Observing reason is led to examine man, as the most likely locus where rational necessity can be seen as work. But this fails due to the nature of observing reason itself, which tries to understand man by looking on him as an object, and cannot grasp his nature as a being who also makes himself. Observing reason cannot really cope with the meshing of the given and the self-made in man, but tries to separate these two aspects from each other. It treats man like a thing, and that is why Hegel sees something appropriate in bringing this section’s discussion to a head in an examination of phrenology, which had been in vogue for a time at the end of the eighteenth century. In phrenology man’s typically human qualities are related to inert matter, the bumps and hollows of his skull. It is true for Hegel that spirit does equal matter, in that it must be embodied. But this relation must be expressed in the ‘infinite judgement’ which affirms both the identity of Geist and its embodiment, and their difference above all which portrays this embodiment as posited by Geist. Observing reason lacks an understanding of man as agent. Taylor, Charles (1975-09-04). Hegel (p. 162). Cambridge University Press. Its sad to say, but neurology and cognitive science havent fundamentally moved past phrenology in terms of the inappropriate manner in which they try to ascertain the nature of their subject matter. Nor are their results much less ridiculous.
Posted on: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 01:36:14 +0000