Peshawar attack puts TTP in an awkward position The attack on All Saints Church happened 4 days ago. dna gets a senior journalist in Pakistan to identify people behind the attack and their motives. The attack on the All Saints Church in Peshawar is a reminder, yet again, of the nature of threat Pakistan is facing. The attack came days after the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz government convened a conference of all the political parties to reach consensus on talking to the self-styled Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, the umbrella organisation that represents the insurgent-terrorist groups that have so far claimed more than 45,000 lives. However, while there was widespread condemnation of the TTP following the attack, the TTP has not claimed responsibility for it. Instead, another group, Jundallah, claimed the attack. Jundallah is loosely affiliated with the TTP, but predates the formation of the Pakistani Taliban, and is considered close to Al Qaeda. The statement by its ‘spokesperson’ Ahmad Marwat said the group will continue to attack foreigners and non-Muslims until the United States stops its drone strikes inside Pakistan. The statement did not differentiate between soft and hard targets, and in any case target identification itself makes clear the group intends to engage soft targets. This rhetoric is closer to the AQ creed than to the TTP’s. While the TTP has, for operational reasons, an affiliation with AQ, this linkage is sustained more through groups that work for both sides. The TTP has been dependent on AQ for training, funding and strategising. But increasingly it has also developed its own, independent existence. In some ways, it has the same relationship with AQ in the tribal areas as the Afghan Taliban did with AQ, though TTP’s overall control of its affiliates is much looser than the Afghan Taliban, who had clear command lines in areas under their control. In fact, despite differences, the TTP and its affiliate groups still pledge allegiance to Mullah Omar, even as they have acted, and continue to act, independently of the Afghan Taliban shoora’s advice. Given the talks scenario and the fact that TTP terrorism gained it the space the franchise has been looking for, it would have been a terrible strategic move for it to approve an attack on a church. One of the most important objectives for the TTP and its affiliates in various tribal agencies is to get the government to withdraw troops from the areas that have been captured during various operations. This is the only way the TTP can regain the physical space it has lost. It is relying heavily on a confused narrative as well as fatigue among the people to get this done. An attack of this type can make it lose its hard-won gains by turning the public opinion around. There’s a precedent for it. The speech Sufi Mohammad made after the deal in Swat and the video that showed the Taliban flogging a woman turned the tide against a deal and made way for the 2009 military operation in Malakand. The TTP would not want a repeat of that. But the attack has happened and it puts the TTP in an awkward situation. It remained quiet for a while, and then said that it has nothing to do with Jundallah. It does not want to own Jundallah’s atrocity. But equally, that is unlikely to be enough. Would it condemn the attack? That’s unlikely too. Jundallah and AQ are still important for the TTP’s operations. And if the franchise HQ is seen to condemn one of its affiliate groups, however distant, it could result in a broader loss of the TTP’s authority, already tenuous outside the tribal areas. So, how can it wiggle out of this situation? This is where the government must step in with a clear warning: the talks are off unless the perpetrators of the church attack are given up. If talks are important for the TTP, it should be able to quietly provide intelligence to the government on the group responsible for this heinous act. It will all depend on how the government plays this and whether it has assessed correctly the TTP’s desire to talk and get some political mileage out of it. Finally, the message the government must send out to the TTP should be that while it (the government) wants to resolve this issue, as is also determined by the resolution of the political parties’ conference, it has zero tolerance for such actions and will resort to use of force if the TTP cannot leash its affiliates. The government will have to signal strength and resolve, not confusion and weakness. The church attack and before that the killing of army personnel, including a major general, has already created a different mood within the army which had reluctantly gone along with the politicians. In other words, while the attack has put the TTP in a difficult situation, it has also put the prime minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, in a near-impossible one. If the TTP wants talks, it will now have to help Sharif sell the idea.
Posted on: Fri, 27 Sep 2013 02:59:11 +0000
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