Emergency rule extension debate Tweet 0 Share 0 0 Comments THE key to deciding whether to extend the state of emergency currently operative in the three North Eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe is to critically examine if the emergency, after about 18 months, has served the purpose for which it was declared? If it has not been successful, is there any alternative to addressing the crisis politically? This poser is germane to the resolution taken by the National Defence Security Council (NDSC) to seek a further extension of the abnormal rule necessitated by the Boko Haram insurgency in that part of the country; particularly as the Senate engages in debate over the Executive’s request for an elongation. Since its declaration on May 14, 2013 the state of emergency imposed on the troubled region has had two extensions before this present proposal. The resolution for the latest extension is obviously connected with the increasing intensity of the insurgency, manifested in attacks by female suicide bombers in secondary schools and the escalation of these attacks to other areas of the north. It is sad that the last 18 months have seen a more emboldened, more ferocious and more devastating Boko Haram perpetrating a harvest of death and bloodletting. It may be argued that the state of emergency since May 2013 might have given the victims a false hope and thereby exacerbating their vulnerability. In the period in question, the insurgents have killed hundreds of people, sacked towns, annexed 16 local government areas and declared a Caliphate over them. Barely one year into the state of emergency, the insurgents traumatized the country by abducting 276 secondary schoolgirls from Chibok in Borno State and overran the seemingly ill-motivated Nigerian troops with gleeful cruelty. If these incidents of carnage and destruction have been occurring while a state of emergency was in place in those three states, of what use would it be to extend emergency rule by another six months? Given the lethargic political leadership of those states and the perceived insensitivity of the ruling elite, will there be any gain for the country to extend the state of emergency in the region? Isn’t there a critical need to change the way of operations of the security forces with a view to winning the war against the insurgency? Or should the nation be simply content with business as usual even as the emergency is extended? To some critics of the extension, a renewed emergency rule would have an unsavoury political implication, considering that the states affected are strongholds of the opposition, All Progressives Congress (APC). Extending the state of emergency, they argue, imposes a moral burden on both the president and the ruling party, against the worsening violence recorded in the past 18 months. Emergency rule in the three states may thus be viewed as a punitive measure to destabilize the north- eastern region. Upon further reflection, could it be said that a genuine state of emergency has been in place? What is the advantage of the emergency rule over other alternatives? What is it that the president has done that he could not have done without a state of emergency? If this question cannot be answered satisfactorily, then the state of emergency, as it has been portrayed, is purposeless. When the Jonathan administration declared a state of emergency to fully contain the violence in the affected region, many Nigerians were genuinely hopeful that the insurgency may be curtailed if not curbed. Government has, however, displayed remarkable lack of capacity to implement some of the suggestions put forward, thus dashing the hope of Nigerians and frittering away their goodwill. Besides the moral burden of executing a proper emergency rule in the affected areas, all the measures put in place have failed with embarrassing consequences: mistrust for the army, disenfranchisement of citizens, and displacement of people with its attendant social problems and the cessation of economic and other activities. Any subterranean feeling that the election will solve the problems of Boko Haram is a misguided political reading, in the face of the emergency’s inefficacy. Had the leadership been visionary, it would have learnt from various experiences, and steered the country to safer shores. A government that is committed to the safety, health and welfare of its citizens would, before declaring a state of emergency, carry out strategic steps to make it effective, through detailed planning, preparation, mobilisation of the appropriate personnel, strengthening the army and garnering logistic and intelligence support long before now. With this, it would have made a difference by building confidence and demonstrating that it has capacity to deal with this albatross. Government could have restored reasonable stability to the crisis region even without a state of emergency; provided it got its acts together. Against what happened in the last 18 months, it is evident that what was being pursued as a state of emergency has, in fact, been a fragmented military containment operation interfacing with a weak political leadership structure in the affected states. If this government is convinced of the efficacy of emergency rule, then it must declare a proper state of emergency in the three states. Beyond the ongoing military operation legitimated by the Anti-Terrorism Act, the government needs to strengthen the emergency in those states. It is also imperative for the President to explicitly own the war by having a direct line to the commander running the efforts. He should not depend on hangers on, whether in uniform or not, who derive gains from the Boko Haram crisis. To this end, he needs a presidential liaison person on the ground to feed him with information independently of others who are there. He needs to act fast before election.
Posted on: Tue, 09 Dec 2014 07:52:06 +0000
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