Pakistan, a product of post-World War II political dynamics, was sucked into the geopolitical whirlpool soon after it was formed. Its strategic imperative after independence was its survival as a nation; this got challenged in 1947 by the first of the four wars that Pakistan and India have fought as neighbours. Chastened by such early threats to its security the country saw no other choice but to seek an umbrella of protection that could ensure its survival. This came from the US which by then had created an alliance of nations against the brewing threat of the Soviet Union and its allies. Pakistan and the US cohabited a world of limited mutual interests in a relationship defined more by each nation’s strategic interests. This has alternately been called a ‘transactional’ or an ‘incidental’ relationship. When in 1979 the Soviet Union marched into Afghanistan, the US used Pakistan to blunt Soviet control of that nation as well as deter it from any further advance. The cold war folded in 1989 soon after the Afghan war came to an end and the Soviet Union disintegrated. That ushered in the era of the non-state player. Post 9/11, the US again moved into the region in pursuit of Al–Qaeda – needing Pakistan’s support again. Post 1989, it has been only such incidental determination that underwrote periods when both Pakistan and the US were forced to intimately reacquaint with each other. Most of that work too is now over as Afghanistan settles downs to a semblance of normalcy. As the final moments of US’ expedition to Afghanistan are being played out, there is a distinct possibility that the US-Pakistan relationship will draw back into its default position of ‘distant interest’. Pakistan’s nuclear programme, and this nation’s unfortunate slide into extremism, will still denote a wary American interest but the connotation will be fundamentally negative. Not much positive is expected from such distant interest. It will also squeeze the space out of any transactional possibilities for Islamabad in a relationship that has traditionally been the source of the military strength that Pakistan has acquired over the years. A lack of another ‘incidental’ moment will obviate any ‘transactional’ benefits. That is in the nature of the US-Pakistan relationship. As America recedes in power and its global image seems challenged with the ongoing strife in the Middle East and the situation in Ukraine, it is likely to increasingly rely on cooperative power engagements with global partners willing to fend for its interests, such as the containment of China. America’s alliance with Nato, and within Nato, will be its primary area of focus, lest an assertive Russia under Putin may just begin to gouge out greater influence in what had become an exclusive American precinct. With partners such as Germany which retain critical economic interests with Russia, even Nato’s commitment to fully fill in for America becomes suspect. It must then look beyond, especially in Asia to checkmate a rising China; Australia, Japan and India, along with a supporting cast in the Far East thus gain incidental eminence for the US. Where must Pakistan then focus its own strategic placement in the evolving geopolitical map of the world? With time, the world will increasingly look more like blobs of nations tied into a geographical, cultural and economic similarity. Socio-cultural and religious commonalities can enable an additional bond. Geographical contiguity will be the key to such union. Connectivity within a geographical region will determine how easily trade moves, which again is a factor of proximity. Economic linkages in turn foster political congruence largely determining how geopolitics shapes the new world. That said, there are three regions of larger geostrategic similarities that Pakistan could be a part of; call these three the intersecting circles of geographical contiguity in the larger regions of south, central and west Asia. These three intersecting circles throw up two constants, Pakistan and Afghanistan, both bedevilled by a perpetual state of war against terrorism and both struggling to recover against this perpetuating menace. What is promising is that both nations seem on the anvil of successful recovery against prolonged strife. Peace and order in both can help unlock the great economic potential within the region bringing in widespread progress and prosperity. The first of these, the Economic Cooperation Organisation, constitutes Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and seven other states including the five Central Asian states, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. Outside of the Middle East this remains the most energy-rich region of the world. Similarities of culture and religion add to the affinity, along with other historic commonalities. Through extension from each extremity in the region – Turkey connects to Russia while both Afghanistan and Pakistan have a common border with China – the region is connected to the two key power poles of the emerging world. Russia is the world’s largest gas producer and exporter while China will soon be the largest economy in the world. There isn’t a more potent geographical combination that could synergise its positives to the benefit of cooperative development and progress for a large-sized population inhabiting this geographically linked region. Pakistan must re-energise this linkage to realise its true potential. Iran’s peculiar international status may act as a dampener in the short run, but is certain to change with an increasing probability of a US-Iran rapprochement. West Asia is Pakistan’s real front-yard and a natural playfield. In search of unlikely liaisons, Pakistan has and can continue to ignore this imperative at its peril. For that to happen though, Pakistan must notionally distance itself from the Middle East construct. We must also understand that the space offered us by US’ ‘distant interest’ policy must be exploited to chart more fruitful associations which are likely to sustain because of their inherent naturalness. Saarc is the other regional association that could offer Pakistan a useful linkage. However, it stands stunted by the inimical India-Pakistan factor. As much as the region seems similar it is equally beset with social and cultural dissimilarities. If Saarc blossoms on the back of some understanding between its two major partners, it can also benefit the ECO; if not, it is better to let the dynamics of the region dictate Saarc’s pace. On the east of Pakistan begins Pakistan’s backyard – not in the politico-security sense but more in the ways of seeking promise of a better social and economic future. It is best to let it lie as such till India can resolve the contradictions of its own strategic objectives and inherent capacities. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is the third regional affinity that holds significant political and economic promise for Pakistan. We must work to regularise our membership of the forum and add to our primary focus of reenergising the ECO. If Pakistan were to focus its diplomacy in the direction of working these three circles of prosperity and socio-economic engagement not only will it meet unmatched prosperity, such affiliation will also give it much greater geopolitical relevance for the rest of the world. To break into newer horizons, the stunted and stagnated older moulds first need to be shattered. While relations with the US will remain important they alone must not drive Pakistan’s strategic future. Neither should an overwhelming concern with India. Pakistan’s future lies to the immediate west of it. The writer is a retired air-vice marshal of the Pakistan Air Force and served as its deputy chief of staff. Email: shhzdchdhry@yahoo
Posted on: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 14:37:15 +0000
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