Canada must rule its Arctic waves ZoomBookmarkSharePrintListenTranslate We should serve notice that we are to be recognized as a maritime nation, and act like one, writes VICTOR SUTHREN. Beset by the problems of confronting the French and Spanish navies during the long struggle with Napoleon, British admiral Horatio Nelson is reputed to have complained, “Was I to die this moment, ‘ Want of Frigates’ would be found stamped on my heart.” In the coming political and economic struggle to ensure the development of the vast resources of the Arctic Ocean proceeds in Canada’s best interests, there is a risk that as international focus descends on what will be in effect a new world ocean, Canada will lack the physical assets to make its voice respected, and not ignored. MICHEL COMTE/AFP/GETTY IMAGESHMCS Fredericton, shown on manoeuvres off Baffin Island, is a small part of the naval capability Canada needs in the rapidly thawing North, writes Victor Suthren. No other country recognizes Canadian sovereignty over the waters between the islands, which may hold one-fifth of the planet’s remaining oil deposits. To declare and enforce our sovereignty in the huge archipelago we claim, an area the size of Western Europe, we must have ships and sailors in those waters in sufficient numbers, and with sufficient capability, to let no nation doubt our commitment. But even with the government’s highly-touted shipbuilding program, the worry is that our will shall fail, and the resources wither below what was promised. We may lose our voice around the Arctic Council table, with new members clamouring to join, to stronger, more robust nations, because of Nelson’s “want of frigates” — or their modern equivalent. In the heady world of military procurement, the difference between an F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and an F-18E/F Super Hornet is a matter of degree of performance: both could arguably do the job Canada needs in the air. But for ships, the matter is far more conclusive: you either build the ships you have to have, or you do not. In the coming political and economic struggle for the Arctic, it will be ships that will guarantee the edge Canada needs — not fighter aircraft, however needed the latter are for other reasons. There is a fear that ordinary Canadians still do not grasp what is at stake in the coming development of the Arctic, a development that the present Conservative government expresses in the limited, if agreeable terms of development “for the benefit of the people of the Arctic.” It is in fact the future of all of Canada that is likely going to be at stake, and this case needs to be made far more effectively. In an Arctic archipelago with opening coastlines that can exceed 16,000 kilometres in length, there are continental shelf mineral and petroleum resources of astounding quantity, possibly a full one-fifth of the planet’s remaining oil deposits. And it is not only what will be found in Canada’s Arctic that will require our national commitment, it is the reality of what other nations will want to do in those waters. Our concern over environmental issues and the survival of northern lifestyles will face the onslaught of commercial nations seeing the Arctic Ocean not only as waters worthy of investment in — and pressuring for commercial control over — but also as newly opening trade routes between Asia and Europe, for which ships are already taking shape on Chinese and Korean computer screens. Canada has been accustomed to think of the High Arctic waters as “ours,” but even our closest ally and neighbour, the United States, insists that the waters between our islands are not ours, but are “international waterways.” That view is welcomed with interest — and anticipation — in many world capitals. The big dogs will soon be running through our back yard; will we be able to bark enough to be heard — and more importantly, to be respected? The Royal Canadian Navy is meant to receive a planned six Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, and although the Navy’s officers are as tight-lipped as ever about getting them, outsiders worry if a deficit-preoccupied government is going to come through with these vessels. Yet, it can be argued that the RCN and its sister organization, the Canadian Coast Guard, need more of these vessels — and with greater capability than merely ice “strengthening” — to carry our flag and our authority into the new Arctic shipping lanes. The planned three Joint Support Ships to back up these vessels and the larger RCN vessels must not only be obtained, but must eventually be joined by other capable multi-purpose platforms. The current fleet of 12 Canadian Patrol Frigates that form the core of the RCN fleet are undergoing a mid-life refit that will hopefully extend their service until a new, multi-purpose class of open-ocean warship now known simply as the “Canadian Surface Combatant” enters service. The frigates were, and are, excellent platforms for their time, but again the worry is that government will not have the vision to see that a highly demonstrated commitment to these new ships must be declared and repeated often, to ensure both Canada’s friends and others less friendly to us know we mean business at sea in the Arctic and elsewhere. In short, as befits the nation with the longest coastline in the world and which fronts what will be three oceans, we must serve notice that Canada is to be recognized as a maritime nation, and act like one. Canada will gain more by looking to the sea — and nothing less than national survival is arguably at stake — as trade by sea grows exponentially and the drive to claim undersea resources, including our own, becomes a serious matter. As to the level of commitment Canada must adopt to face this challenge, the words of Winston Churchill ring out clearly: “It is not enough that we do our best; sometimes we must do what is required.” Our Arctic rights ZoomBookmarkSharePrintListenTranslate As the Arctic melts, the geopolitics of the region heats up. According to a 2012 NASA study, the Arctic Ocean has seen a “steady and dramatic decline” in its ice cover over the last three decades, to the point where the polar cap is the smallest it’s ever been since satellite observations began. The disappearance of the ice has allowed something Arctic explorers could only dream about — the gradual opening of the Northwest Passage as a sea route linking Asia and the West. This has considerable consequence for Canada’s claims of sovereign authority over much of the Arctic archipelago, which until now has depended on Canada’s ostensible “historic rights.” The problem is that in the nottoo-distant future other nations may not regard “history” as sufficient grounds for jurisdictional authority. What is to be done? Well, first and most obviously, Canada has to be able to back up its claims with a realpolitik presence — governmental, cultural, economic and, not to be neglected, military. Soft power persuasion is nice, but military hardware — naval ships, icebreakers, aircraft patrols, satellite surveillance — often earns greater sovereign courtesies. That doesn’t mean forgoing the diplomatic necessities. Canada needs to use its two-year chairmanship of the eight-nation International Arctic Council to assert in no uncertain terms that it will not brook attempts to dilute its Arctic sovereignty. The federal government says Arctic sovereignty is a priority, and to that end appointed Health Minister Leona Aglukkaq as Canada’s representative on the council. Canada’s chairmanship of the council also provides an opportunity to widen the organization’s mandate to include security issues and provide a mechanism for settling territorial disputes without resort to the gunboats. To date, the council’s members — Canada, the United States, Russia, Norway, Denmark (which includes Greenland), Sweden, Iceland and Finland, all of which possess Arctic Ocean coastlines — have been reasonably co-operative. Certainly, there are outstanding issues, particularly boundary disputes and offshore jurisdiction over oil and gas deposits. Norway and Russia quarrel about the boundaries around the Svalbard islands. Canada and the U.S. are at odds over Canadian insistence that the Northwest Passage is an internal waterway. Canada is squabbling with the U.S., Russia and Denmark about extending sovereignty to continental shelves. But relations among the council members may be even more problematic in the future. Earlier this week, at a meeting in Sweden, the council granted China, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Singapore observer status. (Aglukkaq made sure the European Union’s bid for observer status was blocked until it addresses the concerns of indigenous people about its ban on Canadian seal exports.) Their motives in seeking this status are transparent, but not surprising. A shorter sea route connecting Asian and European markets has economic benefits, while the Arctic possesses vast energy and mineral resources to keep their economies ticking. Perhaps the inclusion of these observer nations will encourage them to respect the council’s goals of protecting the Arctic region, especially its fragile environment. But then maybe not. China may have no particular intention to undermine Canadian sovereignty, but its interest in the Arctic is strategic reach. As China “moves from weakness to strength, it will pursue the strategic goal of regional preponderance and re-establishment of a Sino-centric world system,” Gang Chen, a scholar at the National University of Singapore, says in a December 2012 article, “China’s Emerging Arctic Strategy,” in The Polar Journal. “If the Middle Kingdom’s ultimate strategic goal is to win a smokeless war without fighting for supremacy in the world, then the melting Arctic region that will provide abundant natural resources and shorter navigable sea routes may emerge as one of the battlefields that demand tactics and sub-strategies.” China may lack a definitive statement of its Arctic policies, “but this does not mean that Beijing has no hidden agenda regarding the Arctic.” It’s hard not to think so given the recent activities of Chinese leaders, who have visited Nordic countries in which they have never shown previous interest. President Hu Jintao was in Denmark last June — the first Chinese head of state to visit since the two countries established diplomatic relations 62 years ago. (Might this be why Denmark so willingly urged observer status for China?) Prime Minister Wen Jiabao also paid unprecedented visits to Iceland and Sweden in 2012. Beyond this China has set up an Arctic research station in Ny-ålesund, Norway and, in recent years, conducted several Arctic scientific expeditions with the M/V Xuelong, the largest non-nuclear icebreaker in the world. Historically, the Arctic’s remoteness and harsh climate provided Canadians with the luxury of a northern security buffer that allowed them to largely regard the region as a resource depot. This negligence is no longer tenable. The geopolitics of the Arctic melt requires Canada to join the Great Game. We either play the game, and play it well, or our nation will be the pawn of more assertive powers.
Posted on: Sat, 08 Jun 2013 12:41:48 +0000
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