Interesting comments from Mahan Abedin of CFSOT. I gave an interview to BBC Persian Television today on the terrorist attack outside of Saravan (Sistan-Baluchistan province) five days ago during which 14 Iranian border guards were killed by the Al-Qaeda affiliated group Jaish al-Adl. I was at a slight disadvantage in so far as I was giving the interview via skype whilst the other guests (with one exception) were in BBCs London studios. At least two of the guests were of impeccable Baluch separatist stock - and thus sympathetic to the terrorists - and they made the usual noises, whilst ignoring the real reasons why Al-Qaeda has finally decided to go after Iran. Moreover, true to form the BBC Persian presenter did a fine job of fanning Shia-Sunni sectarian strife by artfully presenting and controlling the debate in a manner that gave undue prominence to the issues religious dimension. I made the following points: 1. Jasih al-Adl is no ordinary Baluch separatist outfit. This is Al-Qaeda, albeit with an Iranian Baluch accent. 2. Nor can Jaish al-Adl be seen as the evolution of other hardline sectarian separatist groups, such as the notorious Jundullah, which has been more or less eradicated by Iranian security forces. Jundullah was viciously sectarian but it was not Al-Qaeda, more akin to traditional hardline anti-Shia militant groups across the border in Pakistan. 3. Key question is why has Al-Qaeda decided to target Iran now? What geopolitical considerations inform and drive this policy? Part of the answer lies in Jaish al-Adls stated justification for the slaughter, namely to avenge Iranian atrocities in Syria. Atrocities in this context refer to significant advances on the ground by the Syrian army, aided and abetted by Lebanons Hezbollah and Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Syrias civil war has brought Iran and Al-Qaeda into direct military conflict for the first time, with the West awkwardly and perhaps unwittingly on Al-Qaedas side. 4. A related reason is the decision by Saudi intelligence - or more accurately unofficial affiliated agencies - to bring the Syria war inside Irans borders. This is the other side of Saudi Arabias complex relationship with Al-Qaeda and the Salafi-Jihadis; they fight them at home and in Yemen, but they unleash them in Iraq, Syria and now Iran. 5. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is facing defeat in the Syrian Civil War. American military intervention was their last hope and Obamas reluctance to enforce his own red line was an unmistakeable signal to the Saudis that the Americans will not engage in direct military conflict with Iran and Hezbollah. By striking the Iranian homeland the Saudis hope to affect Irans strategic calculus. But this is unlikely to happen as unlike Western countries Iran is not daunted by civilian or military casualties, nor can the Saudis hope to match Iran in the art of proxy warfare. Therefore, this is a classic case of reap what you sow. 6. In terms of the dynamics inside Irans Sistan va Baluchistan province, specifically in relation to separatism and the associated threats of terrorism, organised crime and the cross-border drug trade, much has been made of Irans immediate response to the terrorist attack by Jaish al-Adl, namely the execution of 16 local terrorists and drug kingpins. Whilst a harsh judicial response is understandable in view of the terrorist atrocity perpetrated against Iranian soldiers and civilians, the longer term solution lies in what the Iranians themselves refer to as *Amneeyat-e-Paydar* (stable security), i.e. a set of security arrangements that are driven by local forces and underpinned by soft cultural and political programmes.
Posted on: Sat, 02 Nov 2013 00:49:44 +0000
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