Professor Loren B Landau, ACMSs South African Research Chair of Mobility and the Politics of Difference, answers some questions on the recent xenophobic attacks: Q: What triggered the recent looting of foreign-owned spaza shops in Soweto, Kagiso and now also in Langlaagte and Alexandra? A: This is a question that can be taken on many levels, only some of which I can address. In the ACMS’s previous research, we regularly see attacks on foreigners triggered by factors ranging from retribution for a perceived misdeed, political and economic opportunism, or as an extension of broader social demonstrations. As someone who has not visited these specific sites, I am not in a position to outline the events that have led to the violence although some of these factors are clearly at play. Beyond the proximate triggers, we should look at broader enabling factors behind the violence. Here is where more systemic patterns of policing and spatial management intersect with the population’s sense of economic alienation, political exclusion, and a history of scapegoating. Together these form fertile environments: dry grass, if you will, that can be lit by a small spark. So when the government denies that the violence is not caused by xenophobia, they are right. The violence is an effort by individuals or group to achieve a more concrete end: economic advancement, political power or recognition, or a sense of social or criminal justice. That is the spark. However, without a long standing political discourse which demonizes outsiders – foreigners and domestic migrants – it is unlikely that the violence would take the form it does or blaze so bright. That the police so rarely investigate or prosecute those behind these attacks only furthers the incentives. Q: Why are authorities so reluctant to label the events xenophobia? A: Only the authorities can truly answer this question and their answers will vary tremendously given their respective positions. Based on my observations, officials’ reluctance ranges from questions of practicality to those of maintaining an entrenched political narrative and order. On the practical side, the police may well wish to draw attention to the criminal aspect of these acts as xenophobia is not a crime nor something they feel they can investigate. Indeed, for better or worse, much of the government’s efforts to address this unrest has been framed as an issue of law and order and this has enabled the police and the military to respond with great force and speed. Some may genuinely see it that way – that this is nothing but petty criminals – but I sense there is more at stake. Accepting that the poor black population is angry, differentiated, discriminatory, and organised represents a visible threat to the ANC and its political project. Rather than a unified and inclusive citizenry that continues to struggle against the legacy of white oppression, we see a black population that is willing to turn on foreigners and other South African ‘outsiders’ in ways that rejects the party’s political legitimacy and promises. Q: What measures have been undertaken to fight xenophobia since the 2008 violence? Why do these flareups keep recurring? A: There is a long list of activities that the government and others have undertaken since 2008 – and indeed some started before then. A good number of these failed because they were never completed or adequately implemented. This includes, for example, the National Action Plan against Racism, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance which S.A. committed to at the 2001 World Racism Conference in Durban. Or the regular social cohesion summits that were supposed to take place. And the independent investigation into the 2008 attacks. That list goes on and on. What is more worrying is the programmes that have been initiated and how they have sought to address the issues. In some instances I fear these have made things worse rather than better. Let me begin with policing. By framing xenophobia as an issue that can be addressed through basic public order policing, the government has deflected attention away from the often overtly political and economic aspects of this work. In many instances, the violence is an effort to establish political or economic dominance in an area yet by only arresting the looters, the actors behind the scenes get off scot free. Many of those who gained power and resources in 2008 are, in fact, still in a relatively privileged position. Where the government and others have sought to address ‘root causes’, they have relied on the reconciliation model used during the country’s transition: by talking things out we can come to understand each other, build tolerance, and potentially forgive past trespasses. This may work in some instances, but it roots violence in people’s attitudes, not in their immediate interests. While changed attitudes may be a hurdle to future mobilization, such changes will take generations and cannot address the local actors orchestrating the attacks. Moreover, those involved in the attacks often do not participate in education and awareness programmes. That discussions of social cohesion – in which the government has located xenophobia – now so regularly exclude questions of xenophobia doesn’t help. Until the government is willing to expose the ill-behaviour of business people, police, and political leaders in many parties (including the ANC), these efforts will come to little. A: Is the notion of xenophobia an adequate term to describe the current events and the violence of 2008 given that the majority of the people targeted were non-nationals from other African counties (and in a few cases migrants from countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan)? Some scholars such as Pumla Dineo Gqola and David Matsinhe have suggested negrophobia as an alternative term for the 2008 attacks. Would you agree with this label? Q: Allow me to try to answer these two questions together. Any single term is unlikely to capture the full range of motivations and interests that bolster the repeated patterns of violence. However, xenophobia in its broadest definition – a fear or resentment against outsiders – is an important ingredient in much of the mobilization. While foreigners – and specific foreigners – have been the most visible targets, similar violence has been meted out against South Africans from the wrong place, village or group. In some instances these have been South Africans of Asian descent who were called Kwerekweres and told to go ‘home’. In many more instances, however, it is other black South Africans who are seen as economically, politically, or socially threatening . In all these cases, people are seen as less entitled to resources – jobs, houses, services, women – because they are not locals. So, is this negrophobia? As noted, a suite of factors motivates or enables each of the attacks. These include anti-outsider discourses aimed at people because they are black and because they are foreign. In this sense, negrophobia captures an important element. That said, assertions of negrophobia do us a disservice. For one, it shrouds the range of anti-outsider activity occurring, activities not limited to ‘blacks’: it is aimed at spatially proximate outsiders who get labelled – for whatever reason – as outsiders. Sure, there have yet to be anti-white attacks. Some cite this as evidence of Afrophobia. However, the absence of attacks is not the same as evidence against anti-white resentment or a willingness to do harm. If whites ran shops in townships, occupied RDP houses, or supported ward level political or social groups in largely black areas in ways that were threatening to the powers that be, violence would likely follow. Second, part of ‘negrophobia’s’ descriptive appeal is it roots the violence in self-hate encouraged by colonialism and apartheid. Such self-hate is real and should be respected. Yet, if we accept this line of argument, we help naturalize and legitimize the hatred. What can we expect, after all?: People were taught self-hate for hundreds of years. Moreover, it ultimately shifts responsibility away from contemporary actors to historical ones. We must not forget past evils, but when hate is mobilized by current leaders — national, local; economic or political — they too must bear responsibility. Q: You have noted that “[m]uch South African debate about xenophobia mistakenly equates it with an overzealous nationalism. While national boundaries serve as a powerful marker of difference, insider/outsider divisions almost equally apply to certain elements of the South African citizenry.” Could you elaborate on these insider/outsider divisions? A: It is easy and convenient to see this as an immigration issue. Doing so, however, hurts us in many ways. For one, it legitimizes a strategy of more stringent migration controls. Given the relatively few foreigners in the country (c. 4%) and the levels of crime and unemployment, getting rid of foreigners would not provide jobs or security but could make matters worse. Secondly, it hides the full level of internal divides that are also present in townships. As suggested above, sometimes violent exclusion against people from specific regions, groups, parties, or even neighbouring townships is widespread. That 1/3 of the people killed in the 2008 attacks were South Africans should be evidence enough that this is not only about fighting perceived demons from beyond the country’s borders.
Posted on: Tue, 27 Jan 2015 09:27:06 +0000
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