Concessions to Jakarta are Tony Abbotts only way to respond - TopicsExpress



          

Concessions to Jakarta are Tony Abbotts only way to respond THE onus now resides with Tony Abbott to demonstrate a flexible and new approach to intelligence and security issues by offering concessions when he replies to the letter from Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Nothing else will suffice. The key to the Prime Ministers reply must be the recognition that this is not just an intelligence crisis with Indonesia. It is a political crisis. It must be treated as a political crisis. That dictates against the mere neither confirm nor deny stance, plus regrets taken by Abbott, because this position cannot satisfy the political pressures now unleashed. It is easy to assert, and certainly true, that Yudhoyono has overreacted. But that testifies to the personal insult he feels, the extent of anti-Australian sentiment within Indonesias political system and the failure of Abbotts initial statement. The responsibility now rests with Abbott to offer concessions to appease Yudhoyono and give him some leverage, not just to halt further retaliation but to restore the suspended co-operation on people-smuggling activity and military ties. The truth is that Australia now operates in a fog of uncertainty. Neither Abbott nor his advisers know what exactly is needed to fix this problem. It would be folly for Abbott to try to cure anti-Australian sentiment on the Indonesian street. His sole aim must to convince Yudhoyono by word and deed that Australia wants to rectify the situation. Security expert and Australian National University professor Hugh White tells Inquirer: Intelligence is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end. Abbotts task now is to repair the political relationship with Indonesia even if that involves damage to our intelligence capability. It is the core point. As former US assistant secretary of state for East Asia Kurt Campbell, now visiting this country as a Lowy fellow, says, the combination of WikiLeaks and the mass release of secrets from former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden has transformed the norms surrounding intelligence policy. Abbott is in a situation where nobody knows how the new norms will evolve. The situation has declined since Abbotts statement to parliament last Tuesday. Indonesia feels a double insult: its President has been spied on and Abbotts response has triggered a new wave of anger from Jakarta. In Abbotts reply to Yudhoyono, he must get pro-active and find a new formula. In his statement, Yudhoyono seemed to give Abbott negotiating flexibility. The Australian government still has faith in Yudhoyono. Abbott believes he remains our friend. The governments assessment is that Yudhoyono is under intense domestic pressure and had to respond. Abbotts initial statement was dismissive of Indonesias concerns, White says. He was really saying, We will spy on whoever we want and that will be good for us and good for Indonesia. He now needs to find a new formula that can placate Indonesia and that wont be easy. Yudhoyono has ordered a series of unfriendly actions against Australia. He envisages they may be temporary. The assumption is that he is merely turning up the political heat on Abbott to force concessions. Australian officials told Inquirer last night there was little operational impact so far. If, however, Yudhoyonos retaliation becomes a new and permanent policy then Australian-Indonesian ties will face a full-blown crisis with disastrous consequences. Abbott faces a huge task: to restore the status quo ante. Is that possible? Nobody knows. But it means sitting pat is not an option. If the spiral is not reversed then recriminations will intensify. Anti-Australian sentiment in Indonesias media and streets will feed a backlash in this country from media, talkback radio and Indonesian loathers, only intensified if Jakartas retaliation produces an upsurge in boat arrivals and the destruction of one of Abbotts core pledges as Prime Minister. Both nations are hooked on the sovereignty issue. Given Indonesias fragility as a nation-state, this is an obsession. But when Abbott first visited Jakarta after becoming PM he said in public and private to Yudhoyono that the boats issue was about Australias sovereignty. He chose those words deliberately. He meant them. It is doubtful if Jakarta fully comprehends this: it may regard the boats as a minor irritant it can turn on and off to provoke better Australian behaviour. Abbotts position is far more difficult than appreciated. Abbott is not going to apologise. Yudhoyono has not asked for an apology. He asks for an explanation for the spying against himself, his wife, cabinet members and close advisers in 2009 under Kevin Rudds government. He is not satisfied with Abbotts comments so far. He seeks new and binding protocols covering security and intelligence and a code of conduct. Presumably, Abbott will agree in principle to negotiate such arrangements. He will offer Yudhoyono an expanded intelligence-sharing deal between Australia and Indonesia. This was Abbotts plan before the crisis blew up. He discussed it when Vice-President Boediono recently visited this country. This situation gives Abbott potential to offer concessions to Yudhoyono short of an apology or grievously compromising our intelligence activity. It remains unclear, however, how far Abbott needs to go. Offering Yudhoyono an explanation leads to the pivotal issue: does Abbott give assurances of no future intelligence operations against the Indonesian President? This is what Yudhoyono must prefer. It is the promise US President Barack Obama gave German Chancellor Angela Merkel, so a precedent exists. From his remarks, Abbott seems determined to avoid this position. So does Australias national security establishment. Given Australias intelligence activity across Southeast Asia, any such public pledge would extend the problem, make it regional and provoke demands from other nations - think Malaysia and Papua New Guinea - for the same assurance. It would become farcical. In careful comments this week, Campbell said the Obama-Merkel situation was not the same as Australia-Indonesia. It is the truth people want to ignore. Australia has many reasons to run intelligence on Indonesia and its location as a source of Islamist terrorism that has led to many Australian deaths cannot be ignored. The undisguised preference of the Labor Party for the Obama-Merkel formula only complicates Abbotts dilemma and weakens his bargaining position with Yudhoyono. But this concession can be avoided only if Abbott can produce an alternative formulation satisfactory to Yudhoyono. This is the challenge. Abbotts problem is that if our major intelligence partner, the US, has adopted this formula, how tenable is it for Australia to reject this approach when confronted by the leader of a close and friendly nation who is deeply offended by being made an intelligence target? The standoff is riddled with hypocrisy. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, who has led the charge against the Coalition from the day of its election, denied that Indonesia listened to the phone calls of friends. We dont do it, he said. That is a false statement. The Abbott government knows it is false. The former head of Badan Intelijen Negara, Indonesias national intelligence agency, has contradicted Natalegawa. Such deceptions do not help. The further truth is that Australian intelligence operations in Indonesia have been used, as Abbott implied, as part of counter-terrorism measures that contribute to the safety of Indonesians. Meanwhile, the chief of Indonesias intelligence agency, Marciano Norman, was reported in The Australian this week as saying a deal had been done with Australian agencies on no more wiretapping and this was concluded before the Snowden revelations. The point is that beneath the politics there is another reality: Australian and Indonesian agencies are well aware of their respective capabilities. Yudhoyono, as a former co-ordinating minister for security, is aware of these capability though, of course, was angered to find himself a target. This crisis is sure to re-draw the map on intelligence. WikiLeaks and Snowden have changed the ground rules. Intelligence operations against friendly leaders work only when kept secret. If they cannot be kept secret they are not worth conducting; if they are not worth conducting, pressure will mount to formalise this. The ANUs White says: Ordinary intelligence leaks are deniable. But this situation is different. Snowden had the documents and the response of the Obama administration has really validated these documents. Abbotts problem is that this situation is different. The normal confirmation or deny rules wont work on this issue with Indonesia. Abbotts statement last Tuesday was technically perfect: every nation conducts intelligence; he would not apologise for protecting the national interest; he would not give details of our intelligence operations; he regarded Yudhoyono as one of our very best friends in the world. Yet the Prime Minister missed the political chemistry. Having said in Jakarta that there was no more important nation than Indonesia, he failed to put this principle into action over the intelligence insult to Yudhoyono. Now Abbott has another chance, with his written reply to Yudhoyonos letter. Abbott has a lot at stake. Consider the list. Indonesia has the power to ruin Abbotts pledge to stop the boats. It can destroy his Jakarta not Geneva foreign policy. It can weaken Australias regional position. A rational Indonesia would do none of this. So Abbott must encourage the forces of rationality in Jakarta. The principle of interdependence needs to be resurrected
Posted on: Mon, 25 Nov 2013 00:20:16 +0000

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