Following up on my post yesterday on my belief for the need on a free-standing vote on the President’s request – and the need for the President to come to Congress to ask for a declaration of war – I believe we will end up batting .500. We will get one and lose the other. At this point there is little chance the President will come to the Congress for authorization. So for those of us who care about Congress’ authority here, I think we will not see the action called for in the Constitution. On the other hand, it now looks like we will have debate and a vote on the President’s funding request for his plan against ISIL’s growth in the Middle East. As of tonight there will be six hours of debate, which is a large block of time as Congressional debates go. If that vote succeeds, then it will be attached to the Continuing Resolution and sent to the Senate. So, while this is the procedure for the next few days, I think outside the Constitutional and cost questions, the big issue still looming with this vote lies in whether or not one believes the plan outlined is practical. I have severe reservations. As has been well documented in the history of war, bombing campaigns by themselves do not win ground, territory or countries. They open up spaces for “boots on the ground” to fill – and the question now is, whose boots will be on the ground? Will they stay? Are they reliable? On this basis alone, the President’s strategy is flawed. It seems to be determined more by political strategy than military tactics. One could argue that it is designed to do something, though arguably not enough to change the balance of power on the ground…which would lead one to ask, then why do it? I say these things because I think we should all be skeptical of funding so-called “moderate” rebels when the history of these groups has been anything but moderate. There is no deep seeded American bias in their perspective, and in many cases, a history of anything but shared philosophies or even common enemies. In fact, while the Germans have been training and arming Kurdish forces in Iraq, they have thus far resisted calls to arm groups in Syria based on fears that their arms and training would ultimately accrue to the benefit of very different groups than those they intend to help. There is also the question of training and resolve. For many fighters we would attempt to recruit and train in this conflict, their primary focus is the Assad regime in Syria - not ISIL. It is one thing to train a solider, another to redirect his belief, redefine a desire for reprisal, or even to bolster his motivation. An example of how important motivation and desire are to winning battles is highlighted in our own revolution and the victories our untrained soldiers saw over what was then the most powerful military in the world. More recently it’s been shown in the Middle East with the $25 billion dollars American taxpayers spent in helping to train over 200,000 Iraqi soldiers - and their quick recent defeats to ISIL forces. In the early summer of this year, roughly 1,000 ISIL fighters uprooted two Iraqi divisions, about 30,000 soldiers, over the course of a few days. Given this reality, I don’t know how I can put great faith in a plan to give a few thousand so-called “moderate” rebels (whose allegiances we’re uncertain of) a month’s worth of training, and expect them to carry out the critical “boots on the ground” mission against highly-motivated and seasoned ISIL fighters. At this point I am unconvinced…and will keep you posted as the debate progresses.
Posted on: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 02:37:04 +0000
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