Changing leaders is not the only way to intervene. By using military power or curtailing the flow of money, outsiders can engineer what scholars call a “mutually hurting stalemate”. In this neither side can advance and the cost of holding tight is high—making peace the least bad option. The NATO air campaign in 1999 against Serbia to protect Albanians in neighbouring Kosovo is an example; bombs rained down on his capital until Milosevic caved in. In 1980 Britain ended Zimbabwe’s civil war by simultaneously squeezing the government and persuading Mozambique and Zambia to threaten to end the aid that they supplied to the rebels making gains in the field. Mutually hurting stalemates are hard to bring about. Knowing that the enemy is under the cosh can tempt embattled combatants to hold out. Separate measures are needed for the two sides. Governments often need less pressure, since they find stalemates painful in themselves. Without full control of their territory, legitimacy seeps away. This weakens them and encourages others who have grievances to make a stand, adding to the problems. Rebels, on the other hand, may require extra pressure, since they are less likely to find a stalemate intrinsically painful. Fighting becomes their raison d’être; keeping the ability to fight on is all they need. “The guerrilla wins if he does not lose,” noted Henry Kissinger. “The conventional army loses if it does not win.”
Posted on: Mon, 11 Nov 2013 07:20:55 +0000
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