India, military modernization, procurement policy; an Australian view India’s Military Procurement: The Need for Diversification India cannot afford to rely upon the one arms and armaments supplier. It must diversify its military procurement. Background A recent report titled ‘Why Russia is Still India’s Best Bet for Defence Procurement Despite Problems’, argues that Russia remains India’s best supplier of its defence requirements, despite the several issues India faces in ensuring their supply. The report is fair in its assessment, highlighting both the advantages and pitfalls of procuring military equipment from Russia. When the topic is examined in slightly more depth, however, the conclusion reached is not so much that Russia remains India’s best bet for procuring its arms supplies, but that Russia should be only one of India’s several sources. Comment India had a rewarding relationship with the USSR, one that Russia subsequently inherited. One aspect of that relationship was built upon Soviet (and subsequently Russian) sales of arms and military technology to India, which Moscow viewed as its best opportunity to influence the developing world. The USSR went so far as to transfer the technology for co-producing the MiG-21 fighter aircraft in India despite earlier denying the same technology to China. In 1965, the USSR acted as a peace-broker in the aftermath of the India-Pakistan War. In 1971, after Indira Gandhi decided to work with secessionists in East Pakistan, India signed a treaty of friendship and collaboration with the USSR to pre-empt China’s entry into the foreseen conflict. The USSR thus proved to be a political ally and soon also became an economic supporter of India, as well as a major source of military equipment. This relationship has continued to the present time. The report provides three main reasons why Russia remains India’s most reliable source for military equipment. First, it claims that Russia fully supports its allies, pointing to its support of Syria’s Assad in the current strife there. It is true that Russia supports its allies, but only up to a point. Using the Syrian example, the primary reason Russia supports the Assad regime is, arguably, because without its naval base at Tartus it would be bereft of any base to counter NATO, particularly Turkey, in the eastern Mediterranean. Its motivation in Syria, therefore, isn’t entirely altruistic. Furthermore, the report appears to forget that during the 1959 border dispute between India and China, the USSR stayed neutral, refusing to be drawn to either side in that disagreement. It is a moot point whether it would have supported India fully had conflict broken out then. The USSR remained neutral during the India-China War of 1962, though it is fair to say that Khrushchev was fully occupied with the Cuban missile crisis at that time. The second reason the report provides is Russia’s willingness to transfer technology to India. It adds that Russia also provides solid political support, citing India’s Ayni air force base in Tajikistan as an example. It is true that the US, say, does not provide an unlimited transfer of technology to its close allies, let alone newer ones like India. The technology behind the F-22 fighter aircraft is a case in point, as is the aircraft itself. Russia, however, is not much different. For example, while India does indeed have substantial input into the design of the forthcoming Sukhoi PAK-FA stealth aircraft, the aircraft itself is being manufactured in Russia. Similarly, while Russia leases Akula-class nuclear submarines to India, and is reportedly helping it to develop its own nuclear submarine, the transfer of technology to India is an entirely different matter. It could be argued that Russia did transfer the technology required to manufacture the Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft to India; but that would be analogous to the US transferring the technology to manufacture the F-15E fighter. As for the Ayni air force base in Tajikistan, the report again appears to disregard the fact that it was Russia’s objections to an Indian military presence there that caused India to lose access to the base. The third reason provided relates to Russian willingness to share its technology with India, the report cites the case of the GLONASS satellite location system, the Russian equivalent of the USA’s Global Positioning System (GPS), which Russia offered to India in 2011. It states that in the event of an Indo-Pakistan war, it is unlikely that the US will come to India’s assistance. This is most likely true. In the case of an Indo-China war, however, when India’s need would be greater, can it be assured that Russia will continue to provide access to GLONASS in the face of China’s economic and military might? Assuming it would, what penalty would Russia apply or what reward would it demand from India? India’s best hope would be to develop and make secure its own version of the GPS, using input from both the US and Russia as needed. As one of the largest arms purchasers in the world, India is in a position to obtain suitable terms in making its purchases. These could include the transfer of technology. Moreover, India has already begun to diversify and strategise its sources of military equipment; witness its decision to purchase French Rafale fighter aircraft, despite Russian aircraft manufacturers tendering for India’s MMRCA requirement. India chose not to acquire all its fighter aircraft from the one source and rightly so; eggs and a single basket come to mind. Russia remains a close ally of India, but it is time for India to diversify and seek other alliances, without damaging its relationship with Russia. Lindsay Hughes Research Analyst futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/29-indian-ocean-swa/1228-india-s-military-procurement-the-need-for-diversification.html#sthash.YQx9y73j.dpuf
Posted on: Sat, 03 Aug 2013 23:39:42 +0000
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