Evan Thompson and his Enactive Approach the the Self Evan Thompson has recently published another book entitled Waking, Dreaming, Being. Self and consciousness in neuroscience, meditation, and philosophy (2). He has also produced a video (1) describing some of this work. The queries made by members of the video audience after his lecture are also of interest, and the comments, names and references given in the queries and in Thompsons replies do seem to give the comfortable feeling that we are all singing from the same hymm sheet, up to a point. Alva Noe, well known for his work with Kevin ORegan and for his own book (4) reviewed by Andy Clark, has written a kindly and descriptive review of Waking, Dreaming, Being (3). Thompson begins his talk with the use of Dalis picture The Slave Market which has been stunned deeply as a Necker Cube style picture (5). Dalis friends tell me that Dali was a nice old man and I cannot help feeling a little sorry for such a scientific use of his work. I have mentioned a video (1) which will roughly bring people up to date on Thompsons work, and I will say a little more about Thompsons Enactivism. It seems to be a rather AI sort of idea - he attempts to consider process rather than entity thus perhaps avoiding reductionist problems (6). I tend to hold to the view that too much reliance on neural networks, and what has been termed neoHebbian ideas may produce some progress but are unlikely to be cutting edge (7). I also mention a matter which I will present at the Kathmandu conference (10). Bernard Baars (8) takes the view that the mind-body problem is scientifically untestable. This is a situation which, however, can be dealt with (9). References (1) https://youtube/watch?v=IZyJODW4lQs (2) Thompson E., (2015), Waking, Dreaming, Being. Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy, Columbia University Press (3) npr.org/blogs/13.7/2014/12/30/373952810/in-search-of-a-science-of-consciousness (4) https://era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/1842/1320/1/noecomm.pdf (5) Bonnar L1, Gosselin F, Schyns PG., (2002), Perception, 2002, volume 31, pages 683 - 691, ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12092795 (6) tricycle/interview/embodied-mind (7) https://philosophynow.org/issues/51/A_Logical_Vacation So much that could be said. Example of a real problem with loops - loops are the lifeblood of computers and mechanistic ideas Mr Barnard: “I’ve told you, I’m not allowed to argue unless you’ve paid.” Customer: “I just paid!” Mr Barnard: “No, you didn’t.” Customer: “Look, I don’t want to argue about that!” Mr Barnard: “Well, you didn’t pay!” Customer: “Aha! If I didn’t pay, why are you arguing? I’ve got you!” Mr Barnard: “No, you haven’t.” Customer: “Yes I have. If you’re arguing I must have paid!” Mr Barnard: “Not necessarily. I could be arguing in my spare time.” (8) Baars B., (2003),Commentary to Morten Overgaard: Foundations for a Science of Consciousness, Journal of Anthropological Psychology No. 13, 2003. (ISSN 1902-4649) (9) Jennifer Nagel and Kaija Mortensen, (2015), Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy, in Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Blackwell (forthcoming) ; philpapers.org/archive/NAGAEP.pdf (10) Science and Scientist - 2015, Buddha Hall, Sushil Kedia Vishwa Bharati, Kathmandu, Nepal scsiscs.org/conference/index.php/scienceandscientist/2015
Posted on: Wed, 21 Jan 2015 11:21:51 +0000
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