How is the Ukraine crisis affecting Central Asia along with annexation of Crimea? When Moscow threw its weight behind the 2008 war against Georgia under the pretext of protecting the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, some commentators thought that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili had simply miscalculated and made the wrong move. Russias annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, by contrast, fuelled quite an outrage across the world. It also provoked growing uneasiness over the Kremlins geopolitical ambitions in the former Soviet republics, sending shock waves throughout the Eurasian region, where President Vladimir Putins seeming grand plan to create an exclusive sphere of influence for Russia has come under the spotlight once again. Central Asia is of specific geopolitical importance to Russia, which has invested significant resources in retaining influence over the former Soviet republics in the region. The key question now is how far Moscow can go in pursuing its interests in Central Asia and, at the same time, how much the Central Asian republics can resist Russia’s encroachments. Undoubtedly, Chinas westward economic expansion has counterbalanced the Kremlins grip on Central Asia, forcing Putin to adjust his regional strategy. However, despite being economically outmatched by China, Russia is still a major player in the region plagued by interstate disputes. From this perspective, the Kremlins strategic efforts have been particularly successful in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia’s weakest links: The former suffered a civil war in the 1990s, while the latter went through two revolutions in the last decade alone. Russia has had a hard time reining in Central Asian states with energy resources - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - which have used oil and gas wealth to transform themselves into relatively independent regional players. Once holding a monopoly over gas deals in Central Asia, the Kremlin has been losing its grip on pipelines in the last decade due to Chinas advancement in the region. Resource-rich Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have successfully diversified their gas delivery routes away from Russia towards the Chinese market, while cash-strapped Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain dependent on Russian oil and gas imports. Kyrgyzstan, for instance, sold its state-run gas company to Russias Gazprom for the symbolic price of $1 (including conditional clauses for debt repayment and future investments) in exchange for a guaranteed supply of natural gas. Likewise, landlocked Tajikistan receives its duty-free oil from Russia. Russia retains its military presence in at least parts of Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are home to the largest Russian military installations in the region. Defence Minister Sergei Shoygu recently declared that in recent years, we have worked to strengthen the Russian military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan: we have increased the number of air defence units at Kant airbase, and the 201st base now has a divisional structure. At the same venue, Kazakh President Nazarbayev upped the ante on issues of regional security and development by proposing the creation of an Organisation for Security and Development in Asia, the Asian alternative to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Such declarations may offer a glimpse into Central Asia’s future dynamics, as leaders appear to develop a common understanding of current regional political realities in light of the changes emanating from the conflict in Ukraine. If Russia has a master plan to restore its empire, its advancement ahead - easy as it may appear in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - may be met with serious hostility from some Central Asian leaders. aljazeera/indepth/opinion/2014/06/ukraine-crisis-central-asia-201466124720172220.html
Posted on: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:39:05 +0000
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