In the light of current political stalemate, it is important to examine our system of government and understands key components. If you are interested in the full article let me know. Presidential Power, Party System and Cabinet Instability in Semi-presidentialismTsai, Jung-hsiang What distinguishes semi-presidentialism from presidentialism and from parliamentarism is dual executive. The president can unilaterally appoint the prime minister or can nominate the prime minister but has to get the investiture of the parliament. Not only can the president maneuver the formation of cabinet but also has authority on the dismissal of the cabinet and the prime minister. The president possesses some formal power or informal authority to dismiss the prime minister, especially when the prime minister is from the same party (Samuels and Shugart, 2010). However, the parliament also has the censure power to sack the prime minister in semi-presidentialism. Comparatively speaking, we can envision that semi- presidentialism entails more cabinet instability than presidentialism or than parliamentarism. Cabinet instability can indicate policy failure, policy discontinuity, or intraexecutive conflict in semi-presidentialism. When some landmark policies fail, the cabinet can be held accountable and can be dismissed afterwards. Frequent turnovers of cabinets would also make some policies lagged or even not protracted. Furthermore, cabinet instability could make it difficult for governments to adopt and implement new policy programs and portfolio volatility could make it difficult for cabinet ministers to obtain relevant information during policy formation and implementation (Huber, 1998). Simply put, cabinet instability produces damaging effects on the continuity and effectiveness of policy making in semi-presidentialism. Fierce struggles between the president and prime minister can also spark the reformation of the cabinet. Cabinet instability turns out to be a deterrent to democratic governance and even leads to democratic breakdown in some semi-presidential countries (Bernhard, 2005; Powell, 1982; Skach, 2005). Why some cabinets cannot finish their terms and have to be terminated prematurely as some cabinets endure until the next election approaches in semi-presidentialism is the major puzzle in this paper. This paper seeks to elucidate the circumstances under which cabinets break down, what structural attributes cause more cabinet instability in semi-presidentialism, and how the fluctuation of cabinets affects the operation of semi-presidentialism. By keeping close track of these pathways systematically, it can increase our understanding of cabinet turnovers and their effects on governance of semi-presidentialism.
Posted on: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 00:25:59 +0000
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