===International Terrorism and Salafi Caliphate=== The Salafi brand of Jihadism seeks to evolve terrorism into a more constructive goal; creation of the Islamist super-state, to reinstate the Caliphate. This goal, however, is still very much in its infancy, because before 1995 terrorism depended on splinter sects for its recruiting and organization. One suggested reason for the name of Al Qaeda (‘The Base’ or ‘Foundation’ in Arabic), was to build a global Islamic organization with Sunni leadership and direction, to claim broad general support in Islam for restoration of the Caliphate. This is also consistent with Jihadist strategic thought, which incorporates three stages: Da’wah, Hijrah, and Medina. The Da’wah stage establishes Jihad leadership, the Hijrah stage recruits members and creates action cells, and the Medina stage focuses on creation of the Caliphate. Within that grand strategy, the same thinking applies to operational planning. At that level the Da’wah stage establishes cell leadership, the Hijrah stage deploys cells to the targets, and the Medina stage activates the mission. Salafis are distinct for five ideological rules: Tawhid (the unity of God) expresses the universal or global reach of their mission, which is why Salafis, unlike earlier terrorist groups, seek targets anywhere in the world. Hakimiyyat Allah (God’s Sovereignty), which rejects all human law on the ground that God’s law is perfect and absolute. Therefore in service to Allah, a Salafi may violate any code or statute. Bid’ah, which rejects all innovation to Islam, especially any argument that tolerates non-Muslims or is in variance to original teachings and customs Takfir, or the rejection of a Muslim from the Umma with no trial or hearing, to declare him or her to be apostate on the accusation alone, for which the accused must either repent and show penance, or be executed as Kufr. Jihad as the central commandment from God against regimes deemed infidels These rules not only shift terrorist ideology from a regional perspective to a global perspective, the ruthless violence against all dissent allows Salafis to enjoy disproportionate influence in terrorist activities. It should be worth noting at this point, that Salafis do not cooperate with either the Muslim Brotherhood (whom they regard as too moderate and likely to give up the Jihad) or Shiites (meaning they do not trust the governments of Iran or Syria, which they consider apostate). Salafis represent less than one percent of all Muslims, but they are well-organized, tight-knit (forget about infiltration), and well funded. Regarding the United States, the U.S. has four general pillars of Grand Strategy: Defense against attack from enemies, foreign or domestic Protection of American citizens and interests worldwide Support for democratic republics which protect individual freedoms Discourage/Defeat rogue regimes While methods and tactics have differed, these values have been supported by both major political parties for more than eight decades now. With regard to the Jihadists, the pillars may be described as follows: No more 9/11-style attacks (which is why the Obama Administration kept pretty much all of the Bush counter-intelligence structure) Government support for private security firms and coordination with businesses to prevent violence and international incidents Advocacy for the nascent Afghan and Iraqi republics, even if they are not ideal in structure or ideology Strong diplomatic and economic efforts to address Iran, Syria, Libya, and Egypt Unspoken on the surface, but a very real aspect of the implementation of U.S. policy in the Middle East, is the Avenging Angel tactic. During the Bush Administration, this was most often represented by the teams hunting down Al Qaeda leadership, while the Obama Administration has preferred Special Forces in the military, most notably the SEAL teams. Each method has seen advantages and costs, but both were chosen by professionals as the best option for the extant conditions. More on this in a little while. The careful reader may note a key flaw in the Salafi strategy – the lack of a comprehensive grand strategy. Sure, they want a Caliphate, but there is no clear means to attaining goal. Worse for the Salafis, each group leader considers himself an Amir, but in most situations there is no simple means to choose an overall leader. Bin Laden tried to sort that out by creating Al Qaeda, which posited a clear hierarchy, but Bush answered effectively by using his Avenging Angels to take out leadership at every opportunity. Obama is doing the same thing but is pursuing figureheads and logistics experts, where Bush focused on financial and training providers. The lesson learned by the Jihadists is to have leadership identified only at local levels, but by definition this works against their long-term goals.
Posted on: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 15:30:17 +0000
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