CONTINUATION OF CHAPTER 2 OF GHANA UNDER RAWLINGS EARLY YEARS BY EMMANUEL HANSEN: The Coup and its significance. On 31 December 1981, the following broadcast was made over radio and television: Fellow citizens of Ghana, as you would have noticed we are not playing the National Anthem. In other words this is not a coup. I ask of nothing less than a revolution, something that would transform the social and economic order of this country. The military is not to take over. We simply want to be part of the decision-making process in this country. Fellow citizens, it is now left to you to decide how this country is going to go from today . . . I am not here to impose myself on this country, far from it. We are asking for nothing more than to organize this country in such a way that nothing will be done from the Council, whether by God or Devil, without the consent and the authority of the people . . . I am prepared to, at this moment, face a firing squad if what I’ve tried to do for the second time in my life does not meet the approval of Ghanaians . . . There is no justice in this society and so long as there is no justice, I would dare say let there be no peace. (8) (Emphasis added) With these words what was to become known as the ‘December 31st Revolution’ was announced to the people of Ghana. There is something odd about announcing a ‘people’s revolution’ to the people but we shall leave that aside for the moment. The Ghanaian political leadership seems to be enamoured with the word ‘revolution’. Since 1966 every change of government effected by extra-unconstitutional means had been called revolution. Changes of government of this sort have been justified on two main grounds, either the restoration of an old order or the creation of a new one, although it is more to the point to argue that, more often than not , the preferred change had involved both the need to restore an old order and the imperative of creating a new one, or sometimes reinforce certain features of the old order which are advantageous to the coup makers. The restoration of an old order as well as the creation of a new one has been called revolution and when Ghanaian political leaders talk of revolution it is important to go beneath this terminology to find out exactly what changes are proposed what changes are proposed. It could also be that there is a recognition on the part of the leadership that the kinds of changes conjured up by the revolution have a great deal of support and hence he need to hitch on that support by dubbing every extra-legal change of government a revolution. The concept has been applied to the restoration of an old order, as well as to a radical change in socio-economic position with all the consequences it entails. It would seem though that almost every coup though that almost every coup seemed to have an element of both. Thus, when in 1966 the military took power from the government of Kwame Nkrumah and embarked on what was clearly a restoration of the old order, it described its action as a revolution. It claimed to be preparing the ground for the restoration of democracy, the later seen in terms of an electoral competition between two or more parties in periodic election and the restoration of the economy. By which they meant the restoration of capitalism for the recruitment of the political elites in whom the task of running the affairs of the state would be entrusted for a period of four years till the next round of electoral contests. In 1972 when the military overthrew the government of Dr Busia, the action was justified in the name of revolution, meaning creation of a new social order. Here, revolution was seen not as restoration of liberal democracy which it felt had failed under Dr. Busia to respond to the economic needs of the mass of the people and to restore democracy national unity and dignity but also create a new political and economic order which it was thought will meet such needs. General Acheampong was to say that ‘military intervention can be justified only if it opens the way to a genuine revolution that brings real benefits to the people, giving a new sense of meaning and purpose to their lives” (charter of redemption). It has to be noted that although General Acheampong did attempt some changes in the state of the economy and of the political system, not the least of all was the disastrous ‘Union Government’ campaign, it did restore privileges to military officers etc. When in 1978 the military overthrew General Acheampong and his Supreme Military Council (SMC), it was justified in the name of revolution of the old order of collegial rule, economic management and political probity. When in 1979 Rawlings overthrew the interim military government of General Akuffo, the action was justified in the name of moral revolution, a restoration of values of honesty, accountability, political integrity and probity which had held the state and society together in the period preceding the rule of the military in 1972. This second time round, Rawlings justified his intervention in the name of revolution. It is of course naïve to think that the mere capture of state power by a military junta would in any meaningful sense of the word constitute a revolution. In this particular instance, the capture of state power was seen as the beginning of a process which would lead to a fundamental change in structure of power, class relations, political institutions and processes, as well as the basic structure of the production process. Whether this is possible or not is another matter, but it was in this sense that the supporters of the military junta called the coup of 31st December, a ‘revolution’; it was revolutionary in aspirational terms. This means the capture of state power would initiate a process of change leading to the unfolding of a revolutionary transformation of Ghanaian society. Let us look at the specific character of this revolution and the principles by which it can be evaluated. In doing this we rely largely on the opening words of Jerry Rawlings soon after the coup. There are some who would be tempted to reject the statement as a piece of opportunistic declaration, having little or no significance to actual political behavior. However, considering that the statement in general is consistent with the tenor of Rawlings’ pronouncements during the time of the AFRC and during the time of the hand-over, and that it has constituted the main plank of the Left critics of the government as well as the government itself (see Fui’s letter as well as special statement in THE POST, December 10, 1986 which quotes the statement), have stood, we are justified in using it as the main yardstick. Going back to the quotation with which we started this section, five main ideas stand out. First, there was the stated need for revolution, defined in terms of the transformation of the social and economic order. Among progressive groups and individuals the idea had persisted for sometime that Ghana’s post-colonial problems were such that only a revolution could respond effectively to them. What exactly this revolution was to entail has never been precisely articulated. There is, however, a consensus that it would involve the termination of the control of the local economy by foreign multinational companies, changes in the class structure of control of the state, creation of political forms which would make the interest of the broad mass of people predominant and realizable and a programme which would initiate a process of improving upon the material conditions of the mass of the people. Those who broadly shared this position I would identify as belonging to the Left. Those who entertained the opposite position that there was nothing basically wrong with the nature of the country’s structure of production or production relations or the nature of economic relations with western capitalist countries or the structure of power, class relations or the nature of state power, and that certain aspects of its functioning needed to be reformed, I would identify as the ‘Right’. I am conscious that in both groups it was possible to find some grey areas but putting it in such broad terms enables us to situate the argument within a framework which is more analytically meaningful. Within each group there were some disagreements as regards the specific policies to be pursued in order to realize the broad objectives. But between the two groups the differences were of a fundamental kind. It is important to grasp this. Thus when Rawlings came out with the statement that what was needed was a social revolution necessary to transform socio-economic structure of Ghanaian society, in a statement which amounted to a political manifesto, he identified himself with the Left. Then in the early days of the AFRC, Rawlings had spoken of the oppressed in a way which brought him into instant empathy with the Left and radical groups generally. However, there has always been some anxiety about his impetuosity, predisposition to voluntaristic action, inclination towards activities of the ’lone ranger’ type, inability to accept organizational discipline and constraint, his preference for the foco theory of revolution (see Regis Debray and Che Guevara) and insistence on moral reform, and what would appear to be his insensitivity to the need to create social and political structures as the bedrocks of his vision of revolutionary change. When therefore he made this statement which amounted to a political manifesto for the Left and the progressive organizations generally, it signaled his renunciation of idealism and the embracing of a materialist perspective. This, in the eyes of leftists prepared the ground for a meaningful cooperation. As events were to prove, their conclusions were rather premature. In Ghanaian conditions of the time, it was possible to argue that the mass of urban workers, the students, and he radical intelligentsia in varying degrees shared the Left platform, whereas the professionals, the middle classes, the officer corps of the military, the men of the liberal professions like law and medicine, the petty bourgeoisie located in the distributive sectors of the economy, in academia and in the upper layers of the state bureaucracy as well as the chiefly classes generally shared the Rightist outlook. The peasantry, on the whole, usually onlookers in the political divide, unless they perceived their interests as directly threatened as in the case of the cocoa disputes of he fifties, inclined towards the position of the chiefly classes. In organizational terms the extra-parliamentary political groups such as June Fourth Movement (JFM), the New Democratic Movement (NDM), the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG), the People’s Revolutionary league of Ghana (PRLG), the African Youth Command (AYC), the Pan-African Youth Movement (PANYMO) and the Movement for National Affairs (MONAS), broadly shared the Left position. The parliamentary parties and the establishment-oriented political organizations, such as the People’s National Party (PNP), the Popular Front Party (PFP), the Action Congress Party (ACP) [United National Convention (UNC)] and the Social Democratic Front (SDF), occupied the Rightist platform. So, when Rawlings made his announcement which put him firmly on the platform of the Left, the various organizations related according to their ideological predispositions. The second important theme in the transformation process was its libertarian and anti-authoritarian nature and the central role it assigned to the mass of the people; nothing was to be imposed on the people from above, least of all from the junta, although it started with the capture of state power from above. It was to be a revolution from below and grassroots initiative was to provide the main dynamic. Its course would be determined by the dynamics of the people’s struggles; and the mass of the people would remain the main agents of the transformation process. The Armed Forces, conceptualized as a distinct group with corporate interests would only be part of the decision-making process, not the decision-making body. They were to employ the instruments of violence in a direct class manner to ensure that in the unfolding of the process, the interests of the mass of the people were not sacrificed and that the initiatives remained in the hands of the progressives. It is needless to say that this would only be possible if the Armed Forces shared the same class and ideological interests as the mass of the people. This was one of the main problems because the armed forces shared both class and corporate interests. Stability was often maintained by using the corporate interests to overrule class interests and in the unstable conditions of the time class interest came to the fore but the issue was not clear-cut in any way. The transformation was to be achieved through the principle of consent, and mass democracy and popular participation were to be important tens of this transformation. A third principle of the revolutionary transformation following on the need for mass democracy and popular participation was the concept of the people as constituting the sovereign power in the land. ‘ . . . nothing will be done from the Castle without the consent of the people – the farmers, the police, the soldiers, the workers, the rich and poor would be part of the decision-making process of this country.’ The populist content of the message was clear. It was later to be a big bone of contention between Rawlings and the Left. But it must also be noted that it was the theme of which ran through the first issue of the Workers Banner, the JFM paper. In overthrowing the civilian government the military was only acting on behalf of the people. It was not substituting itself for the people. It was only creating conditions under which institutions could be created for the people to exercise their sovereign power which was denied them, even under the constitutional rule of Dr Limann. A fourth principle of the transformation was the recognition that justice, distributive and popular justice was to be an important and necessary condition for the creation of the new society. The fifth principle was the accountability of the leadership to the led and the sanctions for leadership’s failure. There was to be an organic relationship between rulers and the ruled. And to underline his awareness of exploitation he concluded that ‘let no man make money at the expense of another man’. It was a declaration which aroused the imagination and the enthusiasm of the urban working class who had in the previous years watched helplessly as inflation ate the substance of their wages while dubious businessmen in the distribution sectors of the economy made windfall profits out of the import-export business and the peculiar conditions which existed at the time. A number of contradictions and problems could be pointed out between these principles and the action of the coup. In the first place how could one reconcile the concept of people’s power and grassroots initiative with an action which started with capture of state power from the top. Second, how could the Armed Forces be the arbiter and at the same time a partisan in the sense of using the instruments of violence to advance the cause of the mass of the people? Third, as already pointed out, this would imply a congruence of class and ideological interests which as no empirical validity. The Armed Forces was a multi-class organization and depending on the class of those who control it, it could be used to advance the cause of the mass of the people or of the petty bourgeoisie. At this particular time there was a small group of Leftist soldiers who occupied the important position in the constellation of forces which effected the coup but they did not constitute the dominant position to commanding position in the Armed Forces as a whole. For this to happen it would be necessary to move from position to a commanding position within the Armed Forces. This could only be done with the support of the leadership of the coup. This was one of the most crucial problems which Rawlings faced. And finally, although the principles stipulated the need for accountability and sanctions for leadership failure, there were no mechanisms for enforcement. And, lastly, for the leaders of the coup there was the tension or the contradiction between the need to keep order and maintain control over the pace of events and at the same time give the initiative to the mass of the people. How could this be done in the absence of an all-embracing political party with firm organizational links and mechanisms for enforcing discipline? We need not allow these problems to detain us now. It was clear enough as a political manifesto. In fact the speech deserves more attention than has so far been given to it. It was an unequivocal call for revolution, defined in terms of the transformation of the socio-economic order achieved through democratic struggle and popular participation of the mass of the people. A cardinal point of this transformation process was accountability and the reduction or elimination of inter-group conflict through the promotion of social justice. The military coup was to be a catalyst, a social action which would create the conditions for bringing the transformation process into being. In other words, it was to turn a military revolt into a social revolution. Although it said nothing about a political movement, there was some kind of unstated understanding that it would be based on some sort of unity of the Leftist political organizations forming the political base of the initiative, with the Defence Committees, which were to emerge later, as the advance and shock troops as it were.
Posted on: Thu, 04 Jul 2013 13:51:36 +0000
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