CHAPTER II COLLABORATION WITH THE ALLIES IN 1942 IN NORTH AFRICA American’s formal entry into World War II in December 1941 significantly changed the course of the war as it infused American strategy and resources into the conflict. The British and American approaches as to how to prosecute the war in Europe were divergent after the Americans entered the war in 1941. The British were essentially designing a strategic plan that would rely on blockade, bombing, subversive activities, and propaganda to weaken the will and ability of Germany to resist. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was skeptical of confronting the German land forces head on believing that committing vast armies of infantry and armor to the continent like was done in World War I would be a mistake. Instead, he proposed a strategy that would emphasize mobile, hard-hitting armored forces operating on the periphery of German-controlled territory rather than a large scale ground action against the German war machine on the continent. Therefore, Churchill believed that the best approach was to wage war on the continent with a peripheral strategy. Historian Dr. Maurice Matloff wrote: “the Mediterranean or ‘soft underbelly’ part of the peripheral thesis has received great attention in the post war debate…from the beginning the British leadership envisaged a cross-Channel operation in force only as the last blow against a Germany already in the process of collapse.” The Americans on the other hand believed that large-scale land operations would be needed to defeat Germany. Mass concentration was the core of American strategy. Matloff wrote: “in the summer of 1941 the [American] army’s strategic planners concluded that sooner or later ‘we must prepare to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to combat.” These two opposing strategic views of how to best prosecute the war in Europe against Germany and the Axis powers were reflected in 1942 in the debate over Operation Bolero vis-à-vis Operation Torch. American Admiral Harold R. Stark had as early as November 1940 predicted that it would take large scale land operations to defeat Nazi Germany and in the summer of 1941 the army’s strategic planners concluded that in the end the Allies would have to defeat Germany by defeating her ground forces. After Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Secretary of War Stimson, General Marshal and American war planners in the United States were concerned with American assets becoming too widely disbursed and as a result devised Operation Bolero. The plan was designed to assemble troops and supplies in England for a major cross-Channel invasion as early as the spring of 1943. According to Matloff, the British initially approved Bolero in principle in April 1942 but that the agreement lasted less than three months. The British strategic planners were concerned that a major cross-Channel offensive at this juncture would be premature prompting Churchill to go to Washington for a strategy meeting and propose a North African operation instead of Bolero. This new British proposal so frustrated the American war planners that they threatened to concentrate on the Pacific theater instead of Europe, however, President Roosevelt overruled them. Roosevelt believed that since the British were not in favor of a cross-Channel operation in 1942 that a thrust into North Africa would be a viable alternative. Operation Torch would place American ground forces against the Germans and a successful operation in North Africa would help secure vital Mediterranean Sea lanes and potentially secure a staging point for an Allied invasion into southern Europe. Additionally, resources existed for Operation Torch where they were suspect for a cross-Channel operation in 1942. Substantial evidence exists that a significant number of high ranking Vichy military officials would be involved in the planning of Operation Torch and that Vichy complicity with the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) is additional evidence of high ranking Vichy Officials defying Pétain and the armistice agreement with Germany. Operation Torch began in the early morning hours of November 8, 1942 when Allied troops, mostly American, landed ashore at various points in Vichy French-controlled Morocco and Algeria marking America’s first major offensive in World War II. Historian David A. Walker wrote: “simultaneously, pro-Allied guerrilla fighters organized by General William J. (‘Wild Bill’) Donovan’s recently formed Office of Strategic Services (OSS) sprang into action to assist in the invading forces.” For the previous three months, these guerrilla fighters had been recruited and trained by OSS agents stationed in Vichy French North Africa. This tactic by American forces represented a new approach or dimension to military operations in the field during World War II. Additionally, OSS agents were tasked with assessing enemy motivation and the conducting of clandestine negotiations designed to create pro-Allied factions in either enemy or neutral countries. It is important to note the early collaboration between American and Vichy French authorities in North Africa began in the form of the vice-counsels organization which was the precursor of the OSS which formed in June 1942 and its predecessor organization, the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), in July 1941. In May, 1941 the vice-consuls organization was established after the Murphy-Weygand economic agreement of March 10, 1941. This agreement allowed for certain American goods to be imported into French Northwest Africa even though the British had a blockade of the area in effect. In return, the Americans would be allowed by Vichy French authorities to maintain American observers in Vichy controlled North Africa to monitor the destination of the imported goods and ensure that they did not fall into the hands of Axis powers. To further accentuate the Vichy American collaboration Dr. Walker wrote: “Furthermore, OSS maintained links with disaffected officers of the Vichy French army of North Africa, and it was on the basis of evidence supplied from this source that OSS agents claimed that the resistance of the Vichy French to a primarily American invasion of North Africa would be minimal.” It was reported that one of the major tasks entrusted to the OSS was the recruitment of the distinguished French General Henri Giraud to the Allied cause. Many historians have noted that, for a long period of time during the planning of Operation Torch, General Eisenhower favored General Giraud over Admiral Darlan to head Vichy French forces during the North African operation. However, other historians dispute this as Douglas Porch points out that Eisenhower believed General Giraud was “reactionary, old-fashioned and cannot be persuaded to modernize…he has no, repeat no, political acumen whatsoever.” A possible reason for the OSS directive on the recruitment of Giraud was found in an incoming message R-2014 from Headquarters ETOUSA on October 16, 1942 addressed for the eyes of General Eisenhower only in paragraph of that communication: [Eisenhower was] to transmit this information to General Giraud immediately. General Mast stated that General Giraud desires that he be dealt with instead of Darlan, who he feels cannot be trusted, but is merely desirous of climbing on the band wagon. A request was made for an expression of unity of French forces (army and navy), of whom Darlan is Commander-in-Chief. The French Fleet is extremely important in that the admiral controls ports and coastal batteries in French North Africa. Mast stated that the army is loyal to and will be commanded by Giraud instead of Darlan; also, that the navy in French North Africa should go along with the army. I urge that the success of the operation depends upon the working of the French forces with us. This message from General Marshal at Headquarters ETOUSA to General Eisenhower on October 16, 1942 provides a portion of the evidence why some historians believe that General Eisenhower preferred Vichy General Giraud over Admiral Darlan to head Vichy French troops during the North African operation. General Mast, who commanded a Vichy French army division in Casablanca, Morocco during this period, was one of America’s chief contacts in North Africa and a strong advocate of General Giraud leading French troops during the invasion. Historian Dr. Arthur Funk has noted, however, that three weeks prior to the commencement of Operation Torch an agreement had been consummated in a London meeting by General Eisenhower, General Clark, Churchill, Eden, and the British Chief of Staff General Sir Allen Brooke and that Roosevelt had been kept informed. Funk wrote: “these deliberations had led to a qualified acceptance of Darlan (he was then considered less useful than a rival candidate, General Henri Giraud) as a possible replacement for Clark as Eisenhower’s deputy.” The news that Admiral Darlan would lead Vichy troops in North Africa brought indignant protest in the American and British press because he was perceived as a Nazi collaborator and had demonstrated his anti-Semitism as well as his Anglophobia. Additionally, the British had backed and given refuge to Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle, who considered the Allies reported deal with Darlan an ill-considered affront. The editorials in both the British and the American press asked the same basic question: “how could American commanders, General Dwight Eisenhower and his deputy General Mark Clark have been so short-sighted or ignorant that they could improvise a compact with a notorious double-dealer, a fascist and a quisling, in order to obtain uncertain temporary advantage?” Evidence based on documents found in General Mark Clark’s letters show a significant number of high ranking Vichy French officials like General Mast, General Giraud, and Admiral Darlan were open to and did collaborate with the Allied cause. Arthur Funk wrote: “Even before Giraud and Darlan had been taken under consideration; the Allied planners had decided to reach a political and military accord with some Vichy official.” Allied planners, in early October, had drawn up a model agreement as a benchmark to use when they began negotiations between Allied task force commanders and whatever senior Vichy official surfaced in Algeria or Morocco who would be willing and capable to aid the Allies by providing facilities and security measures necessary to prosecute the invasion. There is little doubt that the existence of such a benchmark document was evidence that the Allies were searching for ways to deal with Vichy officials thus aiding their cause during Operation Torch and the war in general. At the insistence of President Roosevelt, General de Gaulle had been ruled out during the early planning stages. Therefore, the principle of collaboration was established weeks before the invasion of North Africa. Once the principle of collaboration with Vichy had been agreed on; it became urgent to identify and successfully recruit a Vichy official. At this point, it should be noted that General Eisenhower made a last-minute effort to recruit Vichy General Giraud into the operation. Some historians have noted that Allied commanders learned after the invasion that General Giraud had little or no influence in North Africa which left planers little choice but to negotiate with Admiral Darlan. It is well known among scholars that the United States and the British decision makers preferred a friendly Vichy leader to control the operation over an American military government in North Africa which would have been the only practical alternative. There is little question that the controversy over which Vichy official would emerge was further complicated because of the demeanor and character of Free French resistance leader General Charles de Gaulle who President Roosevelt refused to consider. There is evidence that as late as October 1942 the Americans were still considering Giraud because on October 27 General Marshal sent an urgent message to General Eisenhower which stated: Mast sent messenger to France after meeting with Clark. Giraud request you continue study of plan for bridgehead southern France. He concurs in principle with our plan. Information for me only which I have promised not to transmit to you is that Giraud is willing to come to French Africa for the military operation. He did not wish you to know because last Friday messenger left in the morning by air before I could give him text of proposal which Clark, Mast, and I had agreed upon and approved. Giraud had, therefore, only an oral account of Clark and Mast morning meeting, October 26. On basis of oral preliminary report he agrees, subject to final decision upon study of text. This communication was sent to General Eisenhower a little more than a week before Operation Torch would be launched on November 8 providing further evidence of Allied and Vichy collaboration. Additional evidence found in the Clark’s files concerning Vichy-Allied collaboration prior to Operation Torch was a letter from General Mark Clark to General George Marshal dated October 30, 1942. In this letter General Clark reported on a secret meeting that had taken place at a location in Algeria when Allied officers conferred with Vichy General Mast and his staff. Those present at that meeting were General Mast, American diplomat Robert Murphy, Major General Mark Clark, Brigadier General Lemnitzer, and Colonel Jousse (Chief of staff to General Mast). The following is a brief summary of the meeting as reported by General Clark: General Mast desired to know what positive indications there were that the Axis powers intended to occupy North Africa in the near future. Upon being informed he stated that the French had similar information. He pointed out that, in his opinion, it was necessary to undertake simultaneous operations in Southern France together with any North African operation, or France would be lost. He indicated that the French army could hold a bridgehead if it was provided with modern arms and equipment. Upon being informed of the logistical difficulties involved in such an operation, he stated that he fully appreciated the problem. General Mast estimated that he could raise a French North African Army of about 300,000 in two weeks if the Allied Nations could provide them with the necessary arms and equipment… This letter addresses some important points about Vichy-Allied collaboration in that General Mast was concerned about the possibility of the Axis occupying French North Africa and his concern that an Allied operation in North Africa would in all probability precipitate a strong German response into southern France. There is little doubt that most of these Vichy leaders were cognizant of their duty to protect France and its sovereignty over all else and at this juncture cooperation with the Allied cause was the best course of achieving that goal. It should be noted that General Clark sent a coded message to General Eisenhower in London on October 24, 1942 which preceded the letter to General Marshal dated October 30. The October 24 communication was to inform General Eisenhower that the meeting with General Mast had successfully taken place on October 22 and that Mast was to contact General Giraud in France in regards to assuming command of French forces in North Africa and that a favorable response was expected within days. General Clark stated that “I base this on their [French] favorable reaction to the strength of forces USA could put into such an operation. All questions settled satisfactorily except time of assumption of Supreme Command by French. My view on this submitted to Giraud through Mast for this consideration with definite understanding my proposal had yet to be confirmed by you.” Additional evidence of the sensitive negotiations between the Americans and the French prior to the North African invasion was found in a message from General George Marshal in October 1942 to General Eisenhower concerning the delicate situation between the French and the British. The message acknowledged the uncertainty of who the French would choose between Admiral Darlan and General Giraud to lead French troops during the pending invasion. Also the problem of French distrust of the British that was manifested after the action at Mers-el-Kebir on July 3, 1940. A British Naval task force had attacked the French fleet, which was at anchor and not expecting an attack from its former ally. Marshal’s urgent message to General Eisenhower: This is extremely important. The French suspicion and distrust of British intentions after the United Nations are established in the area. We must make it clear that the U.S. will control and direct the action toward the territories in question after the occupation. It is realized that the question of Giraud and Darlan is a very delicate one which is difficult to handle. The suggestion is made that negotiations may be possible without too much detailed entry into personalities. Clark should state that we have no RPT no intension of interfering with the civil government of the territory in question, that we are quite prepared to accept a French Commander-In-Chief later under the conditions outlined in your message number 3711; and that we will provide for equipment for French forces that operate against the Axis. Any suggestion that we accept Darlan as the future Commander-In-Chief of armed French forces in North Africa may result in a complete disruption of negotiations since Clark’s negotiations will be conducted with the representative of General Giraud and it appears that there is considerable feeling and possible distrust between the two. We do not RPT not consider it advisable for America to be involved in any way with the selection of the commander of the French forces but believe that this is a matter to be handled by the French themselves… It is apparent that the Americans placed a high value of collaboration with the Vichy French. Their cooperation would save American and Allied lives and be vital in a successful North African operation. The French also placed a high value on collaboration with the Allies because it offered the best chance to rid France of the domination and occupation of France by Germany and would preserve French sovereignty. The Americans believed it was essential to allow the French to choose who would head French forces in North Africa. The two primary candidates were Admiral Darlan and General Giraud. Admiral Darlan had consistently provided Marshal Pètain with strong support from the fall of France in 1940 when he became Chief of French Naval forces and Minister of the Navy. Additionally, Darlan used Pierre Laval’s dismissal in December 1940 as an opportunity to consolidate his power and two months later was appointed deputy premier as well as adding the positions of Interior, Information, and Foreign Affairs. Then in 1941 Darlan consolidated War, Army and Navy under his control when he became Minister of National Defense. When arguably Vichy France’s chief Nazi collaborator Pierre Laval was dismissed in 1940 by Marshal Pétain many of his contacts with German authorities were lost, however, Darlan because of Germany’s military successes, to that point, was so impressed that he made an attempt to reestablish those ties with the Nazis. Darlan’s motivation did not appear to be ideological like was the case with Laval but practical as he wished France to be on the winning side without regard to which side that might be. Therefore, to hedge his position, Darlan did not blindly follow the German lead but continued to monitor the situation ready to jump on the Allied side if circumstances dictated. Darlan came from an old republican family in the southwest of France. His father a small town lawyer, political figure and minister of justice in the Meline cabinet was a friend of George Leygues who served several times as minister of the navy in the late 1920’s and 1930’s. Leygues gave Darlan the opportunity to serve as head of the minister’s staff. In effect, Darlan served as Minister of the Navy from 1926 to 1939. Robert Paxton wrote: “The main result of that career was Darlan’s considerable success in winning funds from a parsimonious Third Republic for naval construction between the wars. The French Navy was, in 1939, at its strongest point in history.” When the German’s began their major offensive in May none of the great European navies risked a sea battle which left the powerful French fleet intact. After the armistice in June 1940, the French fleet was the last major military asset available to the French and both the Axis and the Allies coveted the use of the French fleet. The evidence confirms Darlan was untrustworthy and double dealing but at the same time arguably the best option to lead French troops during the North African campaign. As General Marshal’s dispatch confirms, the Americans believed it prudent to allow the French to choose their leader for the North African campaign. General Henri Giraud, one of France’s most esteemed General officers, was the other high ranking member of the Vichy regime that General Eisenhower, General Marshall and the Allies had considered to lead French forces during the North African campaign subject to who the French chose for the task. Historian Arthur Funk points out that Eisenhower had relied on Giraud to rally French troops for seven weeks prior to D-Day. The plan was to fly Giraud directly from France into Algiers for the purpose of appealing to the French forces to cooperate with the Allied invasion. Under this scenario, Eisenhower had hoped that Giraud would be seen as the savior of French honor and would be recognized as Governor and Commander-In-Chief of French forces in North Africa. Additionally, if this strategy was successful, the British and American forces would go virtually unopposed during the initial invasion. However, Eisenhower sensed based on several messages from General Clark, General Marshall and others that a misunderstanding had festered among the French on weather Darlan or Giraud should lead French forces. Funk points out that the Allied plan endorsed by Roosevelt and Churchill was to bring the French back into the war and that the North African campaign was a good opportunity to accomplish that goal provided a strong Vichy leader could be found who was ready and able to rally French forces to support and not oppose an Allied landing. The Americans had pursued a Vichy policy following the Armistice of maintaining diplomatic relations with Pétain’s government with considerable opposition from the left and Charles de Gaulle’s Free French. The hope was to obtain Pétain’s invitation for the Allies to occupy Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia without considerable bloodshed. However, Pétain refused to break with Nazi Germany so the American’s tried to lure Pétain’s proconsul in North Africa, General Maxime Weygand, into the Allied cause. Throughout 1941 Robert Murphy the American Counsellor of Embassy at Vichy was assigned to Algeria for the purpose of persuading Weygand that President Roosevelt would support a French uprising with guns and equipment. Funk contends that “if Weygand had been willing to take an independent line, he might have built his 100,000-man Armistice Army into a formidable threat to Rommel in Libya. But Weygand refused to defy Pétain and in November 1941, he was forced into retirement.” This did not end the Allied hope that a powerful Vichy leader or leaders could be persuaded to join the Allied fold and aid in the fight against the Nazi regime and the Axis powers. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the German declaration of war on the United States served as a catalyst for the Allies to focus on the Mediterranean as the major strategic area in the west. Prime Minister Winston Churchill in January 1942 journeyed to Washington to consult with President Roosevelt and American Military leaders on the extreme importance of focusing on Europe first and avoiding America’s military assets from being widely dispersed in the Pacific theater. Churchill strongly recommended an Allied invasion and rapid occupation of French North Africa. As a result, Churchill and Roosevelt authorized a secret mission to meet with Weygand who had retired to southern France. The hope was to persuade him to head a clandestine North African resistance. Weygand refused, leaving the underground movement Robert Murphy had been tasked with developing without a military leader. As D-day for operation Torch approached, Admiral Darlan and General Giraud were the two best options available to lead French forces in support of the Allies. Robert Paxton contends that Darlan was surprised and enraged when the Allies landed on November 8, 1942 and initially headed up French defenses in North Africa but on November 11 asked the Allies for a cease fire after learning that the Germans had entered the unoccupied zone of France realizing that there was, at this point, no reason to continue observing the Armistice. Paxton wrote: “He tried for the next week to get the Allies to accept a neutral Pétainist regime in North Africa. Only after General Mark Clark had threatened to institute direct Allied military government…did Darlan agree to commit French resources in North Africa to the Allied side.” Even though Marshall Pétain publically ordered continued resistance to the Allies, Darlan knew that Marshall Pétain was under pressure from the Germans and was no longer free to act independently. Paxton wrote: “Around him, Darlan formed an ‘Imperial Council’ of senior Vichy officials and officers present and willing to participate in the war against Germany: General Bergeret, Vichy aviation minister; General Nogues, high commissioner of Morocco; Governor-General Boisson, of French West Africa, Governor-General Yves Chatel of Algeria, and General Henri Giraud…” The Allies had transported General Giraud to North Africa by British submarine from General Eisenhower’s headquarters at Gibraltar to head pro-French military forces in North Africa. Paxton points out that the majority of the French Army and administration in North Africa, at this juncture, were at war against the Axis powers even though most of the Vichy legislation remained on the statute books and most of the North African Vichy leaders remained loyal to Marshall Pétain. Admiral Darlan was assassinated on December 24, 1942 leaving a large number of loyal Vichy officers and civil servants who had switched to the Allied side. Even General Alphonse Juin the commander of French troops in Algeria who had only eleven months earlier negotiated with Marshal Goering in Berlin joined the Allied cause. The evidence points to 1942, during the planning and execution of operation Torch, as a key turning point in the Vichy French military rallying to the Allied cause. An interesting abstract of a speech delivered by General Giraud at Algiers on March 14, 1943 is part of General Clark’s papers at The Citadel. This abstract was delivered to Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. #464, U.S. Army on March 16, 1943. The following sixteen points of Giraud’s speech were addressed: 1. Alsace and Lorraine have been incorporated in the German state. Not a single voice in France was raised in protest. Here, we protest and Alsace and Lorraine will become French again. 2. The people of France have never accepted the armistice. 3. A French Army of 300,000 men is being armed in North Africa. It takes time, but deliveries from America have already begun. 4. France will be free and take her place again among nations. 5. The sovereignty of the people, destroyed by the Germans, will be restored in France. 6. I promise the people of France that their right to choose their provisional government will be safeguarded. 7. I am the servant, not the chief, of the French people. 8. Since 22 June 1940, the will of the French people has not been freely and publicly expressed. 9. In the absence of a proper foundation of the free expression of the will of the people, legislation passed since 22 June 1940 is of no legal value. 10. Ordinances have already been passed and others will follow to reestablish the French tradition. 11. We are going to take such progressive steps of adaptation as are imposed upon us here by the entanglement of our economic lives. 12. It is impossible to suppress laws and decrees with the stroke of the pen without making adaptation to new conditions. 13. Already some measures have been taken. Municipal assemblies, general councils, and financial delegations are restored. Laws of racial discrimination imposed on France by Nazis no longer exist. The law of 2 June 1941 and all decrees passed under it are abrogated. 14. The degree of Cremieux (1870) which established a difference between Arabic and Jewish natives is abrogated. 15. The territories to which France has carried civilization shall be preserved intact. 16. The union of all Frenchmen for the common cause is essential and I call for that union. This speech by General Giraud in March 1943 accentuates what some historians interpret as the key points that many Frenchmen believed in but were unable to express under the military domination of Nazi Germany. Marshall Pétain’s options in June 1940 were limited because of the military situation the Germans had imposed. In order to save France from losing all hope of maintaining its national sovereignty and completely capitulating to Germany he asked for an armistice. However, once the military tide began to turn on Nazi Germany in 1942, many of the leaders and people in Vichy France were ready to assume their traditional place as a free constitutional society and join the Allied cause. The strategic decision to target North Africa in November 1942 was made by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt. It was proposed to Roosevelt by Churchill in early 1942 and was not popular with American war planners and represented one of the few times Roosevelt overrode his military advisors. The reasons the President made this decision were as much political as military. It represented a way of winning Vichy cooperation and collaboration in the Allied cause and thus bringing France back into the war on the Allied side. In addition, the plan was designed to ease the pressure on the hard-pressed Soviet armies in the east and check potential German advances into the Middle East.
Posted on: Sun, 23 Mar 2014 11:24:08 +0000
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