FYI—Al Arabiya (by Omar Ashour of University of Exeter and the Brookings Doha Center—a comprehensive crash course): »If he [Mursi] survived, he will have to rely on the army as a guarantor of safety and of the whole unfolding political process, as well as on his supporters to mobilize. But the HCAF is not on his side at the moment. And even if it was, this means putting the army at the forefront of politics again, losing the gains of August 2012, and giving the ultimate political say to the ones carrying arms, not the ones casting votes. The mobilization of supporters is also risky. [...] If the president did not survive, the scenarios will depend on how he gets removed. Certainly the pattern of removing an elected institution with support on the ground by a mix of street mobilization and army intervention does not lead to positive outcomes. Military dictatorships, civil wars, or both are usually the result. Spain in 1936, Iran in 1953, Chile in 1973, Turkey in 1980, Sudan in 1989, Algeria in 1992 and Tajikistan in 1992 highlight the processes quite well. [...] The scenario of France in May 1968 features calling for early (parliamentary) elections and then try to come back stronger, as the Gaullists did in June and July 1968. The problem is that Mursi does not have de Gaulle’s background, and the chaotic transition of Egypt in 2013 is far behind the French consolidated democracy in 1968. The persecution and witch-hunting of the Gaullists was quite unlikely then, but already a declared goal by several opposition figures in the case of Mursi and the Muslim Brothers in Egypt...«
Posted on: Tue, 02 Jul 2013 11:52:00 +0000
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