France - Rwanda (7 responses) Anthology: "Rwanda in 1994, Black and White Liars" RPF (89) - Rwandan genocide (55) - Judge Bruguiere (5) - Philippe Brewaeys (3) 08/04/2013 at 18h: 31 By Jeune Afrique Decrease text size Increase font size Print Forward Share this article The book cover of Philippe Brewaeys. The book cover of Philippe Brewaeys. © DR In a book published on April 6, "Rwanda in 1994. Blacks and whites liars" Philippe Brewaeys back on the mistakes of the French investigation into the Rwandan genocide. Extracts. The investigation of Judge Bruguiere could she take another turn? Two notes of the DGSE indicate at least another direction. The first reports that [...] "the assumption that the rockets may have been fired by armed elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Front is not satisfactory. To approach the airport, it is necessary to go through several military checkpoints and the area is prohibited to civilians. In addition, patrol police and soldiers of UNAMIR crisscross the land [...]. Guided by the activists of the CDR, equipped with preset lists, the soldiers of the presidential guard began to massacre the Tutsis and the Hutus from the South or supporting opposition parties. Most often, these liquidations spare neither women nor Children1. " [...] >> To read on this topic: the documentary that accuses Judge Bruguiere In April 1994, the GISS, the Belgian military intelligence service, had similar to the DGSE, he even borrowing some extracts information in its report: "The fire caused the accident (rockets and surface to air missiles? ) came from the edge of Camp Kanombe. The shooting appears to have been carried out by well trained and already in the scope of airport security personnel. It appears very unlikely that the RPF could have had access to the security perimeter of the airport (we had to cross several dams, the area was closed to civilians and patrols UNAMIR [*] accompanied by Rwandan gendarmes controlled the field). In addition, it is unclear in the situation before the attack, what benefit the RPF could wish to take the chaos that this attack was created, while most observers gave to consider that the Arusha Accords him were already more favorable it was hoped at the outset [...]. We believe that the charges that make the RPF responsible for the attack are not vraisemblables2. " If their premise is the same, the lessons learned by both services are diametrically opposed. For the GISS, "we prefer [...] the explanation attributing the attack to the" hawks "of the regime close brothers-President and speaking through the RTLM they contrôlaient3." For DGSE by cons, "should be excluded from the attack elements [...] of" clan Akazu "[...]. It is thus possible that the attack was the result of a faction of the army, close to the party Democratic Republican Movement (MDR) and mainly from southern country.4. " The State Security [Belgian] going in the same direction as its military counterpart, although its source is casual and unverified. Speaking of AMASASU Association as "the Hutu hardliners of the Rwandan army," Security states that "this military association would accept in any way the Arusha and reportedly warned President Habyarimana that to [ the] sign [...] would be considered an act of weakness on his part and he would pay the gesture by his death [...]. " Colonel Vincent continues: "The president is also accompanied by the President of Burundi to prevent an attack. My personal belief is that it is a matter between Rwanda and Rwandan flow for the Arusha Accords. For extremists, these agreements meant to medium term takeover Tutsis. They absolutely did not want [...]. I confirm [...] the general Nsabimana and other senior military ensured that this would not happen and they were ready to thwart any action by the RPF. At the airport, about 15 April 1994, I had a discussion with Major Mutabera which clearly told me that they had to understand that they had to implement the "final solution [...]. Arusha meant for them to power by Tutsis5 ". " 1. Special plug Rwanda, DGSE, 11 April 1994. 2. Report of Major Hock of GISS, Location Rwanda, 19 April 1994. 3. Report of Major Hock of GISS, Location Rwanda, op. cit. 4. Special plug Rwanda, DGSE, 11 April 1994. 5. Hearing Colonel André Vincent by Belgian military May 6, 1994. * English Appellation of UNAMIR, the United Nations Mission for Assistance in Rwanda. FROM JEUN AFRIQUE
Posted on: Sun, 16 Jun 2013 17:02:38 +0000
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