MIddle Class as the leading force of democratic change? Case of Indonesia. REAL (right wing political group in Azerbaijan) looks at the middle class as the social force that will bring democratic change in Azerbaijan. This is one of the basis of their political strategy. I consider this cornerstone of their strategy, one of their assumptions as highly questionable, to say the least, especially in Azerbaijani reality. Middle class in Azerbaijan is extremely conservative, has a lot to lose, supports Aliyev regime out of interest or fear. Only few (dozens) of the members of this class may become leaders and frontline fighters against Aliyev regime, but as social force this class is not politically active and not a social force for change. Not in Azerbaijan. Not now. Looking only at liberal and neoliberal interpretations of the democratization process is extremely unhelpful in the case of Azerbaijan. In academic literature there is a serious debate on the role of the middle class in the process of democratization. I think that Indonesia is one of the good and more relevant examples for Azerbaijan that we must look at to understand the nature of this debate. In order not to lose much time on facebook commenting (not much time for that now) to answer my friends, I just decided to share the relevant part of one of my essays I wrote on this topic at SOAS, to stimulate our debate. Enjoy: "... There is strong argument in academic literature that economic and social changes, brought about by the development of capitalism, bring democratization. Research data proves positive relationship between the level of socioeconomic development and liberal democracy (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 26 ff in Aspinal, 2005, p.11). The more countries develop economically, the more strengths and skills of societies of those countries develop to sustain liberal democratic governance. (Lipset, 1959 in Zakaria, 2003, p. 69). The issue of what social forces are strengthened or created by the development of capitalism or specifically how dominant is the role of the “middle class” in democratization processes is also part of this complex relationship between capitalism and democratization that we try to see at the example of Indonesia. In the 1960’s Indonesia was largely agrarian society (Aspinal, 2005, p. 12). Soekarno’s “Guided Democracy” and “Guided Economy” left the Indonesian economy with 600% inflation rate and little productive capacity (Hadiz, 2001, p. 127). The state at this period had a great degree of autonomy from social forces because of the underdeveloped nature of different social classes (Hadiz, 2001, p. 121).The rapid rise of capitalism in Indonesia during Soeharto era has started with brutal and bloody extermination of the PKI (Indonesian Communist party) - third largest Communist Party in the world in 1965-66 (Benedict Anderson, “Exit Soeharto”, 2008, New Left Review, No 50, p. 35). The American establishment and western strategists were very satisfied that communists were not able to ascend to power in strategically important Indonesia despite the fact that high-level intelligence report (called “Prospects for and Strategic Implications of a Communist Takeover in Indonesia”) from September 1965 was predicting that it would be an inevitable outcome of internal political struggle within two or three years. (John Roosa, p 14). It was within this geopolitical context that Soeharto has opened up the economy of Indonesia for foreign capital, something what would be equal to accepting colonial order for early nationalists under Soekarno ( Hadiz, p128). Americans appreciated this change and immediately mobilized its Western Europeans and Japanese allies to found the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia to fund the development budget of “New Order” under Soeharto regime. The formation of OPEC and skyrocketing oil prices in 1973 gave Soeharto huge resources to launch unprecedented modernization campaign of Indonesian economy. Indonesian intellectual elite adopted at this stage modernization theory as its ideological weapon to justify its policies of suppression against political opposition in the name of stable and rapid economic growth. (Hadiz, 2001, p. 123).The West celebrated Soeharto for this “sincere campaign”, for promotion of rapid growth and for expansion of “middle class”. Many believed that “middle class” will be the “harbinger of real democracy” (Anderson, 2008, p 35-36). The fall of international oil prices in 1980s forced Soeharto to undertake some serious changes in his economic policies. It was time of rise of neoliberalism on global scale, and to attract new private international investors and foreign aid it was unavoidable for the regime to accept the condition of structural adjustment including deregulation and retreat of the state. The government reduced non-tariff barriers, provided incentives for export, simplified investment procedures and liberalized rules on the establishment of banks and capital controls (Hadiz, 2001, p. 129-130). Limited economic liberalization was not followed by political democratization. The regime could overcome this phase of its life via slightly reshaping its authoritarian corporatist and oligarchic framework. But it was more and more obvious that economic development and industrialization contributed to the emergence of new social forces, of the new “middle class”. (Hadiz, 2001, p 134). It is strongly argued in academic literature that economic change brings with it political change by strengthening certain social classes, especially the middle classes which demand more representation. The middle classes are seen by many scholars in this context as the dominant or main agents of democratization (Aspinal, 2005, p. 11-12). It is assumed by many writers that the middle class has automatically interests in the democratization and in limiting arbitrary interventions of the state in its affairs. Samuel Huntington considers “the urban middle class” as the most active supporter of the democratization. They were the leaders of “third wave movement for democratization” (Huntington, 1991, p.67 in Aspinal, 2005 p. 12). This point was much debated in academic literature as it will become apparent from my essay. We have to look also in more details at the nature of capitalism in Indonesia in order to understand to what degree it influenced the process of democratization and what kind of social classes it strengthened (specifically the “middle class”). The nature of Suharto regime and the way how it changed throughout his 32 years in power gives some important insights to contemplate about this complex relationship and challenge some of the assumptions like “middle-class-as-chief-agents-of-democratization”. Increasing number of scholars argue and emphasize that democratic transitions have unstructured and indeterminate nature. They depart from and abandon class and structural explanations and instead argue that crucial role in democratic transitions is played by the choices made by state and opposition elites. Especially important for democratization is the division of the ruling elite (contingent choice theory). Some even argue that “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence … of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself” (Guillermo O’Donnel and Philipe Schmitter, 1986, p.19 in Aspinal, 2005, p. 15). The generals in New Order” era could initially erect a corporatist system and co-opt major sociopolitical forces inside of the system. The regime was the result of collective effort of a group of generals where pluralism in the narrow ruling circle itself was initially respected. (Aspinal, 2005, p.203-205). The term “financial generals” has been coined in literature on Indonesian politics to describe the role of military in financial affairs of the country (Robinson, 1986, p. 252). Generals were at the core of emerging capitalist class in Indonesia. Powerful state corporations were managed in early years of “New Order” by generals (p. 255) who have built their business interests in alliance with Chinese and foreign capital (p. 267). They were at the decision making positions to influence distribution of licenses, monopolies and concessions and having these opportunities they could accumulate immense economic and political power in 60’s and 70s (p. 268). The further growth of economy, high oil prices, their decline, the consequent liberalization of the economy, the ongoing integration into the global economy created more complex structure of the capitalist class where still generals and their families played crucial role. At the beginning of his ascendance to power Suharto was more like the first among equal generals, but by the end of 70’s and later he consolidated his power and his grip on power could be more and more characterized like sultanistic style of governance. (Aspinal, 2005, p. 203-205). Sultanisation of Suharto rule, his personal decision de-facto to open the doors for Islamization of Indonesian politics in 1990 and some other factors created in the long term environment conducive for division in the ruling elite and even in the military itself. The urban middle class in the 1960s was a tiny class suffering from hyperinflation of Soekarno regime and frightened by the possible takeover of power by communists. The alliance with military was the most attractive option for the relatively wealthy urban groups. The map of social classes in Indonesia has significantly changed after many years of rapid industrialization and constant economic growth in “New Order” era (Aspinal, 2005, p. 12). The agrarian workforce proportion hit the level below 50% (Hill, 1994, p. 56 in Aspinal, 2005, p.12). And still some writers saw the rising middle class as a creation of the state which is ready to fight for narrow personal interests and to improve its position within a space and institutions protected and defined by the state (Robinson, 1996, p. 85). The “middle-class-as-agent-of-democratization” idea supported by Huntington (in Aspinal, 2005, p. 12-13) has been seriously criticized by different authors in academic literature. Historical evidence shows us that middle class has in some cases supported, but in others has not supported authoritarianism. Singapore is a clear example where the middle class supports authoritarian system. Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens (1992) argue that historical context is very important to determine if middle classes join a democratic movement or stay loyal to the authoritarian system. According to them, it is impossible to call middle classes invariably democratic, rather they adapt to given historical conditions and join the forces in society that can protect and may be advance their interests. (Aspinal, 2005, p. 261). The example of Latin America is indicative in terms of how ambiguous middle classes can be and how differently they can behave under various circumstances. “They pushed for their own inclusion but their attitude towards inclusion of the lower classes depend on the need nad possibilities for an alliance with the working class. The middle classes were not in favor of full democracy where they were confronted with intransigent dominant classes and had the option of allying with a sizable working class. However, if they started feeling threatened by popular pressures under a democratic regime, they turned to support the imposition of an authoritarian alternative.” (Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens, 1992, p.8 in Aspinal, 2005, p. 13). The middle class in Indonesia sided with military in the establishment of authoritarian “New Order”. The situation did change in 1997-98 when coalition of different social forces including the middle class has brought the regime of Suharto down, but was “the middle class” the leading force in this process and naturally inclined agent of democratization? There were other classes that became very active and pushed for democratic reforms, thus inviting the middle class to join the democratic movement. Some parts of rural population were mobilized in their fight for land. Industrial working class launched unprecedented series of strikes that contributed to the political comeback of demonstrations into political life of Indonesia. The urban poor also played important role in big cities like Jakarta (Aspinal, 2005, p. 14). Inflexibility of Suharto in his late years, the push of the working class, of peasants, of students and finally serious divisions and disunity of the ruling elite along nationalist, religious and succession politics lines created the situation where middle class joined the democratic cause because the costs of governance especially after economic crisis were unbearable. Economic crisis was one of the last blows that played a significant role in the downfall of Suharto and pushing for democratization process in Indonesia. ..."
Posted on: Wed, 25 Sep 2013 08:46:20 +0000
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