In May 1980, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned a Special Operations Review Group of six 6 senior military officers led by Admiral James L. Holloway III to thoroughly review all aspects of the Iran hostage rescue attempt, so as to better prepare for any similar event in the future. Holloways group listed 23 issues that were significant in the failure of the mission, narrowing this list to 11 major issues. The overriding issue was operational security (OPSEC), that is, keeping the mission secret so that the arrival of the rescue team at the embassy would be a complete surprise. OPSEC severed the usual relationship during a military operation between the weather forecasters and pilots; the pilots were not informed about the local dust storms. Another OPSEC requirement was that the helicopter pilots come from the same unit. The helicopter unit picked for the mission was a U.S. Navy mine-laying unit flying CH-53D Sea Stallions; these helicopters were considered the best suited for the mission because of their long range, their large capacity, and their compatibility with shipboard operations. Radio silence was ordered during the helicopter flight. Two hours into the flight, the crew of No. 6 helicopter saw a warning light indicating a main rotor may be cracked. They landed in the desert and confirmed visually that a crack had started, so they stopped flying their aircraft because this was normal operating procedure. Helicopter No. 8 landed to load the crew of No. 6 into No. 8, abandoning No. 6 in the desert without destroying it. Holloways report pointed out that a cracked helicopter blade could be used to continue the mission, that its likelihood of catastrophic failure would be low for many hours, especially at lower flying speeds, for instance 27 hours of flying time might be available at an airspeed of 120 knots.[105] Holloway found that pilot No. 6 would have continued his mission if the helicopter group had been instructed to continue to fly with a cracked blade. When the helicopters encountered two dust storms along the way to the refueling point, the second more severe than the first, the pilot of No. 5 turned back because the mine-laying helicopters were not equipped with terrain-following radar. They had night vision goggles that suited their duty as mine layers, but were useless in this kind of very thick dust storm.
Posted on: Sat, 06 Dec 2014 22:25:38 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015