*** QUESTIONS for the panel of experts I will be on regarding the topic of counter terrorism strategy. Muslims: check out the [Strategies] section, following [Definition] - last line of paragraph 1. Feel free to donate your 2 cents to any or all of the points listed. :) *** Over a Decade later…What Now? What Next? A Quick-Look Assessment of Terrorism in its Current and Future Manifestation SUGGESTED QUESTIONS Questions [Definition] 1. We typically define that class of activities that the US is engaged in countering as “the use of violence by non-state groups to achieve political aims.” In your view is this the proper way to conceive of this class of activities? Is there general consensus on this among (academics, operators, practitioners, etc.)? a. Would you say that terrorism and violent extremism are synonymous? b. Would you draw a distinction between jihadists, violent extremists and those engaged in asymmetric warfare? [Strategies] 2. Current U.S. National Counterterrorism strategy is articulated as “disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents to ensure the security of our citizens and interests …. [it focuses on] pressuring al-Qa‘ida’s core while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our resilience … this Administration has made it clear that we are not at war with the tactic of terrorism or the religion of Islam. We are at war with a specific organization—al-Qa‘ida.” How would you grade US CT efforts, i.e., how are we doing? Do you think the threat of terrorist attack is less now than it was, 10 years ago? In your view, is this current strategy framed appropriately for what you see as the current threat from terrorism/violent extremism? If so, will it remain appropriate for conditions 3-5 years into the future? a. 6-10 years? 3. Much of U.S. CT efforts have included the notion of “discrediting” AQ and/or extremist ideology. Do you see this as a worthwhile activity in countering terrorism/violent extremism or an infeasible distraction? 4. What broader message has the United States communicated to global publics through its words, deeds, images regarding CT? 5. What does your research/experience suggest might be the most effective strategies for countering terrorism/violent extremism aimed at the U.S. and U.S. interests? a. What types of activities would this entail? 6. How should the US National Strategic objective be defined in this area? For example, should the U.S. be concerned with politically motivated extremism whether it is violent or not? If yes, is this feasible as a security strategy? If no, why not? 7. Which strategies are likely to be the least effective for countering terrorism? 8. Which activities should the U.S. not pursue if the intent is to counter terrorism? 9. Where do you see the gaps in our understanding of terrorism/extremism and the ways to counter it? 10. What if anything would you add (or subtract) from the U.S. core principles -- adhering to U.S. core values, building security partnerships, applying CT tools and capabilities appropriately, building a culture of resilience -- upon which current CT strategy is based? [Root Causes] 11. We are interested in your views on the full range (e.g., political, economic, social, psychological, etc.) of both “root causes” and contributing factors of terrorism/violent extremism. a. What do you see/what has your research suggested as the “root causes” of terrorism /violent extremism (e.g., presence of a repressive government; culture of violence)? b. What do you see/what has your research suggested as the most important contributing factors associated with of terrorism /violent extremism (e.g., youth bulge)? 12. Specifically, how does access or the inability to access public goods like individual and public health, education etc. contribute to terrorist activity and/or the emergence of violent extremism? 13. Specifically, how do threats to economic stability, for example resulting from natural disasters, drought or disease contribute to terrorist activity and/or the emergence of violent extremism? 14. Specifically, how does the rule of law – or failures of the rule of law – contribute terrorist activity and/or the emergence of violent extremism? [Adaptive Nature of Terrorism] 15. To what degree to you see terrorism against the U.S. as constantly adaptive (e.g., is it a strategic adaptation or tactical)? Is it predictable? 16. What are the key features that explain this adaptability (e.g., asymmetries, technological advance, lack of operational doctrine, etc.)? 17. What is not adaptable, i.e., what do you see as the constants (e.g., core grievance, dispersed structure)? [Assessment] 18. How well do you believe we judge the effectiveness of U.S. and allied counter-terror efforts? 19. Given the multitude of potential confounding factors, is it possible to measure the effectiveness of our actions? If so, how should this be done? 20. Can you suggest innovative or particularly effective means of gaining indicators of terrorist threats – either strategic or tactical? (For academics: In other words, is there one thing that you would hope someone is or exploring in this realm?) 21. Is there such a thing as “success” in the context of counter-terrorism? If so, can it be measured incrementally (i.e., other than by a dearth of terrorist attack)? 22. Is it necessary, do you think, to posit a minimum acceptable level of political violence?
Posted on: Mon, 10 Jun 2013 16:03:34 +0000