Kalam Cosmological Argument We are all familiar with the Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of God, because its a pretty popular argument in apologetics tool boxes. Ive noticed a lot of discussions surrounding it of late, so I wanted to put in my two cents. For those who arent familiar with the argument: 1) Whatever begins to exist, has a cause. 2) The universe began to exist. C) Therefore the universe has a cause. Ive always found the popularity of this argument strange, because even if the premises are true the conclusion is still only the universe has a cause. The universe having a cause doesnt necessarily entail omnipotence, omniscience, moral properties, nor a being worthy of worship. The terrain of possible entailments of this conclusion is actually quite large and many are compatible with atheism. Still many people want to deny the truth of the premises, and some do better jobs then others. For me, the lack of entailment to a monotheistic God worthy of worship causes me to outright reject the argument. It doesnt prove anything like what is meant when people use the label God, and it certainly doesnt entail the traditional God of classic theism. Still I want to look at what I think are dubious assumption implicit in the argument that could be reasonably challenged. What most cosmologists and philosophers today think is that we are being bewitched by language in this argument. Because the language is so lax and intuitive in our language game, the argument can often be defended with incredulous stares and rhetorically convincing reducto ad absurdums. Begins to exist is an innocent enough sounding statement, but its packed with a serious assumption- the A-theory of time or tensed view of time. A tensed view of time entails that only the present is real, therefore temporal becoming is a real thing and things can begin to exist. The common phrase I see is popping into existence. The future doesnt exist but becomes the real present which ceases to exist as the past. This is in contrast with the B-theory of time or tenseless view of time. This theory entails that past, present, and future are all equally real. There is no temporal becoming- only moments before and after a particular time slice. Now the A-theory of time may be true even if its widely regarded as incompatible with Einsteins theory of special relativity (which is its biggest objection), but plenty of physicists, philosophers, and cosmologists defend the B-theory of time. If youre feeling confused, dont feel bad, because youre not the only one. This assumption deals with controversial abstract theories that most people would never think about. The real meat to this objection is that its not at all clear that the A-theory of time should be granted, because there are major objections to it and significant advantages to a B-theory of time. If the B-theory of time is true, then both premises of the Kalam are false, because the language has bewitched us into granting a false assumption. You can see someone who is bewitched by the language when they say its absurd to suggest things can just pop into existence without a cause. There is no temporal becoming on a B-theory of time, so the idea of begins to exist, began to exist, and pop into existence are just products of our language game while not accurately describing the nature of reality. They have no purchase on the B-theory of time except as rhetoric. They would literally be meaningless. My other two objections are more uncommon and deal with the part of the argument that isnt presented which is the move from the universe has a cause to this cause is God. The first is that of a cause which is a disembodied mind. This is a dubious assumption, because it assumes the truth of substance dualism- a fringe position in the philosophy of mind entailing that mind is an immaterial substance and brain is material. Most philosophers outright reject substance dualism, because of the famous interaction problem. How does an immaterial substance causally interact with a material brain? This objection has lead modern dualists to be what are called property dualists who think mind is an emergent immaterial property of matter. Its easy to see this dualism doesnt fit the Kalams needs, because it needs material coming from mind- not the other way around. Materialists and interaction dualists also have another advantage over substance dualists in that all known mental activity has at least a physical basis in embodied brains. This would be predicted on either materialism or property dualism, but is unlikely on substance dualism. Which means disembodied immaterial minds probably dont exist. This has even been put forward as an argument against God, because our knowledge of minds suggests that disembodied minds are improbable. Its not difficult to see why the assumption that substance dualism is true should not be granted- especially since it isnt necessarily entailed by the conclusion of the Kalam. The last assumption I think is dubious is one thats only recently been brought to my attention- the assumption of agent causation. The Theist needs an agent ontologically distinct from the universe and who through a conscious act of will (ie choice) brings the universe into existence (its not difficult to see the bewitchment of language here too). The coherence of this assumption is not clear and once again assumes a fringe position in the philosophy of mind- libertarian free will. Most philosophers of mind and neuroscientists dont think libertarian free will can ever coherently be anything more than randomness. The case for libertarian free will may very well be in its death throws in contemporary philosophy and science. However, if libertarian free will goes, then so does agent causation along with the Kalam Cosmological argument.
Posted on: Sat, 24 Jan 2015 06:38:05 +0000
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