London Tales on Ukrainia, Crimea and “new Cold War” (Things said or implied in London) 1. The Association Agreement doesn’t require that Ukraine choose between EU and Russia. The reality: EU representatives admitted that the scale and depth of the proposed association excluded Ukraine’s participation in other trade and economic integration projects, which runs counter to EU-Russia understanding that such projects in the Euro-Atlantic should be compatible. 2. There was nothing secret about the Association Agreement. The reality: It was negotiated in secret from the Ukrainian people, EU public opinion and Russia. The text of the draft was published only after the present crisis had started. Russia was kept in the dark till the draft was initialed. Secret diplomacy was one of the causes of WWI (for example, Berlin was unaware of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 and believed Britain would not enter the war). 3. The Agreement with Ukraine is none of Russia’s business. The reality: In the past Russia held talks with Brussels and countries concerned in advance of their joining the EU to manage the impact on its bilateral trade/economic relationship. The fact that this Agreement is short of formal EU membership doesn’t change that reality. Simply, Russia’s participation in this project, by way of absorbing part of the pain to be inflicted upon Ukraine’s economy by radical reforms, was taken for granted. Russia has always been in favor of talking to the EU on the issues of joint neighbourhood. It was not us who declined to discuss those matters. Lord Howell quoted (in the debates on Ukraine on 19 March 2014) Bismarck who suggested “making a good treaty with Russia”, after which he (Bismarck) was sacked. 4. Ukraine’s association with the EU could be carried out on the cheap, at no substantial cost to the EU taxpayer. The reality: Ukraine is on the brink of default. IMF or no IMF, EU countries would naturally have to bear the costs of Ukraine’s economic restructuring and financial stabilization, including $15 bln already committed to pay for servicing its sovereign debt over two-year period. The present authorities in Kiev calculate Ukraine’s immediate financial needs at 27 bln. Who will pay for Russia’s gas for Ukraine? President Yanukovich asked Brussels for $160 bln. over 8 to 10 years. It seems to be the figure comparable to the recent Eurozone bailouts. In the absence of Russia’s cooperation the costs will rise. Former British Ambassador in Moscow Tony Brenton: “Real prosperity and governability (in Ukraine) will be very hard to achieve without Moscow’s cooperation” (The Independent on Sunday, 23 March 2014). Like Henry Kissinger and Zb.Brzezinski, he called for military/political and economic neutrality of Ukraine. What is rarely mentioned is that economic reform, if left to market element, would raze the entire Soviet-era industrial base to the ground, inflicting disproportionate pain on southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, which would only serve to deepen divisions in the country. The Crimea was a low-hanging fruit to be picked by Russia, which acted out of frustration and vexation. The reality: Nobody disputes the mood of the Crimean majority. In that sense it was, indeed, a low-hanging fruit. But Russia acted only after having been cheated on the 21 February agreement between President Yanukovich and the opposition (we were told that it had been overtaken by events, though now our American partners say that its provisions are being implemented by the present Kiev authorities, which, in our view, are partly legitimate). In any way, Stockholm and Warsaw, which hatched the Eastern Partnership, hugely helped by pulling the branch down so that the fruit could be picked. Unlike in Somerset Maugham’s Luncheon (where peaches were not in season then), the fruit of self-determination is very much in fashion now. Just look at the independence of Timor-Lesti and South Sudan. 6. Kosovo is no precedent. The reality: What is then the precedent at all, especially given its prominent place in Anglo-Saxon law? Kosovo was bombed by Nato for more than 70 days to wrestle its control from Serbia. Afterwards it was under Nato occupation before UDI. Russia acted fast and effectively to ensure that no blood is shed and destruction wrought, thus saving Kiev and the West lots of temptation and trouble. The Crimean people exercised their right to self-determination, once the constitutional order had been destroyed by a revolutionary takeover. Or are some more equal than others, and is, in the EU Newspeak, territorial integrity more important than the will of people? Kiev’s political commissars were on their way to stop the Crimeans’ speaking up their mind. The new authorities in Kiev have to prove their legitimacy, since due constitutional process was not followed and it was the decision by the Parliament, which, in the view of The Economist, “is for sale to the highest bidder”. The Soviet Union had to wait for American recognition for 16 years. The US cannot, for almost 35 years, restore diplomatic relations with Iran. Consulting citizenry seems to be a general problem in the EU. Marcel Proust once mentioned in his “In search of lost time”, that French bad news was learnt abroad sooner than in France. It seems that the same is true of the EU. It took the story of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine to bring the message home that something was wrong in the Union. As Christopher Booker wrote in The Telegraph, “The EU, dedicated to eliminate national identity, has finally run up against the rock of a national interest that will not give way”. 7. The EU is a major geopolitical player. The reality: The EU is not suited for old-fashioned zero-sum geopolitical games. That is plainly not its cup of tea. So, the decision to use EU as a geopolitical vehicle was flawed from the very start. And if Ukraine is considered to be the West’s geopolitical ward of Cold War-type (Victoria Nuland said that the US wants a return on its investment of $5 bln into Ukraine’s democracy), the EU is hardly suited, as things stand now, to be the source of funds for this long-term and costly project. Russia would certainly gain a lot if Ukraine becomes a democratic and prosperous state, well in line with European values, including protection of minority rights. Though nobody can guarantee that. The West’s experience in other parts of the world does not inspire such confidence. All the more so that many (Thomas Friedman, for example) believe that the West badly mishandled its relationship with Russia, beginning with the decision to expand Nato in 1994. Hope luck will be on their side now. Recent speeches and articles amount to a new Fulton speech. The reality: At the moment nobody in London can claim to be another Winston Churchill. At the time of Fulton (March 1946) it was meant to help Washington to turn the American and European public opinion around – from the perception of the Soviet Union as an ally to the one of an existential threat. The Cold War was launched partly to sustain the long-term trend of militarization of economy and technological development and, thus, international relations. This trend dated back to getting out of the Great Depression and ran out of steam by early 80-ies, when other, more artificial sources of economic growth were invented in the financial sector. By the way, as became known lately, Foreign Office is yet to open lots of files of secret foreign policy documents, dating back to the Crimean War, which also cover the origins and early years of the Cold War. 9. Michael McFaul’s article “Confronting Putin’s Russia” (The New York Times of March 24, 2014) makes another Long Telegram. The reality: Michael McFaul is no George Kennan, who wrote it in February 1946. His philosophical observations of about 6000 words, as Henry Kissinger put it, were translated into operational policies of containment of the Soviet Union with the emphasis on military dimension. George Kennan himself did not agree and later warned against meddling in the Soviet Union affairs after the Soviet system has crumbled. He believed the subsequent transformation to be too intimate a national affair for outside interference. What rationale for containing Russia over the past 20 years, including now? 10. The world is facing the prospect of another Cold War. The reality: What kind of Cold War? The original one was underpinned by the threat of military confrontation and irreconcilable ideological differences. We have none of those at the moment. Both Russia and the West embrace market economy and democracy. So, it risks to turn into something farcical with Western partners straightening their faces when meeting Russian representatives to make the point of their innocence lost in the Crimea. What kind of innocence after the war in Iraq, war on terror and stretching the UN Security Council mandate in Libya? In the latter case the West and Nato succeeded in proving Stalin’s maxim (no man, no problem) to be wrong: Gaddafi is gone, but there are lots of problems. On the contrary, the events of the past weeks have deepened our Western partners’ understanding of the real scale of the challenge of the Ukrainian crisis. The IMF will have to turn a human face to the Ukrainians and, unlike in other, far-away places, see the human trees for the macroeconomic wood. Geopolitical considerations may prove to be helpful: after all, it was in response to the “Soviet challenge”, that the Western European economies were socialized at the time of the Cold War. The EU wouldn’t listen to President Yanukovich, but the same concerns, expressed by the present Ukrainian authorities receive a favourable hearing in the West. Everybody agree now that Ukraine needs a fully legitimate government, a deep constitutional reform, that would guarantee that one section of its population doesn’t impose its will and narrative, including historical one, on the other. The circumstances require bringing people together, not alienating them and pushing the country to the brink. Their culture and other sensitivities have to be taken into consideration, as well as Russia’s legitimate interests. If the US weighs in with its cheap gas, as Russia did in the 90-ies, it would be perfect. The nationalist/pogrom/criminal elements of Maidan seem to be dealt with in a robust fashion, which is a welcome sign. Now that all faces have been saved, is the time for implementing a positive agenda. It will require, on the part of the Western elites, overcoming their short-termist political and strategic culture. Moreover, this entire exercise, given its generational scale, could have a positive impact upon the way things are done within EU, especially if the same attitude defines the relationship between the Brussels bureaucracy and the people of the EU member-states. They deserve to be treated no worse and getting the same deal that the Ukrainians are, hopefully, going to be offered. 11. The Crimea signals the new world order (The Economist). The reality: If the rules of the game in the XXI century are to be different from those in the XX century, why the Western policies in Serbia in 1999 and Iraq and other places later on, which had nothing to do with international rule of law, couldn’t change that much earlier. Still, humanitarian concern continues to be a common denominator, although in case of Russia, acted on efficiently, fast and without bloodshed. Another difference – we put our troops on the ground in places where they are welcome, we proceed with self-restraint and moderation pursuing clear-cut and limited goals. The world continues to be polycentric, which was not obvious immediately after the end of the Cold War. Now it is evident to our Western partners, when they appeal to China on issues of Euro-Atlantic affairs. It also proves that the old geopolitical triangular relationship between Russia, the US and China is part of a much more complex political landscape. But overall, the international system, as it was designed by the UN founding nations continues to be firmly in place for it was designed for a multipolar world order. The claims to exclusive interpretation of international law and exceptionalism (including exemption from international law) are another matter. 12. President Putin’s response to having been cheated on the 21 February agreement was difficult to foresee. The reality: Russia (as a revisionist power) and its political leadership have been subject of intensely hostile propaganda campaign in the Western media for the past three years. It was nothing short of demonization, character assassination and jingoism. Option One: people in Brussels did not know what they were doing, which proves the known Biblical truth. Then it was a blunder, which, in Talleyrand’s view, is worse than a crime. As a matter of fact, James Sherr of Chatham House wrote in The Financial Times at an early stage of the crisis, that Moscow was not risk-averse, but neither was it reckless. Option Two: those people knew what they were doing. In the latter case the calculation must be indicative of the present reality which is providing a new lease of life for Nato, Western alliance etc. But is it not too high a price for the illusion of living in the XX century. And is it realistic to pursue under the present circumstances, including the economic crisis and globalisation, the old policy of keeping America in Europe, Russia out and Germany down? Russia acted to destroy the West’s credibility. The reality: The Ukrainian crisis was put into motion by the EU. It was Brussels, who rolled the dice, not Moscow. It started in November and could be safely managed by joint effort for three months. The 21 February agreement, when it fell through, marked the point of no return. The events evolved according to our proverb “the farther in the woods, the more firewood”. Moscow had to be superhuman to escape this logic, imposed on it. Anyway it is unfair to blame Russia for the relative decline of the West and the US geopolitical contraction. 14. The Crimean referendum could be rerun under the OSCE auspices. The reality: Unlike in 1870, when Russia unilaterally declared itself not to be any longer bound by the Black Sea provisions of the Peace of Paris and it was later formalised multilaterally (the conference did, indeed, take place in London) to save the looks, the contemporary international law provides for the right to self-determination and its exercise is not qualified. 15. The present debate on Ukraine is no fun. The reality: See HMG responses to President Putin’s speeches of 4 March and 18 (not 17) March 2014 on the Foreign Office web-site, as well as tables, supposedly proving, in graphic detail, Russia’s isolation in today’s multipolar world.
Posted on: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 09:02:56 +0000
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