R. v McIntosh 1995 used the Supreme Courts current interpretation scheme using this Dreidger textbook as a guide; it is done in five steps. This is their guide to interpretation. So for P-6; Step One; After reading the thing in its entire context I figure out what is described as the scheme of the Act... and that is the decisive part. Under my scheme, supported by Blouin v. Longtin et al 1979 and Article 41.1 of the Interpretation Act, Article 2 does not create an offence . The next step is a formality. I read the words of Article 2 in their grammatical and ordinary sense and find that this is in harmony with the intention, object as well as the scheme under which Article 2 does not create an offence, and with that it all ends. I win. That the words in their grammatical and ordinary sense are in harmony with my scheme is important as it confirms that my scheme is correct. These are in harmony with that scheme, as well as the intent and object. The only way they can claim that this scheme is not in harmony with the intent and object of the Act is to claim that a mandatory dispersal order undermines the bylaw, which is a claim not supported by any facts. The Prosecution cannot come up with a scheme that is in harmony with the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words of Article 2. Their scheme cannot properly take care of the entire context like mine can. And with that, they cannot possibly win. These are the five steps of the Supreme Courts interpretation method cited by Justice Lamer in R. v McIntosh 1995. 1. The Act as a whole is to be read in its entire context so as to ascertain the intention of Parliament (the law as expressly or impliedly enacted by the words), the object of the Act (the ends sought to be achieved), and the scheme of the Act (the relation between the individual provisions of the Act). 2. The words of the individual provisions to be applied to the particular case under consideration are then to be read in their grammatical and ordinary sense in the light of the intention of Parliament embodied in the Act as a whole, the object of the Act and the scheme of the Act, and if they are clear and unambiguous and in harmony with that intention, object and scheme and with the general body of the law, that is the end. 3. If the words are apparently obscure or ambiguous, then a meaning that best accords with the intention of Parliament, the object of the Act and the scheme of the Act, but one that the words are reasonably capable of bearing, is to be given them. 4. If, notwithstanding that the words are clear and unambiguous when read in their grammatical and ordinary sense, there is disharmony within the statute, statutes in pari materia, or the general law, then an unordinary meaning that will produce harmony is to be given the words, if they are reasonably capable of bearing that meaning. 5. If obscurity, ambiguity or disharmony cannot be resolved objectively by reference to the intention of Parliament, the object of the Act or the scheme of the Act, then a meaning that appears to be the most reasonable may be selected. [Emphasis added.]
Posted on: Wed, 05 Nov 2014 02:02:34 +0000