GENERAL AYUOB KHAN ........EK QEYQDAAT THGI.......QEYADAAT K NECHAY JAND JETI JATI HAI .........ALLAH PAKISTAN K APUSS K IKHTLAF KHATAM KAR DAY AMEEEEEEEEEN The Battle of Chawinda I refer to Agha Humayun Amin’s article on the Battle of Chawinda, and also being “direct participant, would like to share with your readers, some of my knowledge on the subject. Since I am writing from memory, I will touch only upon those incidents and aspects of the battle, of which I am certain. About a week before the war started, an A. K officer from the Gibraltar Force, exfiltrated, and brought to HQ 24 Brigade, certain Indian Army documents. These purported to show the presence of the 1st Indian Armoured Division opposite us. Brig Abdul Ali Malik accordingly informed the higher HQ, and GHQ detailed Maj. Mahmud of the Army Aviation to physically carry these documents to GHQ for evaluation. GHQ’s assessment was that these documents were part of an Indian deception plan. Brig Malik disagreed with this assessment. So it is incorrect to say that he had no idea what he had against him, though it is correct that when the attack came, he had no way of knowing that this was the main effort of the enemy. But neither did anyone else. When the Jassar fiasco took place, Brig Malik advised 15 Div. not to move him, because he expected a strong attack against his positions. HQ 15 Div. did not agree. HQ 15 Div. ordered 24 Brigade to clear the imaginary enemy bridgehead at Jassar. Brig Malik tasked 2 Punjab Regiment (my unit) to do the needful. The Commanding Officer, Lt Col Jamshed MC Bar, SJ, suggested an attack at first light, instead of a night attack, because we had no idea about the enemy location, terrain etc etc. But 15 Div. orders were clear and inflexible, and so Col Jamshed, decided to lead the attack in person. But before this could be done, the actual situation in Jassar became clear, and the attack was called off. At about first light on 08 September, an NCO of the Engineers came into our positions. He told of a heavy Indian attack that had severely mauled 3 F.F Regiment which was deployed as screen. He was immediately taken to the Brigade HQ, where Brig Malik questioned him in the presence of Col Jamshed and Major Aslam Shah, who was the B.M. If Brig Malik had any doubt about a serious enemy thrust in his sector, that was now removed. It took him about a minute to take, what many consider, the most important decision of the war i.e. to advance on a broad front and engage the attacking enemy forces. This decision was entirely Brig Malik’s, and it saved Pakistan. Had it gone wrong, he would have been court martialled. Since he suspected that HQ 15 Div. was prone to panic, he ordered Maj. Aslam Shah to break wireless contact with the Div. HQ (which was re-established when the enemy had been engaged, and Tikka Khan had taken over 15 Div). Brig Malik then gave the operation orders to his unit commanders, including Lt Col Nisar, CO 25 Cavalry. It is, therefore, absolutely incorrect to say that Brig Malik “abdicated” his command to a unit commander. Indeed, after that first day, 25 Cavalry was not involved in operations as regiment, because the situation warranted squadron actions in support of infantry. And this support these squadrons unstintingly and heroically provided. But this by no stretch of the imagination can be taken to mean the de facto command of the Chawinda Battle was at any time exercised by Co 25 Cavalry. This remained firmly in Brig Malik’s hands who remained unswerving and steadfast and central to the battle, right till the very end. After the first three days of almost continuous battle we had suffered serious depletion in numbers, and had suffered extreme exhaustion both physically and mentally. And so we were withdrawn from the FDLs to recover, but that same evening the situation at the front became so alarming that we were thrust right back into the battle. It is a fair comment on the morale of 24 Brigade group that despite our bedraggled state and the mauling we had received, there was no hesitation on the part of anyone to rejoin battle. From then, to the end of the war, 24 Brigade held its position and survived — but barely. It is difficult to explain what extreme weariness really is. There is mention in the article under reference, of Brig Malik’s request to be moved to the “rear”, which was refused by Gen Abrar. If a Brigade Commander is to make such a suggestion, he cannot just say “rear”. He has to give an alternate plan of operations which he must work out with his staff. Gen Aslam Shah (then B.M) denies that any such suggestion was ever made, and this fits into the experience of people like me, who were quite clearly told that for 24 Brigade, this was to be a “last man last round battle”. Therefore, if such a suggestion is recorded, either its context is missing, or it is the result of a misunderstanding. When we were suddenly pulled out of recuperation and sent back into battle (refer sub-para above) we were told that we will be pulled back for refitment at the first possible opportunity. Perhaps this could be the context. 2. And now I would like to make few general comments as under:- Anyone reading the article under reference is bound to come away with the impression that the Battle of Chawinda was fought exclusively by Brig Amjad Chaudhry, Lt Col Nisar, Maj. Muhammad Ahmed, and the “direct participant” Maj. Shamshad. The infantry, it seems was just not there. As authentic history, therefore, this article will be seen as trifle lop-sided. The truth is that by sheer coincidence some very brave and steadfast men got thrown into what was 24 Brigade. With the courage of these men, came a good deal of luck by providence — and the combination made for quite a number of gallant actions by all arms, and all ranks. Brig Muhammad Ahmed was heroic, and so was Lt Col Nisar, but how can the rest of 25 Cavalry be put into the dustbin of anonymity? Indeed I can’t think of one officer or tank commander who did not perform. Yes, General Abrar was a good commander. He was calm and poised and did not foist needless interference on 24 Brigade. Brig Amjad Chaudhry too had a reputation of a good artillery officer, though I would have to be a very brave man to declare him the best gunner officer in the sub-continent. These officers held their nerve, and did not panic. And nor did they need to. They were never within the sights of the enemy. But people like Lt Col Shinwari, Lt Col Jamshed and Maj. Aslam Shah constantly were, and yet they kept their calm. And last but not the least the composure of Brig Abdul Ali Malik deserves to be saluted. Throughout the battle his HQ was either in the FDLs or not more than 400 yds in the rear. He kept his cool in the face of direct enemy fire for days at end — comparison between him and the others is like comparing a fighter in the ring with the audience. When Lt Gen (Retd) Tariq, S. J came on PTV two years ago on the occasion of Defence Day, he talked of his experiences of the Battle of Chawinda. He was generous in his praise of many gallant actions. But he singled out Brig Malik beyond all the rest as the man whose battle it really was, while all the rest of us revolved around him. Having seen him at close quarters, I cannot disagree with this assessment. 3. Lastly, to call a respected senior officer “a VCO type” General, was not in very good taste.
Posted on: Fri, 06 Sep 2013 06:27:15 +0000