Eric Schliesser Here is the abstract for my talk in Edinburgh next month. Im sure youll find lots to vehemently disagree with, and then claim that adversarial philosophy is bad, bad, bad ;) ====== Virtuous adversariality as a model for philosophical inquiry Recently, there has been much discussion on the (presumed) combative nature of philosophy, which in turn (allegedly) results in overly adversarial interactions both in seminars, lectures and other public events, as well as in writing. It has even been suggested that the combativeness of philosophy might be responsible for the low percentage of women among professional philosophers. Many deplore the tendency towards aggressive argumentation in philosophy and plea for a different, more cooperative approach, while others argue that combativeness is at the essence of philosophy. In my talk, I will develop a model for philosophical inquiry that I call ‘virtuous adversariality’, which is meant to be a response to critics from both sides. Its key feature is the idea that a certain form of adversariality, more specifically disagreement and debate, is indeed at the heart of philosophy, but that philosophical inquiry also has a strong cooperative, virtuous component which regulates and constrains the adversarial component. The main inspiration for this model comes from ancient Greek dialectic, and in my talk I will focus in particular on Book VIII of Aristotle’s Topics and some passages from Plato’s dialogue Gorgias. The picture that emerges is of philosophy as ongoing conversation between interlocutors who respectfully disagree with each other. Disagreement forces them to provide the best possible arguments to support their respective positions, and it is from the comparison between the best possible arguments for competing positions that more robust philosophical theories emerge. Interestingly, Grice’s famous conversational maxims offer sensible principles on how to conduct such philosophical conversations, offering the right balance between adversariality and cooperation. One of the upshots of adversariality thus understood is to offer a counterbalance to the well-documented psychological phenomenon known as confirmation bias: the tendency we have to hold on to the beliefs we already hold, given that as philosophers we are required to anticipate objections by opponents. Indeed, I claim that the virtuous adversariality model offers a number of advantages as a general methodology for philosophy. That is, even if it is not an entirely accurate description of how philosophy is actually practiced (though it may not be that far off the mark), the idea is that the model represents an appealing alternative at the level of normative metaphilosophy, i.e. how philosophy should be practiced.
Posted on: Wed, 02 Apr 2014 14:04:21 +0000
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