POST BY RONALD PAYNE – This is an Example/Sample of the POINTS AND DISCISSION for the Subject of “Job Abandonment”. This Point and Discussion is for inclusion in the COM Appeal “Brief on the Merits” Format. I will in the near future reformat this into the Memorandum Format for COM Appeals and Petition for Reconsideration. In the meantime, read this, this is the information that you want if your case involves the subject of “Job Abandonment”… THE APPELLANT AND PETITIONER AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT WITH AND TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT FROM MISION ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL COMPANY THAT IS AT ISSUE IN THIS MATTER IS NOT PERTINENT, RELEVANT, OR MATERIAL TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE APPELLANT AND PETITIONER FAITHFUL AND VALUABLE SERVICE TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERENMENT IN AFGHANISTAN Congress in enacting the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-8) Section 602(b)(2)(A)(ii) and Section 602(b)(2)(A)(iii) in pertinent part required a Special Immigrant Visa Applicant to establish that they were employed by or on behalf of the United States Government in Afghanistan for a period of time that was not less than one year, and to have provided Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government in Afghanistan, as a prerequisite to being bestowed with the Status of an Afghanistan Special Immigrant by the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan. If Congress intended for the subject of Employment by or on behalf of the United States Government in Afghanistan to be intertwined or intermingled with the subject of Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government, Congress would have so stated as much when it enacted the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-8) Section 602(b)(2)(A) and its individual clauses (i) through (iv). As such, Congress in separately enacting the Employment Clause as found in the Afghan Allies Protection Act (Public Law 111-8) Section 602(b)(2)(A)(ii) and the Faithful and Valuable Service Clause as found in the Afghan Allies Protection Act (Public Law 111-8) Section 602(b)(2)(A)(iii) clearly intended that such subjects were completely separate and distinct from each other and to require their own unique application of eligibility, qualification, and disqualification standards. The Appellant and Petitioner contends that the decision of the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan that is at issue in this matter was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not supported by substantial evidence, and/or not otherwise made in accordance with law because decisions regarding at-will Employment by or on behalf of the United States Government in Afghanistan are not pertinent, relevant, or material to the determination of Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government in Afghanistan. In this regard the Appellant and Petitioner has alleged the following undisputed facts and circumstances: 1. On [DATE] the Appellant and Petitioner sough employment with and was subsequently hired by Mission Essential Personnel Company in the capacity of a Linguist and Cultural Advisor (Interpreter-Translator) to by employed on behalf of and provide faithful and valuable services to the United States Government in Afghanistan. 2. On [DATE] the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan found that the Appellant and Petitioner established all of the eligibility requirements of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-8) as amended, and bestowed upon the Appellant and Petitioner the Status of an Afghanistan Special Immigrant. 3. The Appellant and Petitioner thereafter continued his employment by or on behalf of the United States Government in Afghanistan and to provide Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government in Afghanistan for several additional years while his Special Immigrant Visa Application was being processed to conclusion. 4. On [DATE] the Appellant and Petitioner was deployed to the Republic of Poland with a Joint United States Armed Forces Embedded Training and Mentorship Team and their Assigned Islamic Republic of Afghanistan National Security Forces Unit for an International Training Event. 5. On [DATE] the Appellant and Petitioner was notified in the Republic of Poland by members of his family in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan via electronic communication, that enemy forces and/or criminal elements had discovered his identity and location and have communicated a credible threat against him and recommended that he not return from the Republic of Poland to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for reasons of safety and security. 6. On [DATE] the Appellant and Respondent notified his United States Military Chain of Command (Senior Supervisor) of such threat to his safety and security. Thereafter, the Appellant and Petitioner notified his United States Military Chain of Command (Senior Supervisor) that he would not be returning to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan when the “mission” was complete and the unit redeployed back to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and would instead remain in the Republic of Poland and request protection from the Republic of Poland in the form of Temporary Asylum and protection from the United Nations High Commissioner (UNHCR) in the form of bestowment of the Status of a Refugee and eventually the hope of a third-country resettlement in the United States on account of his United States Government Affiliations. 7. The Appellant and Petitioner then continued in his employment therewith and faithful and valuable service to the United States Government until the conclusion of the deployment and its underlying mission. 8. On [DATE] the Appellant and Petitioner remained in the Republic of Poland while his supporting military unit redeployed back to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Thereafter the Appellant and Petitioner sought Temporary Asylum in the Republic of Afghanistan and applied for Refugee Status with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and subsequently Mission Essential Personnel Company terminated the Appellant and Petitioner employment with Mission Essential Personnel Company for the reason of “Job Abandonment”. Thereafter, Mission Essential Personnel Company notified the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan of its termination of the Appellant and Petitioner Employment for “Job Abandonment”. 9. On [DATE] the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan Revoked the Appellant and Petitioner Status as an Afghanistan Special Immigrant for the reason cited as a Failure to Provide Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government in Afghanistan on account of the Appellant and Petitioner Termination of Employment from Mission Essential Personnel Company for “Job Abandonment”. The Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude in both the public and private sector with the exception of punishment for crime (US Const Amend 13) or in the service to the state while performing a public duty (Butler V. Perry (1916) 240 US 328). The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Article 49 prohibits forced labor (involuntary servitude). The United Nations – Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 4 thereof, to which both the United States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan have ratified, provides that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude). Likewise, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan have also ratified the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor (ILO, C105 – No. 105, 40th ILC Session, enacted 25 June 1957 – enforced 17 January 1959) which prohibits all forms of forced and compulsory labor with very few exceptions thereof, such exceptions thereof being military service, civic duty, and punishment for crime. The United States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan have also enacted various criminal and civil statutes that prohibit involuntary servitude (18 USC 1584, 42 USC 1983, 42 USC 1985) (see: moj-laws.gov.af). The Appellant and Petitioner has not been convicted of any crime and sentenced to any involuntary servitude by a court of a competent jurisdiction. As such, the Appellant and Petitioner is not and was not subject to involuntary servitude for such reason thereof. The Appellant and Petitioner is not and was not a Member of the United States Armed Forces or the Afghanistan National Security Forces. As such, the Appellant and Petitioner is not and was not subject to the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice or the Military Laws and Regulations of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Appellant and Petitioner is not and was not subject to the United States Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 USC 3261 (Public Law 106-523) insofar as Section 3267(1)(C) prescribes that the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act does not apply to a “national of or ordinarily resident in the host nation”, nor is the Appellant and Petitioner subject to the equivalent laws or regulations of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (see: moj-laws.gov.af). Simply stated, the Appellant and Petitioner is not and was not the subject of involuntary servitude or otherwise obligated against his will by way of compulsion to enter into or remain in the Employment by or on behalf of the United States Government in Afghanistan and/or to provide Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government in Afghanistan. Furthermore, insofar as 18 USC 1584 may be applicable in this matter, if it were to be demonstrated that the Appellant and Petitioners Status as an Afghanistan Special Immigrant was actually, attempted, and/or threatened to be revoked on account of his voluntary no-notice resignation, or was otherwise placed or threatened to be placed in jeopardy for the purpose of compelling the Appellant and Petitioner and/or any other Special Immigrant Visa Applicant or person similarly situated to remain in the Employment by or on behalf of the United States Government in Afghanistan and to provide Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government in Afghanistan would reasonably implicates the notion of involuntary servitude and the commission of a criminal offense on the part of any such person in this matter, to include, but not limited to the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan and/or Mission Essential Personnel Company and its applicable Officers, Agents, and/or Employees thereof (United States V. Kozminski (1988) 487 US 931, United States V. Harris (4th Circuit 1983) 701 F.2d 1095). The opposite of involuntary servitude from the perspective of both the Employer and the Employee is “At-Will Employment”. The Doctrine of At-Will Employment, which has been adopted in all Fifty States, provides that an Employer may discharge an Employee at any time and for any reason or no reason at all. Likewise, the Doctrine of At-Will Employment equally provides that an Employee may at any time resign, quit, or otherwise cease work for any reason or for no reason at all (Mark Rothstien, Andria Knapp, and Lance Liebman “Cases and Materials on Employment Laws” New York Foundation Press, 1987). (See also: (1) Jay Shepherd, Firing at Will: A Managers Guide (Apress Media, 2011) pages 3 and 4, and (2) Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will (1984) 57 University of Chicago Law Review 947). The California Supreme Court in the case of Guz V. Bechtel National, Inc (2000) 100 Cal Rptr. 2d 352, 24 Cal. 4th 317, 8 P.3d 1089 explained the concept of employers rights under the at-will employment doctrine when the Court stated that “an employer may terminate its employees at will, for any or no reason, from which the employer may act peremptorily, arbitrarily, or inconsistently, without providing specific protections such as prior warning, fair procedures, objective evaluation, or preferential reassignment. The mere existence of an employment relationship affords to expectation, protectable by law, that employment will continue, or will end only on certain conditions, unless the parties have actually adopted such terms”. Mission Essential Personnel Company is Headquartered in the State of Ohio and publically holds itself out as an “At-Will Employer” and publishes an “At-Will Employment” statement on its Employment Applications from which Mission Essential Personnel Company publically holds out that it may discharge an Employee at any time and for any reason or no reason at all (see: missionessetial). Likewise, neither the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan, Mission Essential Personnel Company, or the Appellant and Petitioner herein, has alleged that the Appellant and Petitioner was anything other than an “At-Will Employee” of Mission Essential Personnel Company. As such, it is indisputably evident that the Appellant and Petitioner was an “At-Will Employee” of Mission Essential Personnel Company that was free to resign, quit, or otherwise cease work with or from Mission Essential Personnel Company at any time and for any reason or for no reason at all (see: [unemployment compensation manual] uchelp/manual/voluntary.htm). Insofar as Mission Essential Personnel Company is an “At-Will Employer” and the Appellant and Petitioner was an “At-Will Employee” of Mission Essential Personnel Company, the classification of the Appellant and Petitioner termination of employment with or from Mission Essential Personnel Company as a “Termination of Employment” is one of pure semantics. The word “Termination” as it is applicable to this matter means “the action of bringing something or coming to an end”. It is undisputed that the Appellant and Petitioner employment with Mission Essential Personnel Company was “Terminated”. What is disputed is by whom such employment was terminated thereby and for what reason thereof. The United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan has blindly accepted the assertion of Mission Essential Personnel Company that Mission Essential Personnel Company has Terminated the Employment of the Appellant and Petitioner for the reason of “Job Abandonment”. As such, the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan, in a manner that can only be described as Summary and Ex-Parte, Revoked the Appellant and Petitioner Status as an Afghanistan Special Immigrant on the grounds that a Termination of Employment for Job Abandonment evidenced a failure to provide Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government in Afghanistan. In contrast, the Appellant and Petitioner asserts that he was NOT terminated from his employment with or from Mission Essential Personnel Company because as a matter of law and fact the Appellant and Petitioner (as an At-Will Employee) RESIGNED (Constructive Quit) his employment with and from Mission Essential Personnel in the first instance, and as such, Mission Essential Personnel Company falsified it employment records thereof and misrepresented to the United States Chief of Mission (in criminal violation of 18 USC 1001) the true facts and circumstances of the Appellant and Petitioner termination of employment with and from Mission Essential Personnel Company, and as such, the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan, erroneously Revoked the Appellant and Petitioner Status as an Afghanistan Special Immigrant. As above-mentioned, on [DATE] the Appellant and Respondent notified his United States Military Chain of Command (Senior Supervisor) of the threat to his safety and security that was communicated to him by his family members in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and that he would not be returning to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan when the “mission” was complete and the unit redeployed back to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and would instead remain in the Republic of Poland and request protection from the Republic of Poland in the form of Temporary Asylum and protection from the United Nations High Commissioner (UNHCR) in the form of bestowment of the Status of a Refugee and eventually the hope of a third-country resettlement in the United States on account of his United States Government Affiliations. It was on this date that the Appellant and Petitioner tendered his “Notice of Resignation” with an effective date of resignation being [DATE]. On [DATE] the Appellant and Petitioner effected his Voluntary Resignation from Mission Essential Personnel Company when he remained in the Republic of Poland while his supporting military unit redeployed back to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. While it can be argued to infinity and nausea between the parties as to who quit or who was fired, or perhaps both, what is indisputable and irrefutable is the dates of the parties activities. Once again - On [DATE] the Appellant and Respondent notified his United States Military Chain of Command (Senior Supervisor) that he would not be returning to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan when the “mission” was complete and the unit redeployed back to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and on [DATE] the Appellant and Petitioner remained in the Republic of Poland while his supporting military unit redeployed back to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. On [DATE] Mission Essential Personnel Company determined that the Appellant and Petitioner action to remain in the Republic of Poland and to refuse to return to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan constituted “Job Abandonment” and thereafter Mission Essential Personnel Company entered into their employment records thereof that Mission Essential Personnel Company had Terminated the Employment of the Appellant and Petitioner for the reason of Job Abandonment. The Unemployment Compensation Manual (uchelp/manual/voluntary.htm) recognizes that a voluntary resignation can be effected through a “Constructive Quit” which is effectively stated as a “No-Call and No-Show” which is precisely what Mission Essential Personnel Company is alleging to have occurred in this matter. Such is also amply set forth in the Judicial Decisions and Administrative Regulations of the several states insofar as the eligibility for unemployment compensation is intended for cases in which the claimant has alleged that their employment termination was involuntary, for from the employers perspective, an employee, or more proper, former employee, would not be entitled to unemployment compensation in cases where the employee voluntary resigned from their employment therewith (see: California Department of Employment Development – Benefit Determination Guide, Section VQ 440, “Voluntary Quit”). The Texas Workforce Commission has adopted the definition of “JOB ABANDONMENT” through citation to Texas Workforce Commission Appeal Cases No. 97-004610-10-042497, VL 135.05(6); Appeal No. 1197-CA-71, VL 450.02(2); Appeal No. MR-86-2479-10-020687, MC 90.00; and Appeal No. 764254-2, MC 135.05 (cross-listed at VL 135.05). In these cases the Administrative Law Judge found that “the concept of job abandonment is generally defined by each company in its employee handbook. The basic idea is to set a limit for the number of days an employee can be completely out of contact with the company, beyond which the company will presume that the employee has decided not to return to work at all. Most companies define job abandonment as absence without notice for three or more days in a row. Such work separations are generally considered voluntary, although TWC may view certain job abandonment-caused work separations as involuntary, depending upon how the claimant and employer explain their respective positions and on what the facts show” (emphasis ours). Thus the Texas workforce Commission has found that a “Job Abandonment” is generally presumed to be a voluntary decision by the [employee] to not return to work, and as such, the TWC for the purpose of determining eligibility for unemployment compensation has determined that a “job abandonment” is actually a voluntary resignation from the employer’s employment therewith, and as such, the claimant who abandoned their job actually voluntarily resigned from such employment thereof and is ineligible for unemployment compensation as a result thereof, except in extraordinary cases in which the claimant has established through the presentation of a claim and evidence that such job abandonment was actually an involuntary employment discharge. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the case of Cruz V. D.C. Department of Employment Services (DC 1993) 741 A.2d 1048 held that the Claimants “conduct in the form of no-call and no-show for three consecutive days constituted “job abandonment” which connotes a voluntary decision to quit. An employee’s departure from a job is voluntary if the departure is not compelled by the employer”… “Because the Claimant voluntary left his job with Employer, the Claimant is not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits” (emphasis ours). Virtually all of the Several States of the Union have Statutorily, Administratively, or Judicially adopted for the purposes of determining eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits the concept that a “job abandonment”, except in the most extraordinary cases, is a voluntary resignation or as otherwise stated as “constructive quit”. When stated in the terms of a “constructive quit” it has been held that an Employee may “constructively quit” if the person does not act as if they are still employed with the employer thereof, even if the person has not expressly quit. In colloquial English such would be referred to as he/she “as good as quit”. The classic example of this is the “no-call & no-show”. Common sense would dictate that a person who has a job shows up for work, or at least calls in. While someone who has quit their employment does not show up or call. Thus, a person who does not show up for work or call in, by and through their actions (or lack thereof) is considered to have quit their employment with the employer thereof, at least insofar as such actions (or a lack thereof) is imputed to have the same force and effect of such words and actions thereof. In this regard, the California Court of Appeals in the Case of Steinberg V. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 582 set forth the elements that must be present to establish a “constructive quit”… (1) the Claimant voluntary committed an act, (2) which made it impossible for the employer to use the Claimants services, and (3) the Claimant knew or reasonably should have known that the act would possibly result in loss of employment. (see also: Turner V. Anheuser-Busch, Inc (1994) 7 Cal 4th 1238 which discussed and compared and contrasted Constructive Discharge and Constructive Quit). The undisputed facts and circumstances clearly established the elements of a constructive quit in this matter, to which is a “voluntary resignation” thereof. First, the Appellant and Petitioner voluntarily committed an act, that being (1) proving verbal notice that the Appellant and Petitioner would not be returning from the Republic of Poland to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and (2) the Appellant and Petitioner did not return from the Republic of Poland to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan when the military unit(s) in which he was supporting redeployed therefrom and thereto. Second, it is and/or would have been impossible for Mission Essential Personnel Company to continue to utilize the Appellant and Petitioners services while the Appellant and Petitioner remained in the Republic of Poland. Third, the Appellant and Petitioner unequivocally known or should have reasonably known that his action in remaining in the Republic of Poland while his supported military unit(s) redeployed to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Likewise, the concept of a “job abandonment” as actually constituting a voluntary resignation (quit) is not particularly unique to the United States, but is even well established in Canada and the rest of the Commonwealth. The British Columbia Court of Queen’s Bench and Appeals in the case of Beggs V. Westport Foods LTD (CanLII) 2011 BCCA 76 held that “To constitute a voluntary resignation, the employee must take a “clear and unequivocal” act to terminate the employment relationship. In determining whether an employee had resigned their employment, the court applies a subjective and an objective test. Subjectively, did the employee intend to resign, and when objectively viewing all the circumstances, whether a reasonable person would have understood from the employees actions and words expressed, at the time, or shortly following thereafter, that the employee had resigned”. In this matter, the Appellant and Petitioner satisfied both the subjective and objective tests. First, subjectively, the Appellant and Petitioner stated his intent to resign from Mission Essential Personnel Company when he stated to his Military Chain of Command (Senior Supervisor) that he intended to remain in the Republic of Poland when his supporting military unit(s) redeployed back to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Second, objectively, the Appellant and Petitioner remained in the Republic of Poland when his supporting military unit(s) redeployed from the Republic of Poland to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Clearly then, under the Commonwealth Test the Appellant and Petitioner voluntarily resigned (QUIT) his employment with and from Mission Essential Personnel Company rather than being involuntarily separated (FIRED) from his employment with and from Mission Essential Personnel Company. Similarly, the California Code of Administrative Regulations in Title 22, Section 125601(d) in Subsection (4) provides in pertinent part; “In the following situations the employee is the moving party in terminating the employment and thus the employee has voluntarily left his or her employment… The employee leaves work prior to the effective date of a discharge and is not paid beyond the last day actually worked. Likewise, the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board in case number “P-B-37” held that “When no option for early leaving is offered and the claimant leaves work without permission prior to the effective date previously scheduled for discharge or layoff, the separation is a voluntary quit”. Clearly then, under any rubric considered in this matter, the Appellant and Petitioner voluntarily, deliberately, and/or constructively “QUIT” (Resigned) his employment with and from Mission Essential Personnel Company, and Mission Essential Personnel Company DID NOT legitimately Discharge (Terminate) the Appellant and Petitioner employment therewith and therefrom. In other terms/words, the Appellant and Petitioner QUIT his employment with and from Mission Essential Personnel Company rather than being FIRED from his employment with Mission Essential Personnel Company, and Mission Essential Personnel Company in this matter falsely and maliciously (as contrasted from mistakenly) stated to the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan that Mission Essential Personnel Company FIRED the Appellant and Petitioner for “Job Abandonment” (which implies “misconduct” and by implication thereof, the failure to provide Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government in Afghanistan), when as a matter of law, fact, and under the totality of the circumstances, the Appellant and Petitioner Voluntary Resigned (QUIT) his employment with and from Mission Essential Personnel Company. Furthermore, notwithstanding that the Appellant and Petitioner tendered his Notice of Resignation and/or his unequivocal intention to remain in the Republic of Poland when his supporting military unit(s) redeployed back to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Appellant and Petitioner delayed the actual execution of his resignation thereof until such time as the mission of his supported military unit(s) was completed. This is irrefutable evidence that the Appellant and Petitioner balanced the equally competing requirements of his own personal safety and security and that of his expectations of Employment on behalf of the United States Government (via Mission Essential Personnel Company) and Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government. In this regard the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan has previously determined that the Appellant and Petitioner satisfied all of the eligibility and qualification requirements of the Special Immigrant Visa Program and bestowed upon the Appellant and Petitioner the Status of an Afghanistan Special Immigrant. But to belabor the point, it is undeniable that the Appellant and Petitioner was employed by or on behalf of the United States Government in Afghanistan from [DATE] to [DATE] for a combined total tine of Employment by or on behalf of the United States Government consisting of [X] Years, [X] Months, and [X] days. Likewise, the Appellant and Petitioner provided Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government in Afghanistan from the very beginning to the very conclusion of his employment by or on behalf of the United States Government in Afghanistan as evidenced by the Appellant and Petitioner numerous Letters of Recommendation, Positive Evaluations, Award Certificates, and Statements in Support of the Appellant and Petitioner. More so, the Appellant and Petitioner Military Chain of Command (Senior Supervisor) and the entirety of the leadership and rank and file of the United States Armed Forces Unit(s) from which the Appellant and Petitioner supported during his final mission (Republic of Poland Deployment in support of the Afghanistan National Security Forces Training and Development) has expressed their commendation and appreciation of the Appellant and Petitioner service thereto and have found the Appellant and Petitioner employment and service to have been in accord with the tradition and standards expected in the military service and have urged the United States Chief of Mission to Afghanistan to reverse and set-aside the decision of the United States Chief of Mission that is at issue in this matter and to reinstate the Appellant and Petitioner Status as an Afghanistan Special Immigrant. Insofar as the Appellant and Petitioner “At-Will Employment” Termination (Resignation) is and was an employment action that is not pertinent, relevant, or material, to the determination of the Appellant and Petitioner Faithful and Valuable Service to the United States Government in Afghanistan, the decision of the United States Chief of Mission that is at issue in this matter to Revoke the Appellant and Petitioner Status as an Afghanistan Special Immigrant was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not supported by substantial evidence, and/or was otherwise not made in accordance with law, from which in rebuttal thereof, the Appellant and Petitioner herein has set forth sufficient law and facts to support that such decision that is at issue in this matter was made in error and that such decision thereof that is at issue in this matter should be reversed, set-aside, and vacated, and that the Appellant and Petitioner Status as an Afghanistan Special Immigrant should be reinstated.
Posted on: Sat, 16 Aug 2014 21:35:24 +0000