I Dare You to Wake Up! Deaf ears will not hear, nor will blind eyes see! NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP FOR AFRICA This Document is Exhibit 10 of U.S. Supreme Court Case No.00-9587NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMORANDUM-46 MARCH 17, 1978 Presidential Review Memorandum NSCM/46 TO: The Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement Zbigniew Brezinski (Is now Obama’s Chief Advisor). His agenda is being carried out by Obama. cc: The Secretary of the Treasury, The Secretary of Commerce. The Attorney General, The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff STUDY RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY REVIEW MEMORANDUM NSC-46BLACK AFRICA AND THE U.S. BLACK MOVEMENT Objective of our policy toward Black Africa is to prevent social upheavals which could radically change the political situation throughout the area. The success or failure of our policy in the region depends on the solution international and internal issues whose importance of the United States is on the increase. II. A. U.S. INTERESTS IN BLACK AFRICA A multiplicity of interests influences the U.S. attitude toward black Africa. The most important of these interests can be summarized as follows: 1. POLITICAL If black African states assume attitudes hostile to the U.S. national interest, our policy toward the white regimes; which is a key element in our relations with the black states, may be subjected by the latter to great pressure for fundamental change. Thus the West may face a real danger of being deprived of access to the enormous raw material resources of southern Africa which are vital for our defense needs as well as losing control over the Cape sea routes by which approximately 65% of Middle Eastern oil is supplied to Western Europe. Moreover, such a development may bring about internal political difficulties by intensifying the activity of the Black movement in the United States itself. It should also be borne in mind that black Africa is an integral part of a continent where tribal and regional discord, economic backwardness, inadequate infrastructures, drought, and famine, are constant features of the scene. In conjunction with the artificial borders imposed by the former colonial powers, guerilla warfare in Rhodesia and widespread indignation against apartheid in South Africa, the above factors provide the communist states with ample opportunities for furthering their aims. This must necessarily redound to the detriment of U.S. political interests. 2. ECONOMIC Black Africa is increasingly becoming an outlet for U.S. exports and investment. The mineral resources of the area continue to be of great value for the normal functioning of industry in the United States and allied countries. In 1977, U.S. direct investment in black Africa totaled about $1.8 billion and exports $2.2 billion. New prospect of substantial profits would continue to develop in the countries concerned. IV. BLACK AFRICA AND THE U.S. BLACK MOVEMENT Apart from the above-mentioned factors adverse to U.S. strategic interests, the nationalist liberation movement in black Africa can act as a catalyst with far reaching effects on the American black community by stimulating its organizational consolidation and by inducing radical actions. Such a result would be likely as Zaire went the way of Angola and Mozambique. An occurrence of the events of *1967-68 would do grievous harm to U.S. prestige, especially in view of the concern of the present Administration with human rights issues. Moreover, the Administration would have to take specific steps to stabilize the situation. Such steps might be misunderstood both inside and outside the United States. In order to prevent such a trend and protect U.S. national security interests, it would appear essential to elaborate and carry out effective countermeasures.1. Possibility of Joint Action By U.S. Black and African Nationalist Movement.In elaborating U.S. policy toward black Africa, due weight must be given to the fact that there are 25 millions American blacks whose roots are African and who consciously or subconsciously sympathies with African nationalism.The living conditions of the black population should also be taken into account. Immense advances in the field are accompanied by a long-lasting high rate of unemployment, especially among the youth and by poverty and dissatisfaction with government social welfare standards.These factors taken together may provide a basis for joint actions of a concrete nature by the African nationalist movement and the U.S. black community... renewal of the extremist national idea of establishing an African Republic on American soil. Finally, leftist radical elements of the Black community could resume extremist actions in the style of the defunct Black Panther Party. ...Basically, actions would take the form of demonstrations and public protests, but the likelihood of violence cannot be excluded. There would also be attempts to coordinate their political activity both locally and in international organizations. In the context of long-term strategy, the United States can not afford a radical change in the fundamentals of its African policy, which is designed for maximum protection of national security. In the present case, emphasis is laid on the importance of Black Africa for U.S. political, economic and military interests. RECOMMENDATIONS In weighing the range of U.S. interests in Black Africa, basic recommendations arranged without intent to imply priority are:1. Specific steps should be taken with the help of appropriate government agencies to inhibit coordinated activity of the Black Movement in the United States.2. Special clandestine operations should be launched by the CIA to generate mistrust and hostility in American and world opinion against joint activity of the two forces, and to cause division among Black African radical national groups and their leaders.3. U.S. embassies to Black African countries specially interested in southern Africa must be highly circumspect in view of the activity of certain political circles and influential individuals opposing the objectives and methods of U.S. policy toward South Africa. It must be kept in mind that the failure of U.S. strategy in South Africa would adversely affect American standing throughout the world. In addition, this would mean a significant diminution of U.S. influence in Africa and the emergence of new difficulties in our internal situation due to worsening economic prospects.4. The FBI should mount surveillance operations against Black African representatives and collect sensitive information on those, especially at the U.N., who oppose U.S. policy toward South Africa. The information should include facts on their links with the leaders of the Black movement in the United States, thus making possible at least partial neutralization of the adverse effects of their activity. B. THE RANGE OF POLICY OPTIONS The concern for the future security of the United States makes necessary the range of policy options. Arranged without intent imply priority they are:(a) to enlarge programs, within the framework of the present budget, for the improvement of the social and economic welfare of American Blacks in order to ensure continuing development of present trends in the Black movement;(b) to elaborate and bring into effect a special program designed to perpetuate division in the Black movement and neutralize the most active groups of leftist radical organizations representing different social strata of the Black community: to encourage division in Black circles;(c) to preserve the present climate which inhibits the emergence from within the Black leadership of a person capable of exerting nationwide appeal;(d) to work out and realize preventive operations in order to impede durable ties between U.S Black organizations and radical groups in African states;e) to support actions designed to sharpen social stratification in the Black community which would lead to the widening and perpetuation of the gap between successful educated Blacks and the poor, giving rise to growing antagonism between different Black groups and a weakening of the movement as a whole.(f) to facilitate the greatest possible expansion of Black business by granting government contracts and loans with favorable terms to Black businessmen;(g) to take every possible means through the AFL-CIO leaders to counteract the increasing influence of Black labor organizations which function in all major unions and in particular, the National Coalition of Black Trade Union and its leadership including the creation of real preference for adverse and hostile reaction among White trade unionists to demands for improvement of social and economic welfare of the Blacks;(h) to support the nomination at federal and local levels of loyal Black public figures to elective offices, to government agencies and the Court. The Negro youth and moderate[s] must be made to understand that if they succumb to revolutionary teachings, they will be dead revolutionaries.J. Edgar Hoover,FBI Chief, re:COINTELPRO against the Black Panther Party COINTELPRO (acronym for Counter Intelligence Program)From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Federal Bureau of InvestigationIn August 1967, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) instructed its program COINTELPRO to neutralize what the FBI called black nationalist hate groups and other dissident groups. In September of 1968, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover described the Black Panthers as the greatest threat to the internal security of the country.[32] By 1969, the Black Panthers were the primary target of COINTELPRO....the BPP was profoundly influenced by Maoist thought.... They were the target of 233 of the 295 authorized Black Nationalist COINTELPRO actions. The goals of the program were to prevent the unification of militant black nationalist groups and to weaken the power of their leaders, as well as to discredit the groups to reduce their support and growth. J. Edgar Hoover called the Black Panther Party “the greatest threat to the internal security of the country,”[10] and he supervised an extensive program of counter-organizing that included surveillance and eavesdropping, infiltration, harassment, false testimony, and a laundry list of other tactics designed to incriminate Party members and drain the organization of resources and manpower. (pg.45)” Through these tactics, it was thought that their potential for further advancement would diminish and probability of continuing to serve as a threat to the general power structure of the U.S,... From 1966 to 1972, when the party was most active, several departments hired significantly more African-American police officers. Some of these black officers played prominent roles in shutting down the Panthers activities. In Chicago in 1969 for example, Panthers Mark Clark and Fred Hampton were both killed in a police raid (In which five of the officers present were African American) by Sergeant James Davis, an African American officer.[citation needed] In cities such as New York City, black police officers were used to infiltrate Panther meetings. By 1972, almost every major police department was fully integrated.... Although COINTELPRO was commissioned ostensibly to prevent violence, it used some tactics to foster violence. For instance, the FBI tried to intensify the degree of animosity between the Black Panthers and the Blackstone Rangers, a Chicago gang. They sent an anonymous letter to the Ranger’s gang leader claiming that the Panthers were threatening his life, a letter whose intent was to induce reprisals against Panther leadership. In Southern California similar actions were taken to exacerbate a gang war between the Black Panther Party and a group called the US Organization. Violent conflict between these two groups, including shootings and beatings, led to the deaths of at least four Black Panther Party members. FBI agents claimed credit for instigating some of the violence between the two groups. On January 17, 1969, Los Angeles Panther Captain Bunchy Carter and Deputy Minister John Huggins were killed in Campbell Hall on the UCLA campus, in a gun battle with members of US Organization stemming from a dispute over who would control UCLAs black studies program. Another shootout between the two groups on March 17 led to further injuries. It was alleged that the FBI had sent a provocative letter to US Organization in an attempt to create antagonism between US and the Panthers. [34] One of the most notorious actions was a Chicago Police raid of the home of Panther organizer Fred Hampton on December 4, 1969. The raid had been orchestrated by the police in conjunction with the FBI. The FBI was complicit in many of the actions. The people inside the home had been drugged by an FBI informant, William ONeal, and were asleep at the time of the raid. Hampton was shot and killed, as was the guard, Mark Clark. The others were dragged into the street, beaten, and subsequently charged with assault. These charges were later dropped. The Chicago Police and FBI were never investigated or charged for their role in the event. “Depopulation should be the highest priority of foreign policy towards the third world, because the US economy will require large and increasing amounts of minerals from abroad, especially from less developed countries.”-Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for U.S. Security and Overseas Interests”Henry Kissinger, National Security Study Memo 200, 04//24/74
Posted on: Wed, 05 Mar 2014 15:16:08 +0000
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