PART 3Plausibility of the Reformist Politics of the ODF I will start my discussion of the ODF politics with a cautionary note. The Oromo struggle concerns the rights and interests of over thirty million men, women and children. Therefore, it is incumbent on us to appraise critically the programs of political organizations that claim to be a relief for the predicament of Oromo nation. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the discussion which follows is a critical assessment of the politics of the ODF; it is not directed against any of its leaders or members as individuals. In other words, the intention is to initiate a constructive debate that can benefit the Oromo struggle for freedom and justice. The substance of the ODF politics The essence of the ODF argument against the struggle for an independent Oromo state can be summarized as follows. The leaders of the ODF posit that, given the present situation in the world and the Horn of Africa, the idea of building an independent Oromo state is not only unachievable but is also “outdated” in this age of globalization. Therefore, they are inviting others, including the Abyssinian elites both in power and in opposition, to join them in a project which aims to reform and democratize the Ethiopian state. In other words, the ODF is changing the Oromo struggle for decolonization (independence) to a struggle for the democratization of the Ethiopian state. Its politics will satisfy the Oromo quest for justice with the acquisition of “democratic” citizenship in Ethiopia. This is more palatable to external forces than to most Oromos. The “democratic” ODF model aims to align and reconcile the antagonistic nationalisms of conquerors and the conquered under the umbrella of the Ethiopian state. The ODF will assure the Oromo people that the goal it has set out in its political program is not only achievable through peaceful means but will also satisfy the Oromo quest for freedom. I will explain my doubts below. Democracy versus decolonization The ODF leaders and members believe that Ethiopia is a colonial empire and the Oromo are a colonized people. They even say that the ODF is engaged in an anti-colonial struggle. However, they give priority to political reform of the empire over its de-colonization, rejecting full sovereignty, the objective of the anti-colonial struggle which the Oromo people have been waging particularly during the last 40 years (Radio Bilisummaa Oromo (ODF), 15 May 2013). In addition, talking about the objective of the Oromo struggle, the ODF President has remarked “kan lolluuf bilisummaa lafaa otoo hinta’in bilisummaa sabaa-tiif”—we are not struggling for a territory but a people (Radio Marii, 31 March 2013). However, the struggle of a colonized people has always been a struggle for control over a territory or homeland. A struggle against colonial rule is not about a political reform of an imperial colonial polity per se, but about de-colonization and freedom from foreign domination. That was why political reform or democracy has not been a question for the anti-colonial movements in Africa or Asia. A struggle against colonialism strives, in the first place, to restore freedom to the colonized people. As far as I know, there has been no demand from the colonized peoples anywhere in the world for amalgamation with the colonizing country under one state umbrella. None of the peoples in the British, French, Belgian and Portuguese colonial empires came with demands for the democratization of those empires and equality of citizenship with the British, the French, the Belgians or the Portuguese. Thus, every nation which could get rid of colonial rule and become independent during the last one hundred years started its struggle with demands for sovereignty. That means freedom from foreign rule and regaining full control over its own territory. After independence, some of those countries became democracies through internal postcolonial struggles; others are not democratic states yet or are in the process of becoming democratic. However, all of them are sovereign states today. That is what the Oromo are striving to be: a sovereign, and a democratic state. What is wrong with that? The loss of democracy is not the root cause of the Oromo conflict with the Abyssinian-cum- Ethiopian regimes. The loss of sovereignty is, and has been, the source of the Oromo predicament. The deprivations which our people have suffered under Abyssinian rulers during the last 130 years started with, and are rooted in, their loss of national sovereignty. The suppression of the democratic gadaa tradition was one of the consequences of Oromo loss of sovereignty. The revival of Oromo democracy is a corollary to the restoration of Oromo sovereignty. Hence, for the revival of the former, the reinstitution of the latter is a pre-requisite. Not vice-versa. Sovereignty is a right to which a people are entitled by birth. As I have stated in another article (Gadaa, 23 March 2012), it is a condition in which a free people live under laws they give to themselves. Hence, decolonization is the restoration of sovereignty wrongly taken from a people by a colonizing power. The Irish people who were the oldest British colony did not ask for the democratization of the United Kingdom (UK). Had their concern been democracy and citizenship, the Irish wouldn’t have struggled for separation from UK after centuries of existence as part of it. They participated in building the British Empire. The economic advantage they had as citizens of the UK or the stake they had in the British Empire, which was at its peak in 1922 when Ireland got its independence, was not prioritized over their national aspiration. Ireland was poorer than England but sovereignty, which was at the core of Irish aspirations, weighed over economic benefits gained as part of the union. They wanted independence because they did not become part of the UK willingly. England invaded their country and stripped them of freedom. That was how their relations started. The same can be said about the large and small soviet republics from Ukraine to Moldavia which seceded from Russian in the 1990s. They chose sovereignty over the economic advantages which staying in a federal arrangement with Russia could accord them. Even the population of the tiny desert republic of Djibouti (23,300 sq. km) chose independence in 1977 over French citizenship. The ODF and the other pro-Ethiopia Oromo organizations have a lot to learn from the history of these peoples. Partners in democratic citizenship As I have discussed in a previous article, the pro-Ethiopia Oromo organizations including the ODF have a misleading view of democracy. Democracy, as one political philosopher has stated, rests on consent and active participation. Consent and participation suggest concession based on give and take. In other words, democratization is a collective project. That means, to carry out such a project in a multinational polity, the ODF needs partners among both the larger and smaller nationalities in Ethiopia. However, I do not see candidates among these nationalities, or their political organizations and leaders that are interested genuinely and are ready to engage the Oromo in the type of a democratic dialogue which the leaders of the ODF have in mind. Their political program states that their politics is different from that of the Abyssinian ruling elites both in power and in opposition. The question is, with whom will the ODF build a democratic Ethiopian state that will “solve” its political problems if what they say is the case? The same can be said about individuals in the Ethiopianist camp whether they are scholars, journalists or politicians. To understand the problem of creating and promoting democratic partnership with the Abyssinian elites, it suffices to observe the reactions which the proclamation of the ODF “vision” produced as reflected in debates conducted by Amhara mass media such as ESAT TV (7 April 2013) and comments made on an interview which the vice president of ODF had made with Ethio-Civility (accessed on 12 July 2013). In those commentaries and debates the grievances of the Oromo people were not give any importance, if mentioned at all. To plead to those who occupy your home and possess your property that you will build an “inclusive” or “common” home with them is tantamount to forfeiting your rights voluntarily. Instead of reclaiming what legitimately belongs to you, you are pleading for a piece of it. It is to be Ethiopians first and Oromos second. To my mind, this is what the ODF politics offers us, because since it is not backed by force, the propositions of the ODF about a democratic Ethiopian state is seen as a toothless rhetoric by Abyssinian elites who are in power and in the opposition. As long as the ODF Oromo leaders do not pose any threat to it, the TPLF-led regime has no reason to contemplate the idea of sharing political power and material resources with them. The ODF politics is also repugnant to those who are in the opposition and are dreaming to rebuild Ethiopia as it was before 1991. They do not accept the simple fact the organization is called Oromo and not Ethiopian Democratic Front. Thus, as political scientists, sociologists and social psychologists remind us that, no matter how fundamental a change a people may experience, old methods and mind-sets do not easily wither away. Indeed, past experience shows that no amount of talks about democracy can make Abyssinian elites democrats or genuine political allies of the Oromo. Every Oromo knows about the most recent experience or the failure of Oromo-Tigrayan alliance of 1991- 1992 in this regard. In my view, given the denial of the injustices suffered by the Oromo in current mass media debates, no fundamental change can be expected in the attitude of the Abyssinian elites, at least in the near future. I assume, what is said above is clear also to the leaders of the ODF.By that I do not mean one should not talk to Abyssinian politicians or political organizations. I see no problem in dialoguing with them. The problem is making them accept and respect Oromo views about Oromo rights. The late Siegfried Pausewang (see Journal of Oromo Studies, vol. 14(1), 2007) criticized the formation of the now defunct Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF) between an OLF faction and the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) as an odd alliance, because it was between a liberation front and an undemocratic anti-Oromo party. He meant an ideological space where the two groups can meet for a democratic dialogue is lacking. Democracy rests on participatory consent. Participatory consent suggests concession based on give and take which is not part of the political culture of the elites in question. They seldom make democratic participation easy. Here participation pertains to the involvement of different views in a dialogue through which consent is achieved and out of which concession emerges. In the past, the Abyssinian rulers have conceded to demands only under pressure. However, whenever they conceded, it did not take them long to go back on their words. Such actions have been a disaster for the Oromo at every turn. In short the Oromo have travelled a long distance on the path of bilisummaa (independence).It is unlikely that the Oromo majority will abandon that path and settle for Ethiopian citizenship. There no doubt that the ODF politics will attract Oromos whose dream is to be accepted as equals by Amhara elites. However, these are a minority and belong to the old generation. Contrary to what the ODF politics prescribes, today; most Oromos find it odd and demeaning to bargain about Oromo national affairs with the Abyssinian elites. They do not believe, for example, that the use of the Oromo language, the alphabet for its transcription, the development of Oromia’s economy, etc. are negotiable or are the business of the Abyssinian elites. What is acceptable to the ODF is not for the Oromo majority. Oromo concern and level of consciousness disregarded Judged by the comments which it has generated among the Oromo so far, the ODF idea of quitting the independence struggle for Ethiopian citizenship is seen as a betrayal by the majority of the Oromo people. One need not carry out an opinion poll to determine Oromo feelings on the subject. It is enough to pay attention to the outbursts of opinion in Oromo mass media and the question which had confronted the ODF leaders at public meetings during the last three months to understand the way its “vision” is being understood among the people at large. The views expressed by other Oromo organizations and veterans of the Oromo liberation movement, the questions raised by the audience at the meeting organized by the ODF, and the numerous comments made in Oromo media reflect that its politics are in conflict with the aspirations of the Oromo people at large. In particular, it is in conflict with the feelings of the “Qubee generation”that was born long after the cross-road, where Ethiopiyawinet and Oromumma went in different directions was passed. Its memberssee no reason for abandoning the path which has been built with the great sacrifices made by their fathers and mothers. The cost paid in human lives and suffering is enormous. In addition, this same generation is already paying its own sacrifice; the price paid during the regime crackdowns on Oromo students during the last ten years is glaring evidence. In general, the writing on the “Oromo wall” reflects the opposite of what the ODF politics suggests. For, example, as I have pointed out in a previous article (Gadaa, 10 November 2012), the art and music composed by Oromos during the last two decades reveal the direction in which the Oromo struggle is moving, which, certainly, is not toward Ethiopiyawinet. However, preoccupied with what they love to call the “changing and globalizing” world, the ODF leaders seem to be less alert to the dynamics in the Oromo society: by and large, their politics contradict the beliefs and aspirations of the Oromo people, including that of the post-Dergue generation. The brutalities and disrespect they have experienced in the Ethiopian prisons and concentration camps have taught tens of thousands of Oromos that lost freedom should be restored at any cost. Those who have been in the struggle and have seen their comrades die in combat do not have any doubt about the legitimacy of the cause for which they fought and their obligation to continue fighting to achieve the goal of freedom. Those Oromos who were in prison and have heard the cries of prison mates, who were tortured or raped, are concerned about the denial of human dignity which their compatriots are exposed to in filthy Ethiopian jails and prison camps. They want to use all necessary means to end that. Their main concern is not the international community’s opinion about armed struggle but the fate of their compatriots who are being denied the right to life in the many killing fields. The international community has failed to stop the atrocities. Therefore, they believe that the struggle for an independent Oromo state is a legitimate option to end the atrocities and get rid of their colonial roots. As most of us remember, it was this Oromo determination which Dr. Berhanu Nega had witnessed among Oromo political prisoners in an Ethiopian jail, and was motivated to build a political party with the objective of “saving Ethiopia” from, as he put it, an impending danger being posed by Oromo politics. The veterans of the Oromo struggle who have seen the Ethiopian regimes’ prisons from inside do not talk about changing times, or about the opinion of the international community concerning armed struggle. Since their struggle has nothing to do with terrorism, they do not see any reason for surrendering to the politics of “war on international terrorism.” They are not terrorists; they are fighting against a terrorist regime and its agents who massacre their children, rape their women, loot their resources and chase them out of their homeland. In general, the majority of Oromo people do not take the ODF politics as a “vision” which can guide them out of their present predicament or will lead them to a life in peace and prosperity. In general, the Oromo see salvation in the struggle for an independent Oromo state. This is clearly reflected in the rapidly growing Oromo arts, literature and music. As I have discussed in another article, the developing Oromo societal culture is embedding and nourishing the national aspiration for independence. Thus, while talking about changes in the world, the ODF seems to disregard the fundamental changes that have occurred within the Oromo struggle itself. The ODF leaders often emphasize being the founding fathers of the OLF. No one denies that they were among the founding fathers. But, as the ODF leaders admit, their idea of struggling for Ethiopian democracy was not an option that was shared by the majority of the OLF founders; an independent state was the option supported by the majority. What is more, the idea of a social movement gets life when it reflects popular aspirations. That is indeed the case with the claim for an independent Oromo state for which most of the founding members of the OLF struggled and died for since the 1970s, is now a popular belief and a collective goal of the Oromo people. It is embraced by the Qubee generation who will brave the path to bilisummaa paying the ultimate sacrifices and carry the kaayyoo (or independence banner) to its destination. The ODF is swimming against this stream, disregarding the popular claim for independence. What the ODF leaders and members seem to have also disregarded, when they declared their political program, is the strength of Oromo opposition which met the pro-Ethiopia Oromo politics, particularly during the last two decades. There was opposition because experience has taught the Oromo not to trust the Abyssinian political elites or Oromo elites who ally themselves with them. Incidents from 1974 and 1991 proved that alliance with Abyssinian ruling elites is disastrous for the Oromo. Consequently, whether they are working with the present regime or are opposed to it, pro-Ethiopia Oromo political organizations are lacking the support of the Oromo people. Notwithstanding its rhetoric, the ODF has no concrete strategy to prove that the alliance it will forge with Abyssinian elites will be different from the alliance forged by Jijjirama with Ginbot-7 or the alliance made by the Oromo National Congress (ONC) and Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM) with Medrek. Given that the political culture and attitude of the Abyssinian (Tigrayan and Amhara) elites is not different from that of the Abyssinian elites of the 1970s or 1990s, it is difficult to say the outcome of an alliance the ODF may forge with the Abyssinian elites will be different from the disastrous results of Meison’s alliance with the Dergue in 1974, and the coalition which the OLF and other Oromo organizations had forged with the TPLF in 1991 to build the abortive Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). International conventions versus Oromo claim to statehood The ODF view that an independent Oromo state is an outdated project is contradicted by international conventions as well as by political theory and philosophy which acknowledge the right of oppressed and colonized peoples to independence. As mentioned above both the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1987 and the UN convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1960 declare that colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community. Globalization has not made the articles of those international conventions irrelevant. They remain potent and have been applied as recent as 2011 with the declaration of independence by South Sudan. The scholarly discourse is also consistent on the question of independence. The widely acknowledged principle is that secession from an existing state is legitimate: (a) if the group in question suffers serious injustices because of forceful annexation of their territory, (b) if their fundamental human rights are violated by a state, and (c) if the group which claims independence is a territorially concentrated group of individuals. I haven’t come across a convincing argument that contradicts this principle. The Oromo situation fulfills all three of the conditions. I do not think that anybody who knows the history of Ethiopia and the geography of Oromia can deny the fact that the Oromo were conquered and colonized. That the Oromo are a territorially concentrated people is a geo-demographical reality. Confirming this fact, a census conducted by the present regime says 85 percent of the population of the Regional State of Oromia is Oromo. The gross violation of human rights which has been perpetrated against them by the past and present Ethiopian regimes is also widely documented. This and the previous article (Part 2) which I have published on this website are summaries of the violation of Oromo human rights by the present regime. The ODF could have used what is said above to argue for the legitimate Oromo right to build own independent state. Ironically, its politics do the opposite. It denies the Oromo the right to territorial sovereignty and supports the territorial “integrity” of the Ethiopian state. Consequently, and I believe unwittingly, they support the position of those who oppose the Oromo struggle for total freedom from the “the prison house of nations” into which they were brought during the Abyssinian conquest of late nineteenth century and have been shackled by the subsequent colonial occupation of the last 130 years. Accommodating irreconcilable interests & antagonistic nationalisms under one roof The ODF will reconcile the interests of the Abyssinian ruling elites with that of the Oromo people to construct its project of the democratic state of Ethiopia. I have discussed elsewhere at length the fundamental problems of democratizing Ethiopia (see Bulcha, “History and Political Culture versus Ethiopia’s Territorial Integrity”, Oromo Commentary, vol. II, No. 2, 1992). Many of the problems I raised in that article twenty years ago remain unsolved even today. The attitudes I described then remain unchanged. Whereas the Oromo, including the leaders and members of the ODF, will change the unjust system on which the Ethiopian regimes have thrived, the Abyssinian elites’ aim is to change regimes while keeping and restrengthening the old system. As mentioned above, the Oromo have made tangible progress in their struggle toward freedom during the last forty years (revival of Oromo language, demarcation of Oromo territory, etc.) and want to expand their victory in every dimension, but the Amhara elites will repair the damages done to their motherland by “ethnic politics” of the TPLF regime: what the Amhara elites see as “damage” to their motherland pertains to the concrete gains which have been made by the Oromo and the other conquered peoples in terms of culture and language; it is opposed to the constitutional recognition (Article 39) of the cultural, linguistic and territorial identities of the oppressed nations and nationalities. In other words, the two groups hold contradictory positions. In the view of one Amhara scholar, “Article 39 of the present Ethiopian Constitution is a recipe for disaster. It undermines Ethiopian unity and resonates artificial quarrels among different ethnic groups who otherwise wanted to live in harmony” (see Ghaladewos Araia, “Gratitude to Interview Respondents and the Oromo Question”, (Ethiopian Review, 12 November 2003). What is “Ethiopian unity”? If Ethiopia were a united country why do we see a never-ending conflict between the Ethiopian regimes and the conquered peoples? Although the Abyssinian elites, particularly those from the Amhara ethnic background, do not respond to such questions, the answers are obvious. Ethiopia has never been a united country. The Oromo are not engaged in quarrels, real or “artificial”, with the Amhara or the Tigrayan peoples. They are in conflict only with the Abyssinian ruling elites who have conquered Oromia and are oppressing them. Thus, the problem of the Amhara elites is that Abyssinian culture and the Amharic language are no more the dominating culture and language in Ethiopia. They argue that there are no nations in Ethiopia. Their contention is that the “national” question is an “invention” and its constitutional recognition by the present Ethiopian regime is illegal and anti-Ethiopia. In short, as the American political sociologist Robinson (Journal of Oromo Studies (9) 1997) has pointed out, the sense of reciprocal recognition among equals on which the basis for fraternal solidarity among citizens is laid has been difficult to establish between the Abyssinian and Oromo political elites. The conflict which has its roots in the Abyssinian conquest and schisms which were created by Abyssinian colonialism in the past are not only persisting, but have even become deeper since the beginning of the 1990s. They are not exacerbated directly by what many people call a divisive TPLF “ethnic politics” but because of the Amhara elites’ hostility to the expression of Oromo culture and identity. The uproar among the Amhara which was caused by the simple statement “I am Oromo first” which Jawar Mohammed made, when an Al Jazeera journalist asked him “Are you Oromo or Ethiopian first?”, reflects such a blatant hostility to the expression Oromo identity (see for example ECADF Tube, 27 June 2013). The majority of the Oromo as we know would have said “We are Oromo not Ethiopians” if asked the same question. In fact that is what the Oromo have been saying for many years. Recent examples of such unequivocal Oromo self-expression were made in a cultural exhibition prepared by the Oromo community in Ireland in May 2012 and in demonstrations staged by Oromo refugees in Cairo, Egypt in June 2013 (Al Jazeera, June 2013). Jawar is demonized because he will simply assert his Oromo identity and demand a fair share for the Oromo people in Ethiopia. He did not say I am not an Ethiopian. Nevertheless, with the Amhara elites the simple assertion of his personal identity has made him a perverted ethno-nationalist. The attack on Jawar Mohammed is not the first attack on an Oromo scholar. In character, it is similar to what some of us who write and talk about the Oromo have been experiencing at international conferences during the last three or four decades. From my own experience, the followers of the “mother of all lies”, which is the so-called Ethiopian historiography, have the audacity to tell audiences that whatever an Oromo, or even an expatriate scholar, says about Oromo history, culture or politics is a lie. Often, they do not even make an effort to provide evidence to support their statements. The difference with the Al Jazeera incident is that those attacks were limited to small audiences in conference halls and were not within the range of the ears of the general public. The messengers of falsehood could often go from the conference halls unchallenged because the Oromo scholar they attack is “alone” in the hall. Not this time. As we have seen, the Oromo response from around the world is damning. To put it figuratively, while attacking Jawar, the anti-Oromo elements have poked their fingers into a fire. Consequently, they have incurred “burns” that can be paralyzing. What is more, their vilification of Jawar has also exposed their anti-Oromo attitude to the world. A South African colleague who follows the Oromo situation with interest sent me a note saying, “the viciousness of many of the responses to the recent Al Jazeera Oromo interview shocked many here. Shocking that such interviews and documentaries are so scarce, and that when they do happen, engender such vilification – Astonishing and profoundly disturbing.” To come back to the main point, what I have described above shows that reconciling the Oromo and Abyssinian nationalisms under one roof is a very difficult task to accomplish. Although pro-EthiopiaOromo politicians, including those in the ODF, will convince us that it is possible to accommodate the Oromo under the umbrella of a democratic Ethiopian state, I do not see the possibility of its implementation in the near future. As I have described in this and the previous article, a Tigrayan version of Abyssinian nationalism is currently at loggerheads with Oromo nationalism. The Amhara elites may not attain the position of former Amhara rulers to suppress Oromo nationalism, but that does not mean they will give up their opposition to the expression of Oromo identity. In short, theODF has to tell the Oromo how it will make the Amhara elites accept Oromo rights. As it is, the alliance which is reflected in its political program is one that cannot bring about peace and prosperity, but sustain conflict, waste time and resources, and hinder the Oromo from social, cultural and economic development. The ODF idea about a democratic Ethiopia sounds good to uncritical ears. The problem is, while the Amhara elites will recognize only the existence of Ethiopian nationalism, which is Abyssinian nationalism in an Ethiopian garb, the ODF will promote the idea of an “Ethiopian home” where all national identities or nationalisms can thrive. The ODF knows that the political programs of all Ethiopianist political organizations are opposed to the token autonomy which the Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution gives the Oromo and other peoples in Ethiopia. I do not say it is impossible to form a common front with these organizations to bring down the TPLF regime. But, as I have argued in another article (Gadaa, 2 February 2012), it is naïve to think about building a post-TPLF democratic state of Ethiopia with political elites who are openly averse to Oromo identity in general and Oromo national identity in particular. It is enough to look at the political programs of organizations dominated by the Amhara elites: they do not have even a space for Oromia as a geographical entity on their map of the future state of Ethiopia. According to them, the map they will (re)draw will be more or less a replica of imperial Ethiopia. The leaders of the ODF are aware of the fact that the Oromo and Abyssinian-cum-Ethiopian nationalisms are embedded in different political cultures. One is democratic, the other autocratic. Ethiopian nationalism is violent as a political culture and predatory in character. It cannot exist in the same state and government together with Oromo or other nationalisms which will protect their peoples and resources. However, it seems that its leaders are expecting a quick transformation of the values which underpin Abyssinian-cum-Ethiopian nationalism once the Oromo and Abyssinian political elites coalesce to form a democratic state of Ethiopia.The question which the ODF has to answer is, how are they going to do that? It suffices to point out here that previous attempts to bring about such a transformation have been abortive and that the schism between the Oromo and Ethiopian nationalisms is deeper today than ever before. In short, had the purpose of the cooperation which the ODF has in mind been with organizations that are struggling for an independentAmhara, Sidama, Ogaden etc. states, the political differences of those with whom it will cooperate could not pose much problem: when the TPLF-regime is defeated the Oromo and the other people will build their own independent states in their respective sovereign territories. Once that is done, common issues can be raised and treated on different levels and forums that can be co-organized by peoples that are free and states that are independent. Later on, that may even lead to the realization of the ODF dream of seeing the Oromo and all the other neighboring peoples living together peacefully in a federal political arrangement. Wrong messages about the Oromo struggle one of the many problems I see with the politics of the ODF is the wrong messages it conveys about the Oromo national struggle in general and the objectives of the OLF in particular. To those who are opposed to Oromo independence, the politics or “new vision” of the ODF has given the impression that Oromo nationalism is dead. Taking the ODF declaration of its “new vision”, which had dropped the issue of an independent Oromo state as the choice of the entire Oromo liberation movement, an observercommented,“gossanyinet wedqoo naw injii yetemellesut wedew aydellem” which means, freely translated, “they are forced to come back (to Ethiopianism) because tribalism is bankrupt” (ESAT, 7 April 2013). In general, the fact that those who are, as one of the commentators put it, the “waanna qenyazmach” or “chief commanders” of the OLF are now quitting it to democratize Ethiopia is taken to indicate the bankruptcy of Oromo nationalism or the ideology on which the OLF is based. In fact, the following answer given by the ODF Vice President, when he was asked why his group left the OLF to form a new front, supports that wrong conclusion. He said “ginbaarun …yasfelgebet mikniyaat ye-Oromoo hizb tigil baallefut 20 ametaat kedersebet darajaa iyaazeqezeqe, tagayuum iyetebetaattene silemexxaa” (SBS Radio, 13 April 2013). Freely translated this means “we formed the new front because during the last 20 years the Oromo struggle (led by the OLF) has been deteriorating, its members [have] been dispersing and it has not been possible to re-organize it.” In general, the politics of the ODF has given the impression that Oromo nationalism is not, and has never been, a mass-based liberation ideology, but a long and irresponsible adventure undertaken by the Oromo elites. Citing statements made by the leaders of the ODF in the past, among others, the ESAT journalists mentioned above have argued that the OLF was created by its leaders to bargain for political power with the Abyssinian ruling elites and not to struggle for an Oromo independent state. I need not stress that this is a blatant distortion of the political objective of the struggle led by OLF. The reader can see the content of the statements made, and the literature produced by the OLF and the activities of its members over the last four decades to make his or her own judgment. In another set of misleading statements alluding to the politics of the Abyssinian regimes and that of the Oromo Liberation Front respectively, the ODF Political Program says: The aspiration of those forces advocating the revival of the policy of upward homogenization through coercive assimilation of the diverse has failed in the past and cannot be achieved in the future. Similarly the obverse policy of aspiring to achieve downward homogenization through the creation of smaller culturally and linguistically homogeneous independent entities [such as Oromia] may not necessarily bring freedom, prosperity and stability, because this alone does not suffice as a cementing factor as the experience of neighboring Somalia, among others, tragically demonstrates”(ODF 29 March 2013) The parallels which the ODF draws between the Abyssinian ruling elites’ policy of control of assimilation and the OLF politics of national liberation in the lines I have quoted above is distortive. The implication is that the Oromo struggle for an independent state will fail as the assimilation policy of the Abyssinian ruling elites did. The suggestion is mistaken for the following reasons. First, the Oromo struggle is not about “downward homogenization,” whatever the ODF means by that phrase. Its objective is not to build a state of which the inhabitants are only Oromo
Posted on: Fri, 09 Aug 2013 13:06:56 +0000
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