only favour Obote. Instead of Amin, Obote would be the natural replacement since it was Obotes government that Amin had overthrown. Uganda s neighbours in the East African community, Kenya and Tanzania , would have supported Obotes return, since that would restore the landscape in Uganda to what they were familiar with. Museveni was an unknown figure in Ugandan politics and it was unrealistic to imagine that Amins downfall would see Museveni chosen to succeed Amin. Museveni hoped to use a gradual struggle to undermine Obotes support in Uganda , which he knew, as a former GSU intelligence officer, was widespread and was the real barrier standing in the way of Musevenis ambitions. The removal of Amin, by itself, would be no consolation to Museveni if this returned Obote to power. An attack on Uganda by FRONASA guerrillas in conjunction with Kikosi Maluum a guerrilla force loyal to Obote was launched on 17 Sept., 1972. President Amin got to know beforehand of the invasion. He even knew the codeword they planned to use: The Cow is about to Calve. Museveni secretly passed the codeword on to Amins security so that the invasion would fail and he gets credit for opposing a military invasion. That is why most of Obotes Kikosi Maluum suffered casualties when the attack was repulsed by government troops loyal to President Amin, but Museveni survived without even fighting. What fighting did he do? One of his friends Black Mwesigwa was so bitter with Museveni for betraying FRONASA and not doing actual fighting when the others in FRONASA were fighting. Little did Mwesigwa know that he was dealing with a snake. The Africa Contemporary Record reviewed this abortive invasion: There were a number of miscalculations and mistakes on Obotes side to account for the failure of the invasion. It came at a time when a strong current of popular support was running in Amins favour over the impending Asian exodus...Expectations that the invasion would lead to popular uprisings were not fulfilled. (Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents, 1972-73, page. B277). Obote and his supporters in Tanzania had not understood how quickly the political climate had changed since Obote was last in power. They had not understood that Amins simple education and his public image as a jokster and simple-minded crowd pleaser resonated with the majority of Ugandans who could not relate with the academic socialist and pan-Africanist ideology of the former Obote government. Moreover the squence of events in Uganda and the moves taken by Amin to consolidate his first wave of support had revealed this army general to be much more alert and politically savvy than people expected. Museveni understood better than Obote what was going on in Uganda , hence his view that a gradual effort was what was needed to remove Amin from power. But we need to remember that Museveni also betrayed his own fighters to Amins army so that he could be seen to be special at predicting disaster. How was FRONASA going to overcome the huge obstacle, namely Amins popularity? How were they to convince enough Ugandans to start doubting Amin so they as FRONASA could achieve their goal of gaining power? In the history of Uganda this question is not explained. It is agreed that Amin was initially welcomed by huge crowds and was very popular, but within a few months, he turned against his people and began what is termed his reign of terror.For sure it seems people dont care to ask as to why a leader who was enjoying such genuine support across much of the country, who traveled with only a handful of bodyguards should turn around and begin to terrorize the very people who had so welcomed him to power and continued to support him. The only reason to explain the terror that was going on in Uganda after late 1971 was that these were acts of sabotage by anti-Amin guerrilla groups. FRONASA, operating from Tanzania as well as inside Uganda , adopted a covert method to achieve its objectives. Most of the intellectual leaders of FRONASA like Eriya Kategaya and Augustine Ruzindana, Jack Maumbe Mukhwana did not know that Museveni was carrying out violent sabotage behind their back. This is a crucial part of Ugandan history known by very few people. Museveni was a plotting, far-sighted fellow. He was a non-drinker a non-smoker, and had no time for leisure. He sensed that regular political organisation and a conventional approach to politics would not work to his ends. He had to try something radically and horribly different. What he did kept a top secret even from some of his senior commanders and political associates was to engage in covert activities that would undermine Amins international credibility while at the same time eliminating the challenges that Museveni would face in his quest for power. Thus the Museveni doctrine called for a process of elimination of rising to the top by bringing down those at the top. Becoming the only towering national figure by eliminating instead of competing against those who were also heavyweights. Thats what Museveni tried to do to Colonel Kizza Besigye in February 2001 when he hatched a plot to shoot down the plane carrying Besigye to a campaign stop in Ajumani, but it was aborted when Besigyes campaign aide Okwir Rwabwoni insisted on being with Besigye. Okwirs brother Noble Mayombo who was part of the plot pleaded with Museveni that he could not face his family if his brother was killed by the government and he was part of the plan.That is why there was a scuffle at Entebbe Airport as military police and military intelligence tried to seize Rwabwoni so he could escape the assassination. You can see how Museveni works when he spread the false story that Besigye intended to kill Rwabwoni and blame it on the NRM government.
Posted on: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 07:32:27 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015