Canada knew nuclear deal with China could be seen as ‘weak’: Docs Carl Meyer, EMBASSY, April 16, 2014 After a major Canadian uranium mining firm landed deals with Chinese state-owned enterprises, the Harper government met several times with the firm and then announced a new protocol to ship raw Canadian uranium directly to China—even though it knew the protocol’s safeguards could be perceived as “weak,” government documents show. Nuclear disarmament advocates fear the new scheme is an example of commerce driving policy in Ottawa. They say it could set a precedent that countries can establish workarounds to international nuclear security standards if the status quo was seen to be restricting potential trade. “Commercial interests, as important as they are, must be shaped and constrained by non-proliferation considerations,” said Cesar Jaramillo, program officer for space security and nuclear disarmament at Waterloo-based Project Ploughshares. But Canada says the deal with China will ensure Canadian uranium is used only for “strictly peaceful, non-military purposes” and that the new requirements are “appropriate to the level of the proliferation risks involved.” The Chinese Embassy also assured Canadians that its nuclear facilities are safe and under control. ‘Isn’t this rather weak?’ Lured by the world’s fastest-growing market for uranium, with 28 new reactors under construction in China, and driven by an explicit desire to bolster the “international activities” of Saskatoon-based Cameco Corporation, one of the world’s largest uranium producers, the government agreed in 2012 to alter its nuclear co-operation agreement with its second-largest trading partner. The new deal, which Cameco says kicked in Jan. 1, 2013, has already seen at least one Canadian uranium concentrate shipment to China, last October. According to briefing notes prepared for Trade Minister Ed Fast and recently released to Embassy under access to information law, the alterations to that agreement gave Canada a new option to fulfill its nuclear non-proliferation policy in a novel way. Canada’s policy, as outlined in the briefing notes, has held that nuclear material shipped to nuclear-armed states must only be held in facilities named in a special list that the state had agreed to with the International Atomic Energy Agency. But the briefing notes show Canada knew China “wants to process or ‘convert’ Canadian uranium in a conversion facility in China that has NOT been placed on its ‘Voluntary Offer’ Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.” The solution, the briefing note indicated, was to permit the export to such banned sites, under a new protocol that would allow China instead to “provide additional reporting to Canada on the uranium.” China would then “notify Canada when the uranium is moved to another facility” where the normal rules would apply. The briefing notes include answers to theoretical questions the government anticipated being asked about the new protocol. One question states: “the additional verification mechanism comprises only administrative reports to [the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission]. Isn’t this rather weak?” The briefing note’s proposed answer: “The proposed additional verification mechanism is appropriate to the level of the proliferation risks involved and in fact goes beyond what the IAEA requires.” The next proposed question asks how Canadians would know that “China will honour its commitments, especially when an international verification organization like the IAEA is not involved.” The proposed answer: “China takes such obligations seriously and has a satisfactory track record of implementing them once agreed.” The note also states that Canada is “not without recourse. Canada could, in the unlikely event of non-compliance, suspend or abrogate the additional verification mechanism, stop authorizing exports of uranium and/or ultimately terminate this protocol and the [nuclear trade agreement] itself, although such steps could have significant consequences.” Concerns over proliferation That has Mr. Jaramillo and others worried about whether there’s a “downward trend” in non-proliferation standards. Mr. Jaramillo said he questioned why the briefing note said Canada “could” suspend or kill the deal, and didn’t use more assertive language like “shall,” which would have indicated a clear trigger for suspension. “In the very letter of the protocol it should be very specific as to which actions or omissions would constitute non-compliance,” he said. That level of specificity isn’t available to the public. The new protocol, which is available on the government’s treaty website, is 476 words. Under Article 2 of the new protocol, which covers the supply of nuclear material, if material is transferred to a facility that’s not on the IAEA list, an “administrative arrangement” kicks in. That arrangement document, and others like it, “are considered protected documents and are not available publicly,” wrote CNSC spokesperson Aurèle Gervais in an email. Mr. Jaramillo said it was important to show transparency. “The idea is not to challenge the legitimate need or desire of the industrial sector to pursue commercial opportunities in China or elsewhere. It’s also legitimate for the government of Canada to advance Canadian commercial interests. But nuclear trade in particular is not like any other endeavour...given its well-known military applications,” he said. “This is a historically volatile neighbourhood in South Asia; there are nuclear and non-nuclear strategic issues permeating relationships and rivalries that involve India, China, Pakistan, and indirectly Canada.” Shawn-Patrick Stensil, an energy and climate campaigner with Greenpeace Canada, drew a parallel with Canada’s recent nuclear deals with India, another nuclear-armed state. “We’ve now been moving to selling uranium to markets that have bomb programs, and our non-proliferation policy is dying a death by a thousand cuts,” he said. “I think this will eventually come back to bite us.” Embassy asked for an interview with Natural Resources Minister Greg Rickford, but a spokesperson for his office said he would not be available by press time. But the briefing notes argue several times that the new protocol would still achieve the Canadian requirement of non-proliferation. “While the additional verification mechanism for uranium will be different than those in our other [nuclear agreements]...the same policy objectives will be achieved,” the notes read. A representative for Cameco says the firm was told the safeguards in the deal are consistent with the standards to which Canada has agreed. “All shipments of Canadian uranium are bound by Canada’s bilateral agreement with China. Assurances are handled by the Canadian government and we are not party to those details. We’re told that requirements are consistent with Canada’s obligations with the IAEA, perhaps even more stringent than what they require,” wrote Rob Gereghty, manager of media relations at Cameco, in an email. For its part, China says it “attaches great importance to international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.” Its “nuclear facilities and material are safe and controllable,” wrote Lei Ding, a press attaché at the Chinese Embassy, in an email. Consulted extensively with Cameco on China Cameco could ship uranium products to China before, said Mr. Gereghty, such as uranium hexafluoride or finished fuel bundles, but not in the raw, concentrated form directly from Canada. The protocol “opened the door for us,” he said. “The majority of our uranium is produced here in Canada. So that’s where the benefit is.” Cameco signed two deals with Chinese nuclear state-owned enterprises in 2010. The company says the first was with China National Nuclear Corporation in June 2010 to supply 23 million pounds of uranium concentrate through 2020. The second was with the General Nuclear Power Group in November 2010 to supply 29 million pounds of uranium concentrate through 2025. Six months after the second deal, Peter McGovern, then the Foreign Affairs department’s assistant deputy minister for Asia and chief trade commissioner, met with “Cameco’s senior team” in Saskatoon “to discuss the details of a nuclear agreement with China,” the briefing note reads. A month later, the department “hosted a whole of government meeting with Cameco...to discuss uranium exports to China,” the briefing note continues. Three months after that, Cameco employees met with the department’s deputy trade minister in Regina, and a few days later, employees met Foreign Minister John Baird in Ottawa on Sept. 6, 2011. This all culminated in a phone conversation between Trade Minister Ed Fast, sitting in his Parliament Hill office, and Cameco president Tim Gitzel on Sept. 22, 2011, which the government anticipated would allow Mr. Gitzel to “advocate [Cameco’s] need for new arrangement for the export of uranium to China.” During this conversation, the briefing note recommended that Mr. Fast “reiterate the department’s support to Cameco’s international activities.” Less than five months after that phone conversation, the Harper government announced the end of negotiations with China over “an agreement that will facilitate increased exports of Canadian uranium to China,” on Feb. 9, 2012. The deal was announced as signed the following July. [email protected]
Posted on: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 00:21:19 +0000
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