FERGUSON UPDATE: While reading through Officer Darren Wilsons testimony before the Grand Jury, I note that the prosecutors handed the grand jurors a copy of Missouri Revised Statute 563.046, and instructed them that it is the law on what is permissible, what force is permissible and when in making an arrest by a police officer. See Grand Jury Transcripts, P. 5, Lines 12-14, 9-16-2013, graphics8.nytimes/newsgraphics/2014/11/24/ferguson-evidence/assets/gj-testimony/grand-jury-volume-05.pdf. The full text of the section 563.046 can be read here: moga.mo.gov/mostatutes/stathtml/56300000462.html, but the portion Im concerned with says: 3. A law enforcement officer in effecting an arrest or in preventing an escape from custody is justified in using deadly force only . . . (2) When he reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is immediately necessary to effect the arrest and also reasonably believes that the person to be arrested (a) Has committed or attempted to commit a felony . . . In other words, prosecutors told the grand jurors that if Officer Wilson believed Michael Brown robbed the store (a felony they saw him commit in a video) or assaulted officer Wilson (a felony Officer Wilson testified to) the officer was PERMITTED BY LAW to kill Michael Brown. However, the two prosecutors presenting the case to the grand jurors intentionally omitted the fact that the United States Supreme Court in a 6-to-3 decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) held laws permitting the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing criminal unconstitutional; nearly thirty years ago. scholar.google/scholar_case?case=5843997099226288287&q=471+U.S.+1&hl=en&as_sdt=2006. Although a lengthy opinion, the pertinent part of what the Supreme Court held was: The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched. The suspect’s fundamental interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon. The use of deadly force also frustrates the interest of the individual, and of society, in judicial determination of guilt and punishment. Against these interests are ranged governmental interests in effective law enforcement .... The Court went on to say, The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but the fact that the police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not always justify killing the suspect. A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead. Kathy Alizadeh was the prosecutor who handed out the Missouri statute to the grand jurors. Ms. Alizadeh was admitted to practice law in Missouri in October of 1985. which means the Tennessee v. Garner case, that was decided in March of 1985, was a current event at the time she took her bar exam. Sheila Whirley, the other prosecutor who was present was admitted to practice law in Missouri in April of 2000, which means Tennessee v. Garner was the law of the land by the time she began practicing. Therefore, the prosecutors intentionally misled the grand jurors into believing that Officer Wilson was justified in killing Michael Brown if he believed Brown had committed a felony and was attempting to escape, regardless of whether he posed any imminent threat to Officer Wilson. That is simply an erroneous instruction designed to force the grand jury into returning a no true bill.
Posted on: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 06:03:59 +0000
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