CHAPTER 32 HISTORY OF SUKKUR BARRAGE: 1855 - 1932 AD HISTORY History of Sukkur Barrage, controversies on its construction, economics, feasibility and funding over a period of nearly seventy years are so interesting that it has to be given proper place as detailed below: In 1847, Lt. Colonel Walter Scott, RE, in his report discussed the possibility of a dam across the Indus at Sukkur to supply water to irrigation canals, but rejected the idea because he thought that such a dam would surely turn the Indus from its present course. In 1855-57, J.G. Fife, RE, the then Superintendent of the Nara Survey, wrote a report ‘A Sketch of Irrigation in Sindh with Proposal for its Improvement’. In this report he suggested construction of five new canals — three of which were to irrigate almost the same area as the present Sukkur Barrage and two more, one each to irrigate left and right banks of the Indus between Jherruck and the Arabian Sea. In 1857, The Hon. Court of the East India Company remarked that Fife’s scheme was not based on detailed surveys and authorised “a minute survey” of the whole of Sindh. In 1858, Fife, then Chief Engineer, proposed a perennial canal on the left bank of Indus to discharge 1426 cusecs in the northern Hyderabad district (present Naushehro and Nawabshah districts) against final design of 10,887 cusecs. In 1859, the Commissioner-in-Sindh, Mr. (afterwards Sir) Bartle Frere forwarded to government a report and estimate by Captain J.G. Fife for Rohri-Hyderabad Canal – a portion of Lt. Fife’s original proposals. For seven years the matter remained in abeyance. In 1866, Colonel Strachey, Inspector-General of Irrigation India, visited Sindh and was much impressed with the necessity for perennial canals in Sindh. Rohri-Hyderabad Canal was prepared by orders of government, but recommended a smaller scheme capable of extension. In 1867, the Government of Bombay accepted the above scheme and informed Fife (then Col. and Chief Engineer) to revise the proposal. Capt. Le Mesurier, R.E., was assigned the job in 1868. Le Mesurier revised the above project for a perennial canal on the left bank to irrigate 815,544 acres. The Bombay Government returned the project asking for the clear understanding with the ruler of Khairpur State, through which the canal was to pass. In 1869, after negotiations with Mir Ali Murad, the ruler of Khairpur State, a revised project for a canal of 7,045 cusecs at a cost of Rs. 20 millions was sent to the Bombay Government, which passed it on to the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India. In 1869, the Secretary of State for India drew the attention of the Government of India to the necessity of improving the irrigation of Sindh. In 1871, the Government of India encouraged perennial irrigation in Sindh and even suggested the “Sindh Triple Project”, a predecessor of Guddu, Sukkur and Kotri barrages. In 1871, The Government of India suggested to the Government of Bombay the preparation of projects for perennial canals for the whole of Sindh – each project to form an integral part of a comprehensive scheme. In November 1872, Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy of India, visited Sindh and from the information laid down before him he ordered the project to be abandoned. In 1877 and again in 1880, the Secretary of State for India, Lord Salisbury, drew the attention of the Government of Bombay to the unsatisfactory state of irrigation in Sindh and asked for investigation in consultation with the Government of India. However, the latter after Northbrook’s minute became cold towards any extensive irrigation works in Sindh. The improvement in the indigenous canal irrigation in Sindh was limited to straightening, widening, deepening and increasing the length of Kalhora-Talpur period canals and also limited improvement of the gradients, which was done up to 1874, as in the Appendix- I the list of early British canals in Sindh shows. Only three new canals — Ford, Briggs and Jacob Wah — were added since 1843. The Sindh engineers now had only one long term alternative to improve existing canals by giving them new heads in the riverine areas and by merging and making many small canals as branches of larger canals. The process was to continue up to 1931. The irrigation maps of 1873, 1899, 1910 and 1931 show these major changes for canal improvement. The canals thus became government owned rather than privately owned, operated and maintained. The Sindh canals remained mostly non-perennial supplying water for about ninety to one-hundred-and-twenty days in the majority of cases and in some unsuitable areas only for one day. The damage was incalculable. In other parts of the South Asia, specially Uttar Pradesh and the Punjab, perennial irrigation led to development of horticulture i.e., evergreen and deciduous fruits, nuts and industrial crops, winter vegetables and floriculture. Sindh’s soil produced mostly rice and followed by a second crop in some suitable areas on preserved moisture. This in turn was limited mostly to peas and oilseeds and occasionally to horse beans and wheat. The low level of this development caused poverty, child labour and lack of revenue. Lack of spending on schools and health facilitates resulted in high death rate and low intelligence. Rice cultivation also caused water-logging, salinity and deterioration of land in Sindh compared to other areas in Indo-Gangetic plains. In 1880, the Secretary of State for India sharply reminded the Government of Bombay of the unsatisfactory state of irrigation in Sindh and requested that the matter be reconsidered in consultation with the Government of India. In 1881, the Bombay Government reported that very large perennial canals could be constructed on both banks of the Indus, but recommended only a small Rohri-Hyderabad Canal and Dhamraho Canal of about the same size. In 1882, the Government of India concurred the scheme and in May 1882 informed the Secretary of State accordingly. The matter then remained in abeyance for eight years. In 1890, Lord Reay, the Governor of Bombay, challenged the wisdom of carrying out inundation irrigation in Sindh, specially as it was being carried out at enormous cost on labour for de-silting and lifting water on the field by Persian wheels. He ordered appointment of a committee to suggest the way for improvement of canal irrigation in Sindh. R.B. Joyner, C.I.E, the then Executive Engineer Hyderabad, was to enquire into the practicability of Rohri-Hyderabad Canal. In 1890, Fife (then a retired general) wrote a letter to the Secretary Government of Bombay pressing for his 1855 proposal for perennial canals in Sindh. In 1891, Joyner reported on perennial canal on the left bank from Rohri commanding 4,000 square miles (2.56 million acres) of land. Incidentally Rohri Canal was constructed in 1932 to command 2.7 millions acres of land. In 1891, surpassingly Charles B. Prichard, once Commissioner-in-Sindh, after whom the Prichard (link) canal was built to supply water to southern reaches of the western Nara Canal and Chairman of Commission appointed by Lord Reay also became party to the rejection of Joyners report as financially unsound. Tando-Phuleli Zamindars and Jagirdars Association had already written many memoranda against the Viceroy Northbrook’s directives of 1872. They also protested against Prichard Committee’s findings. The fate of Rohri-Hyderabad Canal left only one choice for Sindh i.e., improvement of inundation canals. These improvements between 1891-1904 are statistically discussed in the last chapter and shown in canal maps of 1901 and 1910. In 1892, the Commissioner-in-Sindh, Sir Evans James, presided over the Committee on which Mr. Joyner was the Public Works expert and the whole Committee reported that the proposed Rohri-Hyderabad was not needed and was financially unsound. They recommended the final abandonment of this proposed perennial system and instead the construction of an eastern and western canal for eastern Sindh to be fed from a deepened Nara Valley Supply channel taking off the Indus at Rohri. In 1893, sincere to his 1855 project, General Fife wrote to the Secretary of State pressing for implementation of the project and need for a separate Chief Engineer for Irrigation in Sindh to advice the government as well as guide the Superintending Engineers (to be added) for a systematic management of a regular policy. In 1893, the Government of Bombay accepted the recommendations of the Joyner Committee and issued orders for the preparation of the Eastern Nara Improvements and Jamrao Canal projects. The Rohri-Hyderabad Canal Project was abandoned, but the Government of Bombay was not prepared to abandon entirely the principle of high-level perennial canals for Sindh. In March 1894, Mr. Thompson, the then Superintending Engineer in Sindh rejected Fife’s opinion and thus creating further problems for improvement of irrigation in Sindh. In 1903, Indian Irrigation Commission, which referred to Sindh Triple Project, opined that the vast scheme of this type appears to be feasible, but there are practical considerations which would perhaps render it desirable to reduce its scope. Sindh was represented by Chief Secretary of Bombay Mr. John P. Muir Mackenzie, who brilliantly pressed for the weir on the Indus and his performance led to his appointment as Commissioner-in-Sindh in 1904. The Indus Irrigation Commission set up by Lord Cruzan in 1901-1903 took two important decisions. Diversion from the river Indus was not allowed without assent of Sindh. The Commission also laid down the policy that irrigation projects concerning more than one province had to be referred to Governor-General of India for his decision. In 1904, Dr. Summers, Superintending Engineer in Sindh sought permission of the Government to take a canal from Rohri across the Khairpur State to feed Dad Canal and pointed out that continuous increase of irrigation in the Punjab made it essential to construct barrages in Sindh, but it was James Evans, the retired Commissioner-in-Sindh, who in 1899 left a minute that ‘the Punjab will eventually force a weir upon us’. In 1905, Dr. Summers obtained permission to extend his survey of canal beyond Dad Canal across the central Hyderabad canals to the left lands of Phuleli Canal and end in Dhoro Puran below Jamrao tract. In 1906, J. Benton, Inspector-General of Irrigation, Government of India, visited Sindh to enquire into possibility of perennial canals in Sindh and suggested that investigation should be made for a weir and canals with an off-take at Rohri. In the same year (1906) the Government of India suggested to the Government of Bombay that increasing cold weather withdrawls in the Punjab would diminish supplies in the inundation canals in Sindh and suggested that eventually requirement of canal waters in Sindh can be met from: Mithan Kot (predecessor of Guddu) Sukkur Kotri or Jherruck Sehwan For the present only second system need to be considered. The foresight in this suggestion was a weir at Sehwan un-determined by Fife and his successors, and not again discussed seriously until Ayub’s Commission on Agriculture in 1959 and the LIP report of 1965 which pressed for its execution. In 1909, feeling doubtful whether at the assessments proposed projects with a barrage would prove to be a “productive work” (as required by the P.W.D. Code), Dr. Summers prepared an alternative scheme without any barrage. Mr. H.F. Beale submitted his report and estimates for the Sukkur Barrage and for the headworks of all the great canals. Mr. B.E. Vacha submitted his report and estimates for the Eastern Nara Improvements Scheme. 1903-1920 were the years of great development in construction and earth moving machinery. In 1903 Ford had already developed Mode-T car, which remained unsurpassed for 25 years. Caterpillar had developed crawler tractors and Le-Tournea developed scrapper bulldozer blade and power winch to operate them. Ruston of England developing stationary and portable diesel engines jointly with Bucyrus was to develop draglines, clam-shafts, cranes, drilling and blasting rigs and pile hammers. Mulit-cylinder petrol engines were already operating compressors. Multi-cylinder diesel engines too were developed. For higher power requirements multi-cylinder light steam engines with portable boilers became available. These new tools not only lowered the construction costs, but cut down on labour for earth moving, which was difficult to get in Sindh and the donkey labour would have taken many years to accomplish the task of excavation of the canals and constructing the weir (barrage) at Sukkur-Rohri site. In 1910, working on Triple Canal Project, Dr. Summers showed that the Triple Canal Project would give a return of 4.24% exclusive of interest on capital outlay during construction and was unremunerative. But he was convinced that it could be made more remunerative by constructing Rohri Canal first which will remain inundation canal until weir is constructed. This way there will be saving of Rs. 1.5 to 2.0 million per annum on the interest. In September 1910 he sent a revised proposal with the following estimates: Rohri canal Rs. 4,412,861 Barrage or weir Rs. 3,000,000 Widening of Nara canal Rs. 400,000 Total Rs. 7,812,861 The attitude of Thompson and Summers not to expand the irrigation administrative organisation vertically and horizontally beyond the level of one Superintending Engineer for the whole Sindh was responsible for maximum harm to Sindh. In 1912, the Government of India submitted the whole scheme to the Secretary of State for India who appointed a committee of experts to report on it. The committee consisted Colonel Sir J. Ottley, Messrs Lionel Jacob, W.L. Cameron and A.L. Webb. In 1912-13, Secretary of State for India appointed a committee to examine Dr. Summers report. The report came out in December 1913 which stated that: Project was not a protective measure, but was not productive either, as the period of execution was very long (up to sixteen years). It was premature. The scheme should be prepared and kept in readiness as Sindh may suffer due to more withdrawls of water in the Punjab in future. Site for Barrage on upstream side of Rohri did not appear to be suitable. In 1913, the British had difficulty at home in getting raw cotton for their own textile industry. Japan and USA had developed their own textile industries and the British faced difficulty of getting cotton. The British now felt that vast uncultivated areas in Sindh could be profitably utilised for raising cotton as dry climate of Sindh combined with adequate heat days made it most suitable area in the South Asia for raising cotton. Hereafter quick decisions for executing Sukkur Barrage were motivated to serve the British interests. The British-related development in Sindh, primarily was to connect Karachi with Delhi and Lahore to take surplus grains from the Punjab abroad easily, economically and expeditiously, and the policy of no further urgency to develop irrigation in Sindh changed overnight due to demand for cotton in England. Lack of development of irrigation in Sindh resulted in lack of agriculture surplus and therefore under development of urban centres in Sindh. In 1884-85 there were only six towns in Sindh having population of more than 10,000 persons, but none of them had more than 100,000 souls. In 1901 Karachi had a population of 120,000. In 1914, in consequence of the 1913 Report, the Secretary of State declined to sanction the Bombay Government’s scheme, but drew attention to the desirability of further investigations. In 1915, the Karachi Chamber of Commerce strongly protested against any further delay. The Bombay Government declined to accept the London Committee’s opinion that the 1913 scheme was premature. In regard to Sindh as an inundation country not worthy of perennial water supplies would be to adopt a policy of stagnation to which the Government of Bombay declined to subscribe. They proposed to prepare new plans. In 1915, Mr. A.A Musto was put on special duty under Chief Engineer in Sindh to revise the project named Sukkur Barrage Project. In 1917, Inspector-General on Irrigation Sir Thomas Ward visited Sukkur and a conference was held there with the Chief Engineer Sindh and the Chief Engineer Bombay. Subsequently a meeting was held with the Commissioner-in-Sindh at Karachi. The Inspector-General, guided by his predecessor Maechel Nethersole’s minute, made the following important suggestions: Involvement of Revenue (Revenue, Survey and Settlement) Department as well as Canal Officers (Executive Engineers). Ship’s lock may be dropped (This was a mistake as time has proved). Canals may be kept small for economic use of water (This too was a mistake and intensity of cropping remained low in Sindh). Remodelling inundation canals to fit in new canals of the Barrage by methods as adopted in the Punjab. Rohri Canal should be constructed as inundation canal first and then merged in Sukkur Barrage system as remodelling after the construction of Barrage may be costly. Discharge of Rohri Canal should be reduced from 15,500 to 10,000 cusecs (It was designed for 9,600 cusecs and today it carries 16,000 cusecs. The reduction of discharge too was a serious mistake). Revenue, Agriculture and Irrigation officers should work out a payable scheme and demonstration farms may be established. In 1918, Mr. Musto was recalled from Mesopotamia to take up the work of visiting the whole scheme. By coordinating the work (which hitherto had been under four engineers working almost independently – Right Bank canals, the Eastern Nara canals, the Rohri-Hyderabad canals and the Sukkur Barrage) many improvements and economics were effected. On the 16th December the new Governor of Bombay, Sir George Lloyd, G.C.I.E., D.S.O., arrived in Bombay. In 1919, Sir George Lloyd visited Sindh for the first time. All public bodies represented to His Excellency their keen desire to see a far greater use made of the magnificent river Indus than that of serving Sindh’s old-fashioned out-of-date inundation canal system. Sir George Lloyd promised immediate attention to the matter. In 1920, during Sir George Lloyd’s second visit to Sindh he stated that all departments were working at the revised Sukkur Barrage Project with the utmost zeal and at the highest pressure. The revised scheme was completed in this year. In 1921, Sir George Lloyd’s third visit to Sindh reflected his close interest in the project. Mr. Musto’s Revised Sukkur Barrage Scheme in twenty volumes dispatched via the Government of Bombay and of India to the Secretary of State for India. On 25th July Dr. Summers addressed the East India Association, London, strongly condemning the 1920 Revised Project as financially unsound and from an engineering point of view both ‘unsound and dangerous’. Plans and estimates for barrage and canals prepared in 1919 and 1920 respectively were sent by Government of Bombay to Government of India and passed on to Secretary of State for India who gave the approval in April 1923 and construction started on 1st July 1923. The barrage was completed in December 1931 and opening ceremony performed by Earl of Wilmington, Viceroy and Governor-General of India on January 13, 1932. The Government documents in general are silent about the role of public opinion and protests on the question of Sukkur Barrage. Role of Tando-Phuleli Zamindars and Jagirdars has already been mentioned since 1872. But the role of another two workers — Ghulam Muhammad Bhurgari and Seth Harchandrai — is commendable. The former pursued the Sukkur Barrage Project in Sindh Provincial Conference year-after-year and accompanied by the latter met with Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India in 1918 to pursue the project, which could any time be dropped for want of funds. As a result of persuasion by Ghulam Muhammad Bhurgari, Harchandrai and Lawrence, the Commissioner-in-Sindh, E.M. Montagu, Secretary of State sanctioned the project and in ensuing eighteen months settled the question of funding the project by loan from Government of India. He gave final approval to the project in April 1923. Construction of barrage started on 1st July 1923. During the construction Governor of Bombay George Lloyd too played a major role. In 1923, the Sukkur Municipality unanimously passed a resolution that the Sukkur Barrage may be named as the Lloyd Barrage after George Lloyd, Governor of Bombay. (Fifty years later this name was changed.) In July 1923, the Government of Bombay issued orders that in view of recommendations of the municipality barrage may be called George Lloyd Barrage (not Lloyd George, Prime Minister of England) after the then Governor of Bombay. Lloyd had given his full support for its financing and execution. SPECIALIZED CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES Once Sukkur Barrage scheme was approved in 1916 the engineers had to give thought to construction methods and techniques to take up a gigantic project of which magnitude had never been executed in the world before. It was known that labour for construction of the barrage would be a few hundred thousand men for some years, which number shall not only be difficult to get, but will raise the labour rates. The 1917 AD influenza had killed forty per cent rural population of the Sindh and withdrawing labour from Sindh would have adversely affected the agricultural operations. It was, therefore, decided to employ machines some of which were specially designed and built for the purpose. They performed following types of operations: Interlocking sheet pile hammers for cofferdams and pile sheets. Dredgers for depositing sand inside the steel pipes and also excavating the foundations inside cofferdams. Dewatering by pontoon mounted with electrically operated centrifugal and reciprocating pumps as well as well-points. Forty-two miles of railway lines at the barrage-head construction site along with locomotives and truck (wagon) mounted cranes. Pontoon mounted cranes. Electric supply from an independent power house for the construction. Forty-six excavators of various sizes for excavating canals. These worked round-the-clock for five-and-half days a week and two-hundred-and-fifty days a year excavating about 10.4 million cubic feet earth per day – equivalent to 32,000 men working all the year around or 77,000 men for five months of the working season (winter months only). Workshop for maintaining and servicing the machines. The machines were able to excavate about 5.7 billion cubic feet earth for canals at rates much lower than labour rates prevailing then. The cost of machinery employed, including operating costs, formed about 22.6 per cent of overall cost of the barrage. Five other major technological improvements were also introduced along with sanctioning the Sukkur Barrage project. These were: RECTANGULATION OF LAND The Survey of India had rectangulated farming land down to 320-acre rectangles. The Revenue Officer, Sukkur Barrage, further rectangulated land down to the one-acre plot. Standard size of an acre was fixed as north to south 264 feet and east to west 165 feet. This made it easy to level land and gave better control of water into each plot. The watercourses could thereafter be laid economically along the borders of plot. A further benefit to the farmer was assessment of land and water rates to one acre instead of larger plots. Rectangulation helped in orientation of orchards in the most advantageous solar light direction of north to south. SOIL SURVEY Government surveyed the soils and classified them as classes ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ denoting good, fairly good and poor quality land fit for rice only after washing the salts. ‘D’ class land was unfit for cultivation except at high reclamation cost. Facilities of extra water for reclamation were provided for ‘C’ class land. AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH Agriculture Research Station was established at Sakrand in 1924 AD for research into new crops and cropping patterns. This finally led to the establishment of Agricultural College (then known as King George-V Agriculture College) at Sakrand in 1939 – a predecessor of the Sindh Agricultural University, Tando Jam. The already existing Fruit Farm at Mirpurkhas was strengthened to encourage perennial fruit crops like mango, citrus, guava, banana, dates, winter vegetables, etc. Rice Research Station was established at Dokri. A number of small research stations were established near Thatta, Dadu, Larkana, Shikarpur, etc. WATERLOGGING AND SALINITY MEASUREMENTS More than 3,000 piezometers were installed in the irrigated areas to monitor water table. AGRICULTURE ENGINEERING This section was established in 1934 for levelling land, breaking of hard and weedy soils and produce improved agriculture implements for agriculture mechanization as was aimed at. The first workshop was established in 1934 at Mirpurkhas and was shifted to Hyderabad in 1942. The first Agriculture Engineer in Sindh was Mr. Cumming. This workshop was shifted to Tando Jam in 1957. By 1968 Sindh had 13 workshops in different districts with fleet of 600 bulldozers for land levelling and sixty-five hand and fourteen power rigs for installing tubewells. PROSPERITY BROUGHT BY THE SUKKUR AND OTHER BARRAGES The Sukkur Barrage brought prosperity to Sindh by assured summer and winter water. The situation before the barrage is best described by Fife in 1859. He stated that during first inundation season he was in Sindh; there was too little water, during the second there had been too much, during the third inundation had risen too late in the season, during the fourth it had subsided too early and during the fifth there was too much water. Thus he analysed that there was always something wrong as there was always too much or too little water or river rose too late or fell too early. The prosperity that Sukkur and other barrages provided could be seen from the six-fold increase in population over 50 years and 350% increase in cultivated area with several government colleges and six medical universities, etc. The agricultural surplus produced has increased urban population to more than 35% of whole population. One of the major economic impacts of the project was that during the first years of the British rule people were extremely poor, as correctly analysed by Fife, the Sukkur Barrage changed the situation and within a year of its commissioning rural people of Sindh rushed to cities for education as well as better housing and facilities of urban cities. TABLE SHOWING SALIENT FEATURES OF SUKKUR BARRAGE Total latest revised estimated cost of the whole scheme (1935) £ 15,000,0000 Rs. 200,330,000 Total estimated cost of barrage and headworks £ 4,300,000 Rs. 55,897,000 Total length of canals of all size excavated 6,473 miles Total quantity of earthwork to be excavated in the scheme for canals, branches, distributaries and minors 5, 690 millions cu. ft. Total length of new and old watercourses (30,000 + 17, 800 miles) 47, 800 miles Total cost of 46 dragline machines employed for excavation work £ 800,000 Rs. 10,666,000 Total cost of all machinery employed inclusive of draglines £ 400,000 Rs. 45,333,000 Total quantity of earthworks; canals + watercourses (6,280+1,240 million cu. ft.) 7,520 millions cu.ft. Total number of bridges and regulators to be constructed 1,970 Maximum labour employed any time 60,000 persons Gross area commanded by the scheme (in British Territory) 7.4 millions acres Annual cultivation when area is fully developed (in British Territory) 5.01 millions acres New area of virgin soil brought under command 1.95 million acres The barrage across the River Indus has 66 spans of 60’ each with 2 extra land spans to the “gate” Bridge Cill level of Barrage. Full Supply Level R.L. of springing of gate bridge arches. The “gate” bridge is for manipulating the gates in the openings of the barrage and the “road” bridge is for traffic R.L. 177.0 feet R.L. 194.5 feet R.L. 219.0 feet R.L. 201.0. feet Work commenced in (a) All work expected to be finally completed and accounts closed in (b) Canals to flow in July 1923 1934-35 1932 Government land that would come under command. A Class Land 1,058,928 acres B Class Land 602,205 acres C Class Land 289,400 acres Gross Command Area 8.3 million acres Cultivation command Area 7.8 millions acres A Class denotes Good quality land B Class denotes Fairly good quality land C Class denotes Poor land fit for rice only and that too after washing Note:- A mile of Irrigation Department is 5000 feet and not 5280 feet. A foot (30.8 cms) of Irrigation Department has 10 inches (3.08 cms=1.0 inch) and not 12 inches. In this book miles and feet have been used against metric system TABLE SHOWING SOME IMPORTANT DESIGN DATA OF SUKKUR BARRAGE AND ITS CANALS Items, Units, North Western Canal, Rice Canal, Dadu Canal, Eastern Nara, Rohri Canal, Khairpur Feeder East, Khairpur Feeder West, Area under command Acres 1,027,085 547,480 597,464 2,142,000 2,837,000 531,110 409,121 Cultivated area Acres 933,093 480,979 498,682 2,069,200 2,546,000 335,500 315,016 Final area under annual cultivation Acres 761,067 423,802 425,163 1,676,000 2,063,400 261,284 227,131 Maximum discharge Cusecs 5,042 10,215 2,837 13,602 10,887 2,094 1,940 Length of the main canals Miles 36.1 81.7 131.6 216.8 270.70 13.0 44.80 Length of distributaries and minors Miles 700.8 215.0 406.0 1,188.4 1,887.7 - - Length of escapes Miles - - 25.22 9.70 31.20 - - Length of watercourses Miles 8,367 6,500 2,919 9,734 20,253 - - Spans 25 feet each in the head regulator Nos. 6 13 4 16 12 2 2 The maximum discharge of Thames at London is 15,000 cusecs whereas actual maximum discharge drawn in Rohri at present is 16,385 cusecs. Width of Suez Canal at surface is 200 ft. and that of Eastern Nara is 370 ft. The watercourses in the project area will stretch twice around the world and are about 50,000 miles long. TABLE SHOWING ACTUAL CANAL DISCHARGE AS COMPARED WITH DESIGNED CAPACITY OF 7 CANAL OF SUKKUR BARRAGE Name of canal, Design capacity, Actual discharge at peak demand North Western 5,042 9,500 Rice 10,215 13,770 Dadu 2,837 5,738 Nara 13,602 14,452 Rohri 10,887 16,385 Khairpur East 2,094 2,648 Khairpur West 1,940 3,440 TABLE SHOWING THE YEAR WISE CULTIVATION FIGURES ON SUKKUR BARRAGE SINCE ITS INCEPTION TO OPENING OF OTHER BARRAGES Year Cultivation in million acres Year Cultivation in million acres 1932-33 2.428 1956-57 4.744 1933-34 2.783 1957-58 4.797 1934-35 2.728 1958-59 5.182 1935-36 2.887 1959-60 5.271 1936-37 2.985 1960-61 5.264 1937-38 3.208 1961-62 5.460 1938-39 3.206 1962-63 5.627 1939-40 3.365 1963-64 5.741 1940-41 3.485 1964-65 5.644 1941-42 3.425 1965-66 6.000 1942-43 3.224 1966-67 6.052 1943-44 3.413 1967-68 6.251 1944-45 3.282 1968-69 6.368 1945-46 3.523 1969-70 6.351 1946-47 3.684 1970-71 6.249 1947-48 4.093 1971-72 5.838 1948-49 3.859 1972-73 6.021 1949-50 3.936 1973-74 6.214 1950-51 4.130 1974-75 6.219 1951-52 4.361 1975-76 6.395 1952-53 4.451 1976-77 6.572 1953-54 4.650 1977-78 6.675 1954-55 4.762 1978-79 7.041 1955-56 4.866 1979-80 7.285
Posted on: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 04:42:01 +0000
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