David Sloan Wilson, Elinor Ostrom, and Michael E. Cox: Excerpts from an article that reflects a dialog between the coauthors that began in 2009 and was facilitated by the collaborative project between the Evolution Institute and National Evolutionary Synthesis Center on rethinking economics from an evolutionary perspective. The manuscript was completed a few weeks before Ostrom’s death and is dedicated to her memory. This article generalizes a set of core design principles for the efficacy of groups that was originally derived for groups attempting to manage common-pool resources (CPRs) such as irrigation systems, forests, and fisheries. The dominant way of thinking until recently was that commons situations invariably result in the tragedy of overuse, requiring either privatization (when possible) or top-down regulation. Based on a worldwide database of CPR groups, Ostrom proposed a set of principles that broadly captured the essential aspects of the institutional arrangements that succeeded, as contrasted to groups whose efforts failed. These principles can be generalized in two respects: first, by showing how they follow from foundational evolutionary principles; and second, by showing how they apply to a wider range of groups. The generality of the core design principles enables them to be used as a practical guide for improving the efficacy of many kinds of groups. ... Given the importance attached to the conclusions presented by Hardin (1968) and the historical influence of neo-classical economics in policy dialogs, the work of Elinor Ostrom and her associates was considered groundbreaking and eventually earned her the Nobel Prize in economics in 2009. The main import of Ostrom’s work was to show that when certain conditions are met, groups of people are capable of sustainably managing their com-mon resources. Moreover, the tragedy of overuse can be avoided without privatization or top-down regulation. Ostrom’s entire career embodied this theme, starting with her thesis research on a group of stakeholders in southern California that eventually managed to regulate groundwater pumping, preventing a tragic incursion of seawater into the water table. Later, Ostrom and colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis were instrumental in the creation of a worldwide database of groups that attempted to manage a variety of common-pool resources (CPRs) such as irrigation systems, forests, pastures, and fisheries. Drawing from empirical cases and guided by the emerging field of game theory, Ostrom identified eight design principles that enable CPR groups to effectively manage their resources, which can be briefly described as follows (see Cox et al., 2010 for the most recent in-depth discussion of the principles). (1) Clearly defined boundaries. The identity of the group and the boundaries of the shared resource are clearly delineated. (2) Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs. Members of the group must negotiate a system that rewards members for their contributions. High status or other disproportionate benefits must be earned. Unfair inequality poisons collective efforts. (3) Collective-choice arrangements. Group members must be able to create at least some of their own rules and make their own decisions by consensus. People hate being told what to do but will work hard for group goals that they have agreed upon. (4) Monitoring. Managing a commons is inherently vulnerable to free-riding and active exploitation. Unless these undermining strategies can be detected at relatively low cost by norm-abiding members of the group, the tragedy of the commons will occur. (5) Graduated sanctions. Transgressions need not require heavy-handed punishment, at least initially. Often gossip or a gentle reminder is sufficient, but more severe forms of punishment must also be waiting in the wings for use when necessary. (6) Conflict resolution mechanisms. It must be possible to resolve conflicts quickly and in ways that are perceived as fair by members of the group. (7) Minimal recognition of rights to organize. Groups must have the authority to conduct their own affairs. Externally imposed rules are unlikely to be adapted to local circumstances and violate principle 3. (8) For groups that are part of larger social systems, there must be appropriate coordination among relevant groups. Every sphere of activity has an optimal scale. Large scale governance requires finding the optimal scale for each sphere of activity and appropriately coordinating the activities, a concept called polycentric governance (McGinnis, 1999). A related concept is subsidiarity, which assigns governance tasks by default to the lowest jurisdiction, unless this is explicitly determined to be ineffective. These core design principles were described in Governing the Commons (Ostrom, 1990). A recent review of studies that had accumulated since the original study provides strong empirical support for the efficacy of the core design principles with a few suggested modifications that differentiate between the resource system and those authorized to use it (Cox et al., 2010). In this article, we show that the design principles can be generalized in two respects: First, they follow from the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in all species and the evolutionary history of our own species. Second, because of their theoretical generality, we argue that the principles have a wider range of application than CPR groups and are relevant to nearly any situation where people must cooperate and coordinate to achieve shared goals. For both of these reasons, the principles can be used as a practical guide for increasing the efficacy of groups, although local tailoring is usually required for their implementation. ... Given such a strong foundation of theoretical and empirical support, the core design principles can potentially serve as a practical guide for increasing the efficacy of groups in real-world settings. Some groups already work well and do not need improvement; after all, our species evolved by genetic and cultural evolution to function well as groups. There is a sense in which it is instinctive and comes naturally to us. The core design principles are easy to understand intuitively without a lot of formal theorizing. Yet, it is not the case that human groups spontaneously adopt the core design principles, providing much room for improvement. We encourage others to use the principles (and more generally MLS theory) as a practical guide for improving the efficacy of groups, as we are starting to do for schools and neighborhoods. Part of the generality of the core design principles is that they apply across all social scales, from neighborhoods to the global village. To the extent that nations qualify as corporate units, they employ the same range of social strategies as lower-level organisms. To the extent that nations do not qualify as corporate units, it is often due to dysfunctions caused by conflicts from within. Either way, a sophisticated understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in general and the biocultural evolution of our own species is useful for understanding and improving the situation. It is also important to appreciate the importance of interactions across scales. A modern society consists of countless spheres of activity. Each sphere has an optimal scale that must be determined on a case-by-case basis. ... In other words, there is no viable alternative to polycentric governance. Many spheres of activity that are currently being managed at a large scale would be better managed at a smaller scale, but smaller scale units often rely critically on services that can only be provided at a larger scale, as we have seen in the case of neighborhoods relying upon their city for backup sanctions. We look forward to the day when governance consists of optimizing and coordinating among many spheres of activity from a sophisticated evolutionary perspective. evolution-institute.org/sites/default/files/external_docs/Generalizing%20the%20core%20design%20principles%20for%20the%20efficacy%20of%20groups%20.pdf
Posted on: Wed, 03 Dec 2014 06:23:13 +0000
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