From the conclusion to my forthcoming book, Zionism and its Discontents: A century of radical dissent in Israel/Palestine (Pluto Press, October 2014): What hampered the possibility of a resolution of the conflict before 1948 was that the minimum demands of one side were too much for the other side to concede. And, what was being conceded was too little to satisfy the basic demands of the other side. This remains the case today, though the relative positions have changed. Before 1948 compromise solutions – the British Peel Commission of 1937 and the UN partition resolution of 1947 – increased the area allocated to Jews at the expense of that held by Arabs, seeing a large number of Arab residents falling under Jewish rule. Naturally, the Arab side refused to go along with that. After 1967, proposed solutions have been based on withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories. The Israeli side has been reluctant to give up territory it had acquired in war, while Palestinians naturally are more willing to accept a solution that would see them gaining control over land which is denied to them at present. In other words, compromise is deemed acceptable when your side gains territorial assets but not when it loses them. Under what conditions, then, could a territorial price be seen as reasonable? In other words, what may be a suitable exchange for territorial concessions? Historically, the answer was legitimacy and recognition. The Zionist leadership before 1948 was willing to reduce the scope of its aims – at least temporarily – and curb its settlement expansion in exchange for recognition of its right to rule part of the territory of Palestine. The Israeli state after 1967 has been willing to concede some of the territory it is occupying in exchange for recognition of its right to rule the rest of the country. This stated willingness has never been put into practice, however. When the Israeli side is strong and feeling secure and confident, it sees no point in making concessions. When it suffers a setback and is lacking confidence, it fears that concessions would make it look even weaker. Constantly torn between supreme arrogance – our situation has never been better – and mortal fear, whereby giving an inch would lead to imminent destruction, the Israeli leadership insists on retaining ultimate military and territorial control, even if indirectly (as in Gaza). In the face of this, all the commitments Palestinians have been making, from recognition of Israel to effective renunciation of the refugees right of return, are seen as verbal and fleeting in nature, not convincing enough for Israeli Jews, ever on their guard. This conundrum could be termed Israel: the whining superhero. It is founded on a sense that only military might will provide a sustained basis for secure existence. Written agreements may be useful but on the condition that they are always backed up by forceful deterrence, which can be provided by Israel alone and has to be demonstrated repeatedly in order to burn it into the adversaries consciousness. The reliance on the unilateral use of force is usually accompanied by assertions of extreme vulnerability, and a tendency to equate the mildest criticisms made by anyone, anywhere, with genocidal antisemitism. Paradoxically, the greater the gap between Israels military capacity and that of its opponents (reaching in 2014 its highest point ever favourable to Israel), the more the Israeli leadership reverts into presenting itself as an eternal victim in danger of being de-legitimized and wiped off the map. How can this mental attitude be overcome, to allow a rational solution based on mutual recognition and compromise?
Posted on: Sun, 03 Aug 2014 13:15:06 +0000
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