But while Southeast Asian countries may laud some of Beijing’s fresh initiatives, their view of the long-term trajectory of ASEAN–China economic relations is also tinged with caution, for two reasons. First, as the Singaporean commentator Simon Tay has noted, China’s economic size and power has grown tremendously relative to Southeast Asia since the 1990s, and this asymmetry alone worries some in the region today (Japan Times, August 15). Second, and on a related note, ASEAN countries may worry that being overly dependent on China economically would allow Beijing to use its dominance to undermine their foreign policy autonomy. The consequences of overdependence on China were on full display during ASEAN deliberations in Cambodia in July 2012, when Phnom Penh was pressured by its largest trading partner and investor to shape the agenda which eventually resulted in the organization’s unprecedented failure to issue a joint communiqué (Asia Times, July 27). Given these fears, some Chinese commentators and diplomats have emphasized that boosting economic ties with ASEAN requires more than just new economic proposals, but “enhancing political mutual trust” as well (Global Times, October 15; Xinhua, October 8). ASEAN’s reaction to some of the political-security initiatives in the 2 + 7 cooperation framework has been more cautious. Its response to the newly proposed Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation exclusively between China and ASEAN in the ASEAN–China Summit joint statement was a nuanced one, noting it with appreciation but also signaling a preference for a more open and inclusive agreement by mentioning Indonesia’s hope for a similar pact that includes “a wider Indo-Pacific region, beyond ASEAN and China” (ASEAN Secretariat). ASEAN Secretary General Le Luong Minh also later told The Straits Times in an interview that the Chinese proposal “has to be studied carefully first” (The Nation [Thailand], October 15). ASEAN also appeared cool to Beijing’s proposal for an informal ASEAN–China defense ministers meeting in China, choosing to leave this to “a convenient time in the future” in the statement (The Straits Times, October 11). And while the Chinese proposal to strengthen exchanges and relations in the security field may be a good idea in general, experts noted that even the recent enhanced defense ties Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to with Beijing during President Xi’s trip represent more continuity than change in what is still nascent cooperation (The Diplomat, October 16). ASEAN’s caution is not surprising. Greater economic cooperation with Beijing since the 1990s has failed to spill over into the political-security realm, and Southeast Asian states continue to be concerned to varying degrees about China’s growing military capabilities and its lack of transparency about its intentions. Beijing’s renewed assertiveness over territorial and maritime disputes with ASEAN countries in the South China Sea since 2009, including the imposition of unilateral fishing bans, harassment of vessels from other nations, and its saber-rattling at sea with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal, has only compounded these fears (see M. Taylor Fravel, Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 2011). This unease has manifested itself in various forms over the last few years, from Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew’s speech in October 2009 urging the United States to balance a rising China to investments in naval capabilities by South China Sea claimants Vietnam, the Philippines, and most recently Malaysia (Lee Kuan Yew, speech at U.S.–ASEAN Business Council Anniversary Gala Dinner, October 27, 2009; The Economist, March 24, 2012; IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 15). Meanwhile, totally absent from China’s new framework was any mention of dealing with the South China Sea with ASEAN as a region, although this dispute has been the main irritant in Beijing’s relations with Southeast Asia. Instead, Chinese officials at the recent round of Asian summitry repeated their mantra: that the disputes should be addressed bilaterally and that other external actors should not interfere (The Straits Times, October 11). Beyond the rhetoric, Beijing’s actions on the issue over the past few weeks have been worrying to say the least. Beijing disinvited Philippine president Benigno Aquino from the ASEAN–China Expo in Nanning, in apparent punishment for his government’s decision to turn to the United Nations to challenge China’s extensive maritime claims (South China Morning Post, August 2). More generally, experts say China has continued its foot-dragging on a binding code of conduct with ASEAN. Chinese officials continue to say that consultations should only be pushed forward in a step-by-step fashion, even as they work to delay meaningful progress by insisting that the issue be tackled by lower-level officials within the ASEAN–China Joint Working Group and proposing the establishment of an experts’ group to address technical issues (The Straits Times, October 1). But as one Chinese commentator correctly noted, distrust of China will linger in Southeast Asia unless Beijing demonstrates its willingness to address key security issues head-on rather than hoping that economic cooperation will spill over into other areas (Global Times, October 15).
Posted on: Sun, 04 Jan 2015 19:09:12 +0000
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