PAF’s Operational Concept during the War by Usman Shabbir & Yawar A Mazhar The PAF’s day and night strikes against Indian airfields and radars which began on 3 December were in accordance with the high command’s operational concepts. The overriding priority of the PAF was to give maximum support to Pakistan Army’s proposed land offensive into India from West Pakistan; every other air force objective was to be subordinated to this requirement. The proposed land offensive itself was in line with Pakistan’s grand strategy that in case of Indian aggression against East Pakistan effort would be made to capture strategically important Indian territory in the west and force a political settlement. This strategy was in turn driven by Pakistan’s limited resources which could not be split between its two wings separated by thousands of miles of hostile India. The air chief and air headquarters staff considered this commitment to be pivotal because the success or failure of the PAF’s support would in all likelihood determine the fate of Pakistan’s crucial offensive. When the estimated ‘cost’ of fulfilling this commitment was calculated by the planning staff in July 1971, it worked out at a loss of 100-120 combat aircraft and pilots over the projected 7-10 days period. The Air Chief was aware that this would amount to losing one third of his force but he had the full support of his senior commanders when he directed them in August to prepare their units to pay this price for ensuring the success of the army’s offensive. Until the army’s offensive was launched, the PAF was to maintain offensive pressure on the IAF with sustained strikes against some of its forward and rear bases. The objectives of these strikes were: 1. Inhibit to the extent possible – both physically and psychologically – the enemy’s ability to launch operations against either the Pak Army in the field or other targets on Pakistani territory, including the PAF’s own air bases and other installations. 2. Try to force IAF to deploy its strike aircraft at rear air bases and thus deny them full flexibility. 3. Provoke IAF in retaliating against PAF’s own airbases where PAF will use advantages that go to a defensive force and inflict attrition on IAF. PAF was well aware that crippling strikes on IAF bases like those carried out in the 1967 Arab-Israel War or similar to its own strikes in 1965 War (against Phatankot and Kalikunda) were not possible. This was simply because IAF, having learned its lesson well from the 1965 War, when PAF was able to destroy a considerable number of IAF aircraft on the ground as they lacked proper dispersal facilities, had upgraded its air bases. The IAF air bases were now far better protected in terms of aircraft shelters, dispersals, camouflages and air defence. Other than the upgraded air base infrastructure, PAF also lacked some essential tools, such as runway denial/penetration bombs. During this same period, the PAF was also to provide whatever air support was needed for the Pak Army’s ‘holding’ actions along the entire 3,700 kilometer border from Kashmir to Kutch. These relatively shallow penetrations were meant to tie down as many of the enemy’s resources as possible and to try to achieve a favourable tactical posture in the process.
Posted on: Wed, 08 Oct 2014 08:24:47 +0000